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By

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ALL CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO
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CHRISTIAN BAPTISM

JOHN MURRAY

IN THE course of the last three to four centuries it is questionable if any topic in Christian theology can claim as prolific a literary output as the subject of baptism. One reason for this lies at hand. It is the controversy occasioned by the anabaptist rejection of the catholic position and practice. It might seem presumptuous and superfluous to encumber the library of books and pamphlets on the subject of baptism with another study on this theme. But the writer has been constrained to feel that his venture is not a work of supererogation.

Within protestant circles there is at the present time a widespread loss of conviction regarding the propriety and preceptive necessity of infant baptism. Even when the practice still persists, oftentimes there is little more than sentiment and tradition behind it. Such a situation is deplorable. Traditional sentiment can never be pleaded as the proper ground for any element of the worship of the church of God. Divine institution is the only warrant. And when sentiment or custom takes the place of the recognition of divine prescription in any particular that concerns the elements of divine worship, a state of mind is revealed which is altogether alien to the nature of the church and of the worship which it offers to God.

Furthermore, among seriously minded evangelical Christians, whose background and tradition have not been by any means baptist, there is a prevalent doubt as to the Biblical warrant for infant baptism. In this state of mind they are readily susceptible to baptist influence both as respects the insistence upon immersion as the only valid mode and the rejection of infant baptism. The movement away from the established Churches and toward independency has given a great deal of momentum to the tendency to adopt baptistic tenets and practice without necessarily adopting a baptist denomination.

It is with the hope that this study may contribute towards the correction of such evils that it is being offered to the public. While the writer has particularly in view those who are on the margin of abandoning the position taken in this study and of embracing what is in practice, if not in theory, the baptist position, and while it is hoped that many such may be reclaimed to understand that immersion is not necessary to baptism and that infant baptism is the divine institution, yet it is also hoped that this humble attempt may also be instrumental in constraining even baptists to reconsider their position.

The writer knows only too well how persuasive the baptist argument respecting infant baptism can be made to appear and how conclusive it becomes to many earnest and sincere Christians. He knows also how difficult it is to persuade people, whose thinking has been moulded after the baptist pattern, that the argument for infant baptism is Scriptural. But the reason for this is that to think organically of the Scripture revelation is much more difficult than to think atomistically. The argument for infant baptism rests upon the recognition that God's redemptive action and revelation in this world are covenantal. In a word, redemptive action is covenant action and redemptive revelation is covenant revelation. Embedded in this covenantal action of God is the principle that the infant seed of believers are embraced with their parents in the covenant relation and provision. It is this method of God's administration of grace in the world that must be appreciated. It belongs to the New Testament as well as to the Old. It is its presence and significance that grounds infant baptism. And it is the perception of its significance that illumines for us the meaning of this ordinance.

There are certain viewpoints, or at least angles of thought, expressed and sometimes insisted upon which diverge from the judgment of some of the most respected of Reformed writers. In the footnotes I have discussed some of these divergences at greater length. But it did not appear to be in the best interests of the purpose in view to burden the argument proper by expanded discussion of several details. In reference to the argument for infant baptism, in particular, I have tried to emphasize those aspects of the question which

call for greater emphasis and to give the presentation of the evidence a certain direction which, in my judgment, is better calculated to meet certain baptist objections. It has been my purpose to concentrate on what is basic and central, in the hope that the force of the evidence may not be dissipated by what is liable to be the consequence of more diffuse discussion. If these pages which follow minister to the conviction that the positions taken are grounded upon Scripture and enhance appreciation of the grace of God which the institution of baptism evinces, the author will be highly rewarded.

I

The Import of Baptism

The ordinance of baptism with which we are concerned is the ordinance that was instituted by our Lord himself on the eve of his ascension when he gave to his disciples the commission, "Go ye therefore and disciple all the nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you" (Matt. 28:19, 20). Other baptismal rites had preceded this commission. There was the baptism of John the Baptist. But John's baptism is not to be identified with the ordinance instituted by Christ on the eve of his ascension.[1] The character of John's baptism was analogous to

[1] *Cf. contra* John Calvin: *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, IV, xv, 7 and 18; IV, xvi, 27; John Gill: *A Complete Body of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity* (London, 1796), Vol. III, pp. 290 f. Calvin maintains that the baptism of John and that dispensed by the apostles during the ministry of our Lord on earth was the same as that enjoined by our Lord in the great commission. He argues that the baptism of Matthew 28:19, 20 was not the original institution of baptism. His interpretation of Acts 19:1–6 in *Inst.* IV, xv, 18 does not appear to be a tenable one. The element of truth in Calvin's contention for the identity of all three baptisms is sufficiently guarded by the interpretation which the present writer presents above. *Cf.* Edward Williams: *Antipaedobaptism Examined*, *Works* (London, 1862), Vol. II, pp. 67 ff.; N. B. Stonehouse: "The Gift of the Holy Spirit" in *The Westminster Theological Journal*, November, 1950 (Vol. XIII, No. 1), p. 13, n. 12. Dr. Stonehouse takes the position that "specifically Christian baptism began only with the establishment of the Christian church fol-

the character of his ministry. John prepared the way of the Lord and his ministry was preparatory, transitional, and introductive. So was his baptism. We may no more identify the baptism of John with the ordinance instituted by Christ than we may identify the ministry and mission of John with the ministry and mission of Christ. Hence we cannot derive from the nature of John's baptism the precise import of the ordinance of Christian baptism.

There was also the baptism that accompanied the ministry of Jesus prior to his death and resurrection (John 3:22, 26; 4:1, 2). These are the only references to this baptismal rite, which was actually performed not by Jesus himself but by his disciples (John 4:2). What its significance was it is difficult to say. We should be justified in inferring that it stood in a closer relationship to the ordinance instituted just before the ascension than did the baptism of John. It apparently indicated rather markedly the acceptance of Jesus as the Messiah and, in that sense, the discipleship of Jesus rather than that of John, a discipleship which John himself recognised as the only proper result of his own ministry and a discipleship urgently enjoined by John when he said, "He that hath the bride is the bridegroom: but the friend of the bridegroom, which standeth and heareth him, rejoiceth greatly because of the bridegroom's voice: this my joy therefore is fulfilled. He must increase, but I must decrease" (John 3:29, 30). Yet we do not have warrant by which to identify this baptism during Jesus' earthly ministry with the ordinance of Matthew 28:19, 20. The latter is baptism in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. We have no warrant to suppose that the earlier rite took this form. It is quite reasonable to believe that there was a very close relation between these

lowing the exaltation of Christ". He also thinks, however, that "the baptism by the disciples of Jesus mentioned in John 4:1 ff. may best be understood as a continuation of John's baptism". Although the question as to whether the baptism by Jesus' disciples aligns itself more closely with John's baptism rather than with Christian baptism is not of great importance, I am disposed to think that the baptism by Jesus' disciples points more in the direction of the significance of Christian baptism than does the baptism of John. The reason for this judgment is given in the next paragraph.

two rites both in the mind of Jesus himself and in the recognition of the disciples. Indeed, so close may have been the relation that baptism in the name of the triune God was the necessary development of the earlier rite. But we are compelled to recognise the distinctiveness of the rite enunciated and embodied in the great commission. It is from the terms of this institution and from subsequent references in the New Testament that we are to derive the precise import of this ordinance.

We are liable to be misled by the nature of the ordinance, as one of washing with water, into thinking that the basic import is that of purification. However important that element is and even though it is included in the import of baptism, it does not appear to be the most central or basic element. We must take our point of departure from the very formula which Jesus used in the institution, "baptising them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 28:19). It is this notion of "baptising into" that must be appreciated and analysed. This formula appears in other connections, as, for example, "baptised into Moses" (I Cor. 10:2) and "baptised into the name of Paul" (I Cor. 1:13). It is apparent that it expresses a relationship to the person into whom or into whose name persons may have been baptised. It is this fact of relationship that is basic. Hence we have to ask the question: what kind of relationship?

It is here that some of the most relevant references in the New Testament afford us light and direction. Such passages as Romans 6:3–6; I Corinthians 12:13; Galatians 3:27,28; Colossians 2:11, 12 plainly indicate that union with Christ is the governing idea. Baptism signifies union with Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection. It is because believers are united to Christ in the efficacy of his death, in the power of his resurrection, and in the fellowship of his grace that they are one body. They are united to Christ and therefore to one another. Of this union baptism is the sign and seal. The relationship which baptism signifies is therefore that of union, and union with Christ is its basic and central import.[2]

[2] The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Catechisms reflect a fine insight in this regard; *cf.* Confession of Faith, Chapter XXVIII, Sec-

We must bear in mind, however, that the formula which our Lord used in the institution of this ordinance is more inclusive than that of union with himself. Baptism is into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. It means therefore that a relation of union to the three persons of the Godhead is thereby signified. This is entirely consonant with the teaching of our Lord elsewhere regarding the union that is established by faith in him. It is not only union with himself but also with the Father and the Holy Spirit (*cf.* John 14:16, 17, 23; 17:21–23). Consequently baptism, by the very words of institution, signifies union with the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, and this means with the three persons of the trinity, both in the unity expressed by their joint possession of the one name and in the richness of the distinctive relationship which each person of the Godhead sustains to the people of God in the economy of the covenant of grace.

As was indicated above, we may not, however, exclude from the import of baptism the notion of purification. Baptism is dispensed by the application of water in a way that is expressive of cleansing. And it would be unreasonable to suppose that this action bears no analogy to that which is

tion I; Larger Catechism, Question 165; Shorter Catechism, Question 94. The Shorter Catechism says with its characteristic brevity and clarity, "Baptism is a sacrament, wherein the washing with water, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, doth signify and seal our ingrafting into Christ, and partaking of the benefits of the covenant of grace, and our engagement to be the Lord's". Calvin in his excellent discussion in *Inst.* IV, xv and xvi does not place this aspect of the import of baptism in the forefront but rather the purgation of sin in the blood of Christ and the mortification of the flesh in regeneration; *cf. Inst.* IV, xvi, 2. Yet this element is by no means absent. He lists it as the third advantage which our faith receives from baptism; *cf. Inst.* IV, xv, 1–6.

Pierre Ch. Marcel, most recently, in his able treatment of the subject of baptism says: "Le baptême représente, figure et signifie la purification; la cène représente, figure et signifie la nourriture spirituelle" (*La Revue Réformée*, Oct., 1950, "Le Baptême, Sacrement de L'Alliance de Grace", p. 21). Later on in this dissertation, however, Marcel develops quite fully the concept of union with Christ as the principal element in baptism (see pp. 106 ff.). He says: "Nous sommes vraiment incorporés au corps de Christ quand sa mort montre en nous son fruit. Cette communion, cette conformité en sa mort est l'élément principal du baptême, où nous est figuré non seulement notre purification, mais aussi notre mise à mort et la destruction du vieil homme" (*ibid.*, p. 109).

signified by it. There are two respects in which cleansing or purification takes place at the inception of the relationship which is signified and sealed by baptism, namely, purification from the defilement and purification from the guilt of sin.

There does not appear to be in the New Testament any passage which expressly says that baptism represents purification from the defilement of sin, that is to say, regeneration. But since baptism is washing with water, since it involves a religious use of water, and since regeneration is expressed elsewhere in terms of washing (John 3:5; Titus 3:5; I Cor. 6:11), it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape the conclusion that this washing with water involved in baptism represents that indispensable purification which is presupposed in union with Christ and without which no one can enter into the kingdom of God. There is also the consideration that baptism is the circumcision of the New Testament (Col. 2:11, 12). Circumcision, without doubt, symbolised purification from defilement. We should infer that baptism does also.

In reference to the other respect in which purification applies to the import of baptism there need be no question: it represents purification from the guilt of sin. Earlier it was maintained that the baptism of John and Christian baptism must not be identified. It does not follow that there is no similarity in respect of import. Both rites involved washing with water and we must therefore discover some element that will apply to both. John's baptism did have reference to the forgiveness of sins (Matt. 3:6; Mark 1:4; Luke 3:3). We should expect that such a reference could not be excluded from the import of Christian baptism. Such an expectation is confirmed by express intimation in other passages; Christian baptism stands in a similar relation to the remission of sins (Acts 2:38; 22:16; I Pet. 3:21). We may therefore conclude that baptism represents the remission of sin or, in other words, purification from the guilt of sin by the sprinkling of the blood of Christ.

We may say then that baptism signifies union with Christ in the virtue of his death and the power of his resurrection, purification from the defilement of sin by the renewing grace of the Holy Spirit, and purification from the guilt of sin by the sprinkling of the blood of Christ. The emphasis must be placed, however, upon union with Christ. It is this that is

central, and it is this notion that appears more explicitly and pervasively than any other. Hence our view of baptism must be governed by this concept. Anything less than that kind of union expressed in the formula of institution will provide too restricted a conception and will distort our view of what is exhibited and sealed by this ordinance.

II

The Mode of Baptism

Baptism signifies and seals union with Christ and cleansing from the pollution and guilt of sin. The central import is that of union with Christ, ingrafting into him, and partaking of the benefits of the covenant of grace. In reference to the mode of baptism the question is whether a particular method of applying water or of relating the person to water is of the essence of the symbolism.[3] The Baptist contention is that the mode is of the essence of the symbolism and that, since to baptise means to immerse, baptism is not properly administered by any other mode. The Baptist argument rests mainly upon two contentions: (1) that βαπτίζω means to immerse[4] and (2) that passages like Romans 6:3–6 and Colossians 2:11, 12 plainly imply that the death and resurrection of Christ provide us with the pattern for immersion in, and emergence from, the water.[5]

We may now proceed to examine these two arguments.

[3] *Cf.* James Bannerman: *The Church of Christ* (Edinburgh, 1868), Vol. II, p. 123.

[4] *Cf.* Alexander Carson: *Baptism in its Modes and Subjects* (Philadelphia, 1845), p. 19; A. H. Strong: *Systematic Theology* (Philadelphia, 1909), Vol. III, p. 993. Carson says, "BAPTO has two meanings; *baptizo* in the whole history of the Greek language has but one. It not only signifies to dip or immerse, but it never has any other meaning." Strong says, "This is immersion, and immersion only". *Cf.* also John Gill: *op. cit.*, pp. 307 ff.; Abraham Booth: *Paedobaptism Examined* (London, 1829), Vol. I, pp. 40–131.

[5] *Cf.* Alexander Carson: *op. cit.*, pp. 142 ff.; A. H. Strong: *op. cit.*, pp. 940 ff.; John Gill: *op. cit.*, p. 310; Abraham Booth: *op. cit.*, pp. 162 ff. For a statement and criticism of the Baptist position *cf.* Robert Wilson: *Infant Baptism a Scriptural Service, and Dipping Unnecessary to its Right Administration* (London, 1848), pp. 286 ff.

A. *The Meaning of βαπτίζω*

The Old Testament. In the Septuagint[6] *βαπτίζω* occurs very infrequently (II Kings 5:14; Isa. 21:4). In Isaiah 21:4 it is used in a figurative sense to translate the Hebrew word בעת which means to terrify, startle, or fall upon. It would appear that nothing very determinative regarding the precise import of *βαπτίζω* can be derived from this instance. In II Kings 5:14 the reference is to Naaman's baptising of himself seven times in Jordan, and *βαπτίζω* translates the Hebrew word טבל. It is the word *βάπτω* which occurs most frequently in the Septuagint, occurring some seventeen times. In most of these instances it translates the Hebrew word טבל just as *βαπτίζω* does in II Kings 5:14. טבל means to dip or be moist with. In Leviticus 11:32 *βάπτω* translates the Hebrew word בוא and no doubt refers to immersion — the articles concerned are put into water. In Psalm 68:23(24) *βάπτω* translates the Hebrew word מחץ which means to smite through. But the Greek seems to convey a different idea, one akin to that of the Hebrew word טבל.

There need be no question then that טבל means to dip and so also does *βάπτω* which is the Greek rendering. Furthermore, that *βάπτω* may also sometimes refer to immersion there need be no question. This appears in Leviticus 11:32. The question is whether טבל and *βάπτω* *necessarily* refer to immersion and that they therefore mean to immerse. It can readily be shown that טבל and *βάπτω* do not *mean* immersion. That is to say, the dipping denoted by טבל and

[6] In the discussion which follows account is taken simply of instances appearing in the canonical books of the Old Testament. Furthermore, it is not deemed necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of each instance of *βάπτω* and *βαπτίζω*. The purpose of our discussion is simply to show that *βάπτω* in the usage of the LXX does not mean immersion and that it cannot be shown that *βαπτίζω* means immersion. It is not forgotten, of course, that as able an immersionist as Alexander Carson allows that *βάπτω* does not always mean to dip but that it also has a secondary and derived meaning, namely, to dye (*cf. op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff.). Other immersionists, however, do not concede as much as Carson. In any case it is well to review the Old Testament usage in reference to *βάπτω*. This provides a necessary and suitable introduction to the New Testament usage in reference to *βαπτίζω* and its cognates. For discussion of Isaiah 21:4 *cf.* Robert Wilson: *op. cit.*, pp. 178 f., 267 ff.

βάπτω is not always to be equated with immersion. This fact that dipping is not equivalent to immersion needs to be stressed at the outset. Far too often in anti-baptist discussions this fact is overlooked and a good deal of unnecessary argumentation arises from the oversight.

In Leviticus 14:6, 51 we have the ritual prescribed for the cleansing of a leper and of a house in which the plague of leprosy appeared. The priest was to take the cedar wood and the scarlet and the hyssop and the living bird and dip them in the blood of the bird that was slain. It is obvious that a living bird cannot be immersed in the blood of another bird. It may be dipped in such blood but such dipping could not be immersion. Here is a clear case where βάπτω is used to denote an action that cannot be construed as immersion. And so βάπτω does not *mean* immersion. It can refer to an action performed by immersion but it can also refer to an action that does not involve immersion at all. Hence there is no reason arising from the meaning of the word βάπτω why in any instance of its occurrence it should refer to immersion. When it does refer to immersion our knowledge that this is the case is not derived from the word βάπτω but from other considerations.

It is also worthy of note that in these two instances the live bird was to be baptised *into the blood* (εἰς τὸ αἷμα) of the slain bird. Hence even "baptism into" (βάπτω εἰς) does not mean to immerse, and the preposition "into" does not add any force to the argument that βάπτω *means* to immerse.[6a]

[6a] An objection to the validity of the argument drawn from Leviticus 14:6,51 could be urged on the basis of the consideration that the blood of the bird that was slain flowed into the living water in the earthenware vessel and that it was not simply in the blood of the slain bird that the living bird, the cedar wood, the scarlet, and the hyssop were dipped but in the mixture of water and blood in the earthenware vessel. This is the view of able commentators such as Keil and Delitzsch, S. H. Kellogg, J. P. Lange and others. If this view of the ritual could be proven, the position taken above would have to be modified. For it might be maintained that, in such a case, there could be enough fluid for immersion of the four items specified. There are, however, two things to be said in reference to this objection. (1) Even on the supposition that it was in a mixture of blood and water that the items were dipped, it is not apparent that there would have been enough fluid for purposes of immersion. (2) The terms of the passage do not indicate that the procedure

In Leviticus 14:16 we have another instance which, while not as plainly conclusive as Leviticus 14:6, 51, nevertheless, points in the same direction. This has reference to the sprinkling of oil. The priest took some of the log of oil and poured it into the palm of his left hand. Then he dipped his right finger in the oil that was in the palm of his left hand and sprinkled the oil seven times before the Lord. Now it *may* be possible to pour into the cupped left hand enough oil so that the right finger may be immersed in this oil. But it is not an easy performance. The passage concerned does not indicate any such requirement. All that is prescribed is dipping of the right finger in the oil which is in the palm of the left hand, and it is quite unreasonable to suppose that immersion of that right finger was required. Dipping of the right finger in the oil was all that was requisite for the sprinkling which followed, and dipping without the necessity of immersion is rather plainly indicated to be the action in view.

Again in Ruth 2:14 we have the word of Boaz to Ruth: "dip thy morsel in the vinegar". It would be quite unreasonable to insist that the custom to which Boaz referred was to *immerse* one's morsel in the vinegar. On the other hand the idea of dipping something in vinegar is reasonable and natural. No doubt that was what Boaz had in mind.

was such as is supposed in this objection. Leviticus 14:6 says simply that the four items were dipped "in the blood of the bird that had been slain upon the living water". And in Leviticus 14:51,52 the blood of the bird that had been slain and the living water are distinguished. In verse 51 it is distinctly specified that the four items were to be dipped "in the blood of the slain bird, and in the living water". Verse 52, again, distinguishes between the blood of the slain bird and the living water, just as it distinguishes between the living bird and the other three items. "And he shall cleanse the house with the blood of the bird, and with the living water, and with the living bird, and with the cedar-wood, and with the hyssop, and with the scarlet."

If the Talmud should be appealed to in support of the view that the blood and the living water were mixed (see tractate *Negaim*, Chapter XIV, Mishnah 1), it should be borne in mind that the tradition referred to in this tractate distinctly provided that only a quarter of a log of living water was put in the earthenware vessel. Obviously a quarter of a log of water, together with the blood of the slain bird, would not provide enough fluid for immersion of the living bird, not to speak of the additional items which were to be dipped.

Hence there does not appear to be good reason for adopting the view that it was in a mixture of blood and water that the items concerned were dipped nor good reason for relinquishing the view adopted.

This same meaning of βάπτω could also apply in I Samuel 14:27, where we are told that Jonathan put forth the end of the rod that was in his hand and dipped it in the honey. In this case it is of course not unreasonable to suppose that the end of the rod was completely covered by the honey. But it is not necessary to suppose this.

What we have found is this: there is one clear case where βάπτω and even βάπτω εἰς does not mean and cannot mean immersion (Lev. 14:6, 51); there is the other case where it is unreasonable to suppose that immersion was required or took place (Lev. 14:16); there is still another instance where dipping but not immersion is the reasonable and natural supposition (Ruth 2:14); finally, in the case of I Samuel 14:27 immersion is not unreasonable but it is not by any means necessary to the action denoted. Hence we have no reason to suppose that in a great many other instances immersion is the action denoted by βάπτω. In other words, we have no ground upon which to insist that in Exodus 12:22; Leviticus 4:6, 17; 9:9; Numbers 19:18; Deuteronomy 33:24; II Kings 8:15 immersion is the mode of action referred to in the respective cases. There is nothing in the Hebrew word used nor in the context of the passages concerned which requires immersion. And the Greek word βάπτω, as we have just found, does not require immersion. So we are compelled to conclude that there is nothing to show that in any of these instances just cited immersion was practised or even suggested. And returning to II Kings 5:14, the case of Naaman, where we have βαπτίζω rather than βάπτω, this instance cannot be adduced to prove that Naaman immersed himself in Jordan. Without doubt he bathed himself in Jordan; but there is no evidence derived from the terms used either in Hebrew or Greek, or from the details of the narrative, to prove that Naaman immersed himself. Again, Joshua 3:15 cannot be adduced to prove that the priests' feet were immersed in Jordan. We are told that their feet were baptised in the brink of the river. It is quite possible that their feet were immersed in the water. But there is nothing to prove this. Dipping of their feet in the brink of the river is all that is necessary to satisfy the terms used both in Hebrew and

Greek. Besides, in verse 13 we are told that, when the *soles* of the feet of the priests would rest in Jordan, the waters would be cut off and stand in one heap. In verses 15 and 16 we are told that, when the feet of the priests were *dipped* in the brink of the river, the waters stood and rose up in one heap. Surely the kind of contact with the water, mentioned in verse 13, satisfies the terms of verse 15. To demand more for dipping than the resting of the soles of the priests' feet in the water would be indefensible.

In all of the passages so far considered there is only one instance where *βάπτω* clearly refers to an action which involved immersion. It is the case of Leviticus 11:32. It is also highly probable that in Job 9:31 the idea corresponds to that of immersion. At least the idea is much stronger than that of mere dipping and is more akin to that of plunging. Only in these two passages is the idea of immersion required to express the action denoted by *βάπτω*.

There are still two passages to be considered: Daniel 4:30 (LXX vs. 33); 5:21. In these instances *βάπτω* translates the Aramaic verb צבע. This Aramaic verb occurs elsewhere in the book of Daniel (*cf.* 4:12, 20, 22). But only in 4:30; 5:21 is it translated by the Greek verb *βάπτω*. The Septuagint rendering of the clause in question in each case is: *καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δρόσου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ ἐβάφη*. This refers to Nebuchadnezzar whose body was bathed with the dew of heaven. It is possible that the meaning of the Greek rendering is that his body was dipped in the dew of heaven, that is to say, dipped in the dew with which the herbs and grass of the field were drenched. It may be that the thought expressed is that his body was drenched or bathed from the dew of heaven. On the other hand, the meaning may be as weak as that his body was simply moist or wet with the dew of heaven. In any case the thought cannot be adjusted to the notion that his body was immersed in the dew of heaven. This would require the most arbitrary and unnatural twisting of the terms and would amount to unreason in the lowest degree. So again we have an instance of the use of *βάπτω* in another sense than that of immersion. Therefore it does not mean immersion.

The New Testament. In the usage of the New Testament βάπτω recedes into the background and βαπτίζω comes into the foreground. The former occurs only four times (Luke 16:24; John 13:26(2); Rev. 19:13) whereas the latter seventy five to eighty times. There are twenty occurrences of the substantive βάπτισμα and three of βαπτισμός.

In determining the meaning of these terms used to denote baptism it must be remembered again that the question is not whether they may be used to denote an action performed by immersion. It is not our interest to deny that they may be used to denote such an action. The question is whether these terms *mean* immersion and therefore always imply in one way or another the act of immersion and could not properly denote an action performed by any other mode. This is the precise question that is relevant to the Baptist contention. And we are concerned now to deal with the evidence which the New Testament itself presents. The thesis which we are propounding is that the terms for baptism are used to denote actions which were not performed by the mode of immersion and that, while these terms could refer to immersion, yet they do not *mean* immersion. In other words, we undertake to show that the Baptist contention that βαπτίζω and its cognates mean immersion is not borne out by the evidence and that βαπτίζω can be used to denote an action which neither indicates nor implies immersion. We propose to show this by appeal to several passages and groups of passages.

1. *Matthew 15:2; Mark 7:2–5; Luke 11:38.*

In Matthew 15:2; Mark 7:2–5 we have express allusion to the custom of the Jews, called "the tradition of the elders", to wash their hands before eating bread. "Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders? For they do not wash their hands when they eat bread" (Matt. 15:2). "For the Pharisees and all the Jews, except they wash their hands, do not eat, holding the tradition of the elders" (Mark 7:3). There is some uncertainty as to the precise force of the word πυγμή in the clause, ἐὰν μὴ πυγμῇ νίψωνται τὰς χεῖρας, whether it refers to the wrist or to the fist. Both Lightfoot and Edersheim claim that according to Jewish custom there

were two ways of washing the hands before eating, namely, by dipping the hands in water or by pouring water over the hands. In the former case πυγμή may refer to the washing of one hand with the cupped fist of the other. In the latter case there is every good reason for believing that πυγμή refers to the wrist. It is distinctly provided in the Talmudic tractate *Yadayim* that water was to be poured over the hands to the wrist. Chapter II, Mishnah 3, reads as follows: "Hands become unclean and are made clean as far as the wrist. How so? If he poured the first water over the hands as far as the wrist and poured the second water over the hands beyond the wrist and the latter flowed back to the hands, the hands nevertheless become clean."[7] It would appear that Edersheim is correct when he says, "Accordingly, the words of St. Mark can only mean that the Pharisees eat not 'except they wash their hands to the wrist' ".[8] In any case it is a washing of the hands that is in view and, most probably, washing of the hands up to the wrist.

In Luke 11:38 this same tradition is referred to when we are told that the Pharisee marvelled because Jesus "had not first baptised himself before dinner" (οὐ πρῶτον ἐβαπτίσθη πρὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου). There is no reason to suppose that anything else than the tradition referred to above is in view here, and everything would point to that conclusion. The important observation now is that this tradition is decribed as baptising oneself (for this is the force of the form ἐβαπτίσθη)

[7] *The Babylonian Talmud: Seder Tohoroth* (London, The Soncino Press, 1948), p. 552; *cf.* Alfred Edersheim: *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah* (New York, 1910), Vol. II, pp. 10 ff.; John Lightfoot: *Works* (ed. Pitman, London, 1823), Vol. IX, p. 153, Vol. XI, pp. 399 ff.; H. B. Swete: *Com. ad loc.*; Joseph Addison Alexander: *Com. ad loc.*

In appealing to the Talmud caution has to be exercised. The committal to writing of a great many of these traditions is later than the early Christian era. There is often doubt as to the antiquity of some of these traditions, and so in many cases we cannot be sure that they go back as far as the first century of the Christian era. However, the rabbinic tradition embodied in the Talmud in many instances antedates the Christian era and we can discover in the Talmud that which exactly corresponds to the traditions so frequently condemned by our Lord. Hence there is oftentimes a great deal of help derived from the Talmud in the interpretation of the New Testament.

[8] *Op. cit.* p. 11

and provides evidence that βαπτίζω can be used with reference to an action which did not involve immersing oneself. Washing the hands by dipping them in water or, more probably, by pouring water upon them can be called baptism.

It is quite unwarranted to insist that on this occasion (Luke 11:38) there must be allusion to the Jewish practice of immersion and that what the Pharisee expected on this occasion was that Jesus should have plunged himself in water. There is no evidence to support such a supposition and the evidence is decidedly against it. Jewish tradition, it is true, did prescribe immersion in certain cases of uncleanness. *Seder Tohoroth* in the Babylonian Talmud includes several tractates which evince these prescriptions, and the tractate *Mikwaoth* deals expressly with the bathing-pool which served these purposes.[9] In this bathing-pool persons as well as vessels and other articles were immersed. But rabbinic tradition prescribed immersion not for the washing and purification which preceded eating, as in this case, but for the uncleanness contracted by such things as leprosy and various kinds of running issue.[10] These tractates deal with the way in which such uncleanness was to be removed. There is no evidence that the Pharisee, in the instance of Luke 11:38, would or could have considered Jesus as having contracted such defilement as, in accordance

[9] *The Babylonian Talmud*: *Seder Tohoroth* (as cited), pp. 419 ff.

[10] *Cf.* the Talmudic tractate *Kelim*, Chapter I, Mishnah 5 (*The Babylonian Talmud* as cited, pp. 9 f.); the Talmudic tractate *Negaim*, Chapter XIV, Mishnah 2, 3, 8 (*The Babylonian Talmud* as cited, pp. 292 ff.). It is noteworthy in this connection that the Old Testament prescriptions for the cleansing of uncleanness arising from leprosy or a running issue or the seed of copulation *etc.* do not stipulate that the bathing required be by immersion. It was distinctly prescribed that the person to be cleansed should bathe himself in water. Sometimes the expression used is that he bathe his flesh in water and on at least one occasion it is said that he must bathe *all* his flesh in water (Lev. 15:16). But the terms used for such bathing are not such as to require immersion. In Hebrew the term is רחץ and in the LXX λούω (*cf.* Lev. 14:8, 9; 15:1–33). It may be that in many cases the bathing was performed by immersion. But this was not stipulated and there were many circumstances under which it would be most difficult, if not impossible, for immersion to take place (*cf.* especially Lev. 15:13). The important consideration is that immersion was not prescribed (*cf.* for a discussion of Mosaic purifications Edward Beecher: *Baptism in reference to its Import and Modes*, New York, 1849, pp. 32 ff.).

with rabbinic prescription and tradition, required immersion for purification. In other words, there is no evidence which would indicate that the Pharisee expected of Jesus anything more than the washing referred to in Matthew 15:2; Mark 7:3, a washing of the hands as far as the wrist, either by pouring water over them or by dipping them in water. The significant fact is that such washing is referred to as baptising oneself.

These passages offer another relevant datum. It concerns Mark 7:4, and is to the effect that the Jews on returning from the market-place do not eat except they wash themselves. Some question has been raised as to whether this refers to the purifying of their own bodies or to the purifying of the food brought from the market. While it might not be impossible for the form in which the verb appears to bear this latter sense yet the terms used do not suggest it and the context provides strong presumption against it. The preceding verse refers to the washing of the hands before eating and verse 5 brings us back to the same tradition in the question addressed by the Pharisees and Scribes: "Why do thy disciples walk contrary to the tradition of the elders, but eat bread with defiled hands?". It would be natural to relate the statement of verse 4 — "and when they come from the market-place they do not eat except they wash" — to the precise tradition mentioned in verses 3 and 5.

An observation to which interest and importance attach is that there is a variant in the manuscript authority. Some manuscripts use the word *βαπτίζω* in verse 4, others the word *ῥαντίζω*. The latter means to sprinkle, and so the rendering in this case would be: "and when they come from the market-place they do not eat except they sprinkle themselves". If this reading is correct then this passage offers proof that sprinkling was regarded by the Jews as a proper mode for the removal of defilement. We should have to suppose that the intercourse of the market-place was regarded by the Jews as increasing the defilement and it would be reasonable to think that the purification required for this defilement would be more elaborate or extensive than that which was ordinarily necessary before eating, that is to say, more extensive than the mere washing of the hands. The reading "to sprinkle" would very readily supply the answer to this more extensive purification.

If we were to adopt the reading which uses the word *βαπτίζω*, this might appear to give support to the Baptist contention that immersion is the practice alluded to. In other words, it may be argued that while, ordinarily, all that is requisite before eating is the washing of the hands yet after the intercourse of the market-place the total washing of immersion is requisite. And it could be argued that this is the force of the distinction made between the requisition referred to in verse 3 and that referred to in verse 4. Additional support might be derived from the consideration that in the latter part of verse 4 the "baptism of cups and pots and brazen vessels" are adduced as examples of the traditions in view, baptisms which were presumptively performed by immersion.[11]

There is no good reason for controverting the validity of this argument provided evidence could be adduced to prove that after return from the market-place rabbinic or Pharisaic tradition required immersion before eating. In that event this

[11] There is good reason to believe that the "baptisms of cups and pots and brasen vessels", referred to in Mark 7:4, refer to immersion (*cf.* the Talmudic tractate *Kelim*, Chapter XXV, Mishnah 3, 5). The reference to the baptism of "couches" (*κλινῶν*) does not appear in several manuscripts. Hence the text is in question. There need be no question, however, that the Jews did require the purification of couches and beds (*cf.* Lev. 15:20). Edward Beecher, for example, does not appear to be on stable ground when he says, "But above all, the immersion of the couches on which they reclined at meals is out of the question" (*op. cit.*, p. 39; *cf.* Robert Wilson: *op. cit.*, pp. 229 f.). Apart from the question as to whether or not the reference in this case is to the immersion of couches (even assuming that the text is correct), Beecher's flat denial of the possibility of a reference to immersion does not appear to be warranted. The Talmudic tractate *Kelim*, again, indicates that in rabbinic tradition provision was made that beds might be purified in parts and even for the dismantling of beds in order to purification by immersion (see Chapter XVIII, Mishnah 9; Chapter XIX, Mishnah 1. The relevant words in the latter are, "If a man dismantled a bed in order that he might immerse it . . ."). Alexander Carson, without appealing to these rabbinic provisions and without appeal to the Talmud, observes with good warrant: "the couches might have been so constructed, that they might be conveniently taken to pieces, for the purpose of purification" (*op. cit.*, p. 76). It is not now being contended, of course, that the baptism of couches necessarily refers to immersion. All that is being maintained is that we are not justified in appealing to Mark 7:4b to show that *βαπτισμός* cannot here imply immersion. For diversity of mode in Levitical prescription *cf.* Robert Wilson: *op. cit.*, pp. 228 f.

would be a case in which the word βαπτίζω would be used with reference to an action that was performed by immersion. We are not in the least concerned to deny that βαπτίζω can be thus used any more than are we interested in denying that in the latter part of verse 4 the word βαπτισμός is used with reference to actions which were performed by the mode of immersion. In other words, let us grant to the fullest extent that in verse 4 the verb βαπτίζω and the noun βαπτισμός are used with reference to acts of immersion, this by no means proves that either the verb or the noun *means* immersion in such a way that neither of them could be used with reference to an action performed by another mode. To adduce cases in which "baptise" or "baptism" is used to denote an action performed by immersion does not prove that they *mean* immersion. Our inquiry now is conducted to the end of showing simply that "to baptise" does not *mean* "to immerse".

There are, however, two premises upon which rests the argument that in verse 4a we have an instance of the use of βαπτίζω to denote an action performed by immersion: (1) that βαπτίζω is the proper reading; (2) that there is good evidence that on returning from the market-place immersion was the rabbinic requisition. Neither of these premises is substantiated. To say the least, there is doubt as to both. Hence the argument is not established. And it must be remembered that in Luke 11:38 we have an instance of the use of βαπτίζω with reference to an act of washing or cleansing which, in accordance with Matthew 15:2 and Mark 7:3, was performed by washing the hands. So there is no proof that in Mark 7:4a the word βαπτίζω is used in the sense of immersion.

2. *Hebrews 9:10–23.*

In verse 10 we have the expression "divers baptisms" (διαφόροις βαπτισμοῖς). The allusion is to various symbolical lustrations of the Old Testament. The word "divers" indicates that lustratory rites of various kinds are in view. It is not probable, however, that all the lustratory rites are contemplated. It is likely that those which had more direct relevance to the purification of persons are intended; the preceding verse, which is closely coordinated with verse 10, is concerned

with the gifts and sacrifices which could not make him that performed the service perfect as to the conscience. But even if we recognise this delimitation we have still to note that lustrations of various kinds are envisaged.

The significance of this passage as it bears upon our present interest is that the "divers baptisms" referred to in verse 10 must surely include the lustrations expressly referred to in the succeeding verses. In these verses a contrast is drawn between the intrinsic inefficacy, or at least relative inefficacy, of the ritual ordinances of the Levitical economy and the transcendent efficacy and perfection of Christ's purificatory and expiatory work. In a word, the imperfection of the Levitical lustrations is contrasted with the lustration once for all perfected by Christ. In this sustained contrast every lustratory rite that comes within the writer's purview must be included in the "divers baptisms" of verse 10. And that simply means that the lustratory rites mentioned in the succeeding context must come within the scope of the "divers baptisms".

In verse 13 one of these lustratory ordinances is expressly stated to have been performed by sprinkling — "for if the blood of goats and bulls and ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh". When we bear in mind that here a lustratory rite of the old economy is contrasted in respect of its efficacy with the finality and perfection of the blood of Christ and when we remember that it was precisely this thought of relative inefficacy that prompted the reference to "divers baptisms", it becomes exegetically impossible to exclude this rite, or these rites, of verse 13 from the scope of the "divers baptisms". And this means that a lustratory rite performed by sprinkling can be called a baptism.

Again in verse 19 reference is made to the *sprinkling* of the book and all the people, and in verse 21 to the *sprinkling* of the tabernacle and all the vessels of the ministry (*cf.* Exod. 24:6–8). These ordinances are expressly stated in verse 23 to have been purificatory. We cannot exclude them from the scope of the "divers baptisms" of verse 10.

We must conclude, therefore, that the word "baptism" refers to an action that can be performed by sprinkling as well as by any other mode. It cannot, therefore, mean immersion.

Besides, we know that several of the Levitical lustrations, in addition to those mentioned in this chapter, were performed by sprinkling (*cf.* Lev. 14:4–7, 16, 49–53, 16:19; Numb. 8:5–7; 19:18, 19).[12] If the Baptist argument is valid then the "divers baptisms" of Hebrews 9:10 will have to be restricted to those lustratory rites which were performed by immersion and must exclude the most significant lustratory rites and actions of the old economy. On the face of it such a supposition is arbitrary. When examined it becomes quite untenable. For what lustratory rites are more pertinent to the contrast instituted than those which were performed by other modes than that of immersion, examples of which are given in the succeeding context? And what immersions,[13] prescribed in the Old Testament, are directly pertinent to the precise thought of this passage and will satisfy the description, "divers baptisms"?

This passage, therefore, provides us with an instance of the use of the word "baptism" (βαπτισμός) to denote actions which do not involve immersion. Baptism does not mean immersion but can refer to actions performed by other modes. This is what we might expect to be the case in such a passage as Hebrews 9:10. As we think of the diverse modes of cleansing in the Old Testament, sprinkling stands out most promi-

[12] There are so many instances of sprinkling in the ritual of the Mosaic economy that it is not necessary to give the citations. In connection with the blood of the sacrifices no action of the priest was more prominent than the sprinkling of the blood. And the significance of sprinkling is shown by nothing more than by the fact that when the high priest went into the holiest of all once a year on the great day of atonement he sprinkled the blood of the sin-offerings seven times before the mercy-seat and upon the mercy-seat (Lev. 16:14, 15). That this sprinkling had reference to cleansing appears from Leviticus 16:19: "And he shall sprinkle with the blood upon it (the altar) with his finger seven times, and cleanse it, and hallow it from the uncleannesses of the children of Israel". The Hebrew words used for the act of sprinkling are זרק and נזה. Ezekiel 36:25 indicates as clearly as any text in the Old Testament the purificatory significance of sprinkling and the adequacy of sprinkling as a mode of purification. "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you."

For a discussion of Hebrews 9:10 *cf.* Robert Wilson: *op. cit.*, pp. 214 ff.; Edward Beecher: op. cit., pp. 325 ff.

[13] This is a cogent question. It is difficult to know what immersions of the Levitical economy could be adduced to meet the requirements of this passage.

nently as one of the modes and appears in some of the most distinctive lustratory rites. It would be strange indeed if such rites were not in view in the expression, "divers baptisms".

3. *The Baptism of the Spirit.*

John the Baptist contrasted his own baptism with water with the baptism which Jesus was to dispense: "I indeed baptise you with water unto repentance . . . He shall baptise you with the Holy Spirit and fire" (Matt. 3:11; *cf.* Mark 1:8; Luke 3:16). Without question there is here an express allusion to Pentecost. Acts 1:5 and 11:16 confirm this, for in these passages the contrast between John's baptism and that of Jesus is instituted in connection with Pentecost: "John indeed baptised with water, but ye shall be baptised with the Holy Spirit not many days hence" (Acts 1:5). The coming of the Holy Spirit upon the disciples at Pentecost was undoubtedly baptism with the Holy Spirit and fire.

If baptism means immersion then the statement of John that Jesus would baptise with the Holy Spirit and fire must mean strictly "he shall immerse in the Holy Spirit and fire", and any language used with reference to the baptism of the Spirit, however figurative it may be, cannot depart from or violate this basic meaning. In other words, the symbolism cannot represent an entirely diverse mode of the relation of the disciples to the Holy Spirit and of the Holy Spirit to them.

But what we actually find is that the baptism of the Spirit is referred to in terms that are quite contrary to the idea of immersion and in fact preclude it. In Acts 1:8 the Holy Spirit is represented as coming upon the disciples: "Ye shall receive power after that the Holy Spirit has come upon you". The verb is ἐπέρχομαι and conveys the notion of "coming down upon". In Acts 2:17, 33 the Holy Spirit is represented as having been poured out, and the verb is ἐκχέω.[14] In Acts 10:44; 11:15 the Holy Spirit is represented as having fallen upon the persons concerned, and the verb is ἐπιπίπτω.

It is surely significant that the terms in each case are those

[14] *Cf.*, also, Titus 3:6 where the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of regeneration and renewal is said to have been "poured out" on us richly.

of affusion and not of immersion. Yet it is precisely this affusion that is called the baptism of the Holy Spirit.

Furthermore, the baptism with fire, referred to in the texts cited above, received its symbolic fulfilment, to say the least, in the cloven tongues like as of fire that sat upon the disciples at Pentecost (*καὶ ἐκάθισεν ἐφ' ἕνα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν*). If this is baptism with fire or, at least, the external symbol and sign of the baptism with fire, this baptism cannot be adjusted to the notion of immersion. But to the notion of immersion this phenomenon must be adjusted if the Baptist argument is correct that baptism means immersion.

It is not without relevance in this same connection that in the Old Testament the giving of the Spirit, in some cases explicitly referring to Pentecost, is promised in terms of pouring out, shedding forth, and sprinkling (Isa. 32:15; Joel 2:28; Prov. 1:23; Ezek. 36:25–27 where the Hebrew words are עָרָה, שָׁפַךְ and זָרַק meaning respectively to pour out, shed forth, and sprinkle). The language of the Old Testament provides the imagery of the New Testament and is quite foreign to the notion of immersion.

4. *The Sprinkling of the Blood of Christ.*

Baptism symbolises, represents, and seals the application to us of the blood of Christ for the removal of the guilt of sin. The figure used in the New Testament for this application of the blood of Christ is that of sprinkling (Hebrews 9:13, 14, 22; 10:22; 12:24; I Pet. 1:2). It would be strange if the baptism with water which represents the sprinkling of the blood of Christ could not properly and most significantly be performed by sprinkling. It cannot be too frequently insisted that according to Scripture cleansing from the guilt of sin is adequately and effectively administered by the mode of sprinkling no less than by the modes of affusion and immersion.[15]

Sufficient evidence has been presented to show that in the usage of the New Testament *βαπτίζω* does not mean to immerse. It can be used with reference to immersion but it can

[15] *Cf.* the discussion of Hebrews 9:10 above and particularly footnote 12.

also be used with reference to affusion and sprinkling. The New Testament, therefore, confirms the conclusions derived from the study of the Old Testament. Both Testaments mutually support each other in this respect.

It is, however, necessary to consider several other passages in the New Testament because they have been appealed to on both sides of the argument; some of them have been used by anti-immersionists and some by immersionists. It is necessary to examine them in order to determine whether they lend any weight to the argument in favour of or against the immersionist contention.

(a) *I Corinthians 10:2.* "All were baptised unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea." If the Baptist argument is correct, then there must be allusion to the mode of baptism in this text. At least, in order to satisfy the terms of the passage the children of Israel would have to be regarded as having been immersed in the cloud and in the sea.[16] Now it is only too apparent that they were not immersed in the sea — they passed through the sea upon dry ground. They did not enter into the water nor did the water come upon them (*cf.* Exod. 14:22). And as respects the cloud the reference is surely to the pillar of cloud that went before the children of Israel by day, a cloud that did not come upon them and into which they did not enter (*cf.* Exod. 13:21). So the word βαπτίζω is used here with reference to an event or series of events which did not involve immersion in any way.

If the Baptist should retort that, since the children of Israel went into the midst of the sea (Exod. 14:22), were thus below the level of the water and hemmed in by it on both sides, they could be regarded as immersed in the sea, then we have the strange notion that to be below the level of the water amounts to immersion, even though the water comes into no contact whatsoever with our bodies. If this is the case, we shall have to revise our concept of

[16] John Gill says with reference to this passage that it was "a figure of baptism by immersion; as the Israelites were under the cloud, and so under water, and covered with it, as persons baptized by immersion are; and passed through the sea, that standing up as a wall on both sides them, with the cloud over them; thus surrounded they were as persons immersed in water, and so said to be baptized" (*op. cit.*, p. 311).

immersion to such an extent that it will be very different from that which is required by the Baptist contention. Besides, even if it were allowed that the going into the midst of the sea conforms to the idea of immersion, we must also take into account the cloud in which the children of Israel were baptised. There is no evidence that the children of Israel entered into the cloud or that the cloud came upon them.

The main relevance of this passage is simply that the word *βαπτίζω* can be used without any intimation or suggestion of mode, that *βαπτίζω* itself does not express mode, and, particularly, that it does not mean to immerse.

(b) *Acts 8:26–40.* Anti-immersionists have appealed to this text in support of their own contention. They argue that since this was desert it would be improbable, if not impossible, to find enough water for purposes of immersion. This is not a valid argument. There is the possibility of sufficient water for such a purpose and the terms used would indicate that there was a well or pool or stream of water. Anti-immersionists cannot prove that there was not sufficient water for immersion. Neither can it be proved that the Ethiopian eunuch was not immersed by Philip.

It becomes equally necessary, however, to show that the Baptist appeal to this text to prove immersion is indefensible.[17] The text does not prove that Philip immersed the eunuch. Such an inference may seem to be contradicted by the express terms of the passage. Is it not said that both Philip and the eunuch went down into the water (*καὶ κατέβησαν ἀμφότεροι εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ*) and that they came up out of the water (*ἀνέβησαν ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος*)? Is not immersion implied in the prepositions "into" and "out of"? The fact is that immersion cannot be established by such expressions. It should be noted that Philip as well as the eunuch went down into the water and came up out of the water. If such expressions imply or prove immersion, then they mean that Philip immersed himself as well as the eunuch. But such a supposition is quite unreason-

[17] *Cf.* John Gill: *op. cit.*, p. 309. Calvin, whom Gill quotes at this point says with reference to Acts 8:38: "Here we see what was the manner of baptising among the ancients, for they plunged the whole body into the water: now the use is, that the minister only sprinkles the body or the head".

able. Why should Philip have immersed himself, and why would Luke be so anxious to inform us that Philip immersed himself as well as the eunuch?

It is not now maintained that Philip did not immerse the eunuch when he baptised him. That may have been the mode in this case. But what is to be recognised is — a fact too frequently ignored in the Baptist argumentation — that this passage does not prove immersion. The expressions, "they both went down into the water" and "they came up out of the water" are satisfied by the thought that they both went down to the water, stood on the brink or stepped into the edge, and that Philip baptised the eunuch by scooping up the water and pouring it or sprinkling it on him. This is *all* that can be shown to have occurred. As far as the going into, and coming up out of, the water are concerned nothing is stated in respect of the eunuch that is not also in respect of Philip himself. Hence there is no proof of immersion in this passage. What the actual mode was we simply do not know, and this text does not support the Baptist contention.

(c) *The Baptism of John.* The baptism of John is said to have been in Jordan (ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ ποταμῷ — Matt. 3:6; Mark 1:5) and into Jordan (εἰς τὸν Ἰορδάνην — Mark 1:9). He also baptised in Ainon near to Salim because there was much water there (ὕδατα πολλὰ ἦν ἐκεῖ — John 3:23).

At the outset it should be understood that John may have baptised by the mode of immersion; there does not appear to be evidence by which immersion could be disproved. Furthermore, if John baptised by the mode of immersion there is in this very consideration a good reason for choosing Jordan and Ainon as the sites of administration — there was abundant water in both places. And the expressions used with reference to Jordan, namely, "in the river Jordan" and "into the Jordan" could readily be taken as reflecting, to some extent at least, on the actual mode.[18] The point upon which emphasis must be placed is that the expressions used and the consideration mentioned in reference to Ainon, that there was much water there, do not prove that immersion was the mode and that the exigencies of immersion were the reasons

[18] *Cf.* John Gill: *op. cit.*, p. 308.

for choosing Jordan and Ainon. There are several other sufficient reasons why Jordan and Ainon should have been chosen.

We know only too well that in Palestine water supplies were jealously prized and guarded, and we know how friction sometimes developed over the use of water supplies. To say the least, it would have been prejudicial to John's ministry for him to have baptised except where there was abundant water. Large multitudes came to John's baptism. It would have been disrupting to a local community and an interference with their needs for large multitudes to congregate around limited water supplies. Apart from the actual water used for baptism, it would have been interference amounting to impropriety to deprive people of ready access to the water supply requisite for their daily needs.

Again, apart from the consideration of the water used in baptism and apart from the impropriety of interference with the needs of a local community, it would be necessary to seek a place of much water in order to meet the needs of those who congregated. Oftentimes the people who came to John's baptism came long distances. In many cases it is altogether likely that animals were used for conveyance. Those who came would therefore need water for their own use and for the use of the animals they may have brought. It is obvious that a place of much water would be indispensable.

We have thus a whole series of considerations which coalesce to show that a place of much water was requisite apart from the question of immersion. Hence the choosing of Jordan and Ainon does not prove that these places were selected because they afforded the amount of water requisite for immersion.

The expressions, "in the river Jordan" and "into the Jordan" do not prove immersion. As far as the expression "in the river Jordan" is concerned it may be nothing more than a designation of location just as "baptising in Ainon" in John 3:23 designates location. Consequently, the expression "in the river Jordan" proves nothing respecting the mode of John's baptism. And as far as the expression "into Jordan" is concerned we found already that even such an expression as "going down into the water" does not necessarily imply immersion. Standing in the water or on the brink of the river would satisfy completely the idea expressed.

(d) *Acts 2:41;10:47; 16:33.* These passages have sometimes been adduced to disprove immersion. But they establish no such conclusion. There is nothing in the actual circumstances of these instances of baptism which makes immersion impossible. On the other hand, there is nothing to suggest, far less to require, immersion. Hence it is far better not to appeal to such passages in this debate. An argument is only weakened in its effectiveness when it is supported by irrelevant or inconclusive data.

Conclusion. On the basis of such considerations as these, derived from both Old and New Testaments, we are led to the conclusion that though the word βαπτίζω and its cognates can be used to denote an action performed by immersion yet they may also be used to denote an action that can be performed by a variety of modes. Consequently the word βαπτίζω itself cannot be pleaded as an argument for the necessity of immersion as the mode of baptism.

It is still possible, however, that other evidence could be presented to show that immersion belongs to the essence of the symbolism. We turn, therefore, to the other phase of the Baptist argument in support of the thesis that immersion is the only proper mode of baptism.

B. *The Burial and Resurrection of Christ*

The two passages upon which the greater part of this phase of the argument for immersion rests are Romans 6:2–6; Colossians 2:11, 12. In essence the argument is that, since baptism represents union with Christ in his death and resurrection, immersion in water and emergence from it provide an analogy which graphically portrays that which is represented and sealed by baptism. Romans 6:3, 4 would appear to indicate such symbolism: "Or are ye ignorant that as many as were baptised into Christ Jesus were baptised into his death? Therefore we have been buried with him by baptism into death, in order that as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, even so we should walk in newness of life." But more careful analysis will show that there is no necessary allusion to the mode of baptism.

It is beyond dispute that the leading thought of the apostle here is that of union with Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection. And verses 5 and 6 are confirmatory. They carry on the same thought in different terms: "For if we have become planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in that of the resurrection: knowing this that our old man has been crucified with him, in order that the body of sin might be destroyed, to the end that we should no longer serve sin".

Paul is here dealing with the antinomian argument and, in order to rebut it, he sets forth the particular phases of union with Christ that are peculiarly adapted to that purpose, namely, union with Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection. He does this to show that every one who is united to Christ is, by virtue of the efficacy of Christ's death and the power of his resurrection, freed from the dominion of sin, lives a new resurrection life, and therefore cannot make his Christian faith and profession a plea for, or an inducement to, continuance in sin. Baptism, by which the Christian profession is registered and sealed, means baptism into union with Christ, and Paul is here stressing what such union means, particularly in reference to the death and resurrection of Christ. Believers died with Christ, they were planted together in the likeness of his death, they were buried with him, they were crucified with him, they were raised up with him and planted together in the likeness of his resurrection.

It is very easy to focus attention upon one or two of the terms which Paul here uses and make it appear that the indispensable mode of baptism is after the analogy of what we have arbitrarily selected. It is very easy to point to the expression "buried with him" in verse 4 and insist that only immersion provides any analogy to burial. But such procedure fails to take account of all that Paul says here. It should be noted that Paul not only says "buried together" (*συνετάφημεν*) but also "planted together" (*σύμφυτοι*) and "crucified together" (*συνεσταυρώθη*). These latter expressions indicate the union with Christ which is symbolised and sealed by baptism just as surely as does "buried together". But it is only too apparent that they do not bear any analogy to immersion. Even if it should be conceded that the different shades of

meaning possible in the case of "planted together" (*σύμφυτοι*) leave room for some resemblance to immersion, yet no resemblance can obtain in the case of "crucified together". We are represented as having been hung on the cross together with Christ, and that phase of union with Christ is represented by our baptism into Christ not one whit less than our death in him and our burial with him, not one whit less than our being planted with him in the likeness of his death and our being raised with him in the power of his resurrection. When all of Paul's expressions are taken into account we see that burial with Christ can be appealed to as providing an index to the mode of baptism no more than can crucifixion with him. And since the latter does not indicate the *mode* of baptism there is no validity to the argument that burial does. The fact is that there are many aspects to our union with Christ. It is arbitrary to select one aspect and find in the language used to set it forth the essence of the mode of baptism. Such procedure is indefensible unless it can be carried through consistently. It cannot be carried through consistently here and therefore it is arbitrary and invalid. This passage as a whole points up the arbitrariness of such procedure by emphasising a phase of our union with Christ that bears no analogy whatsoever to that of immersion.

Confirmatory of this conclusion is Galatians 3:27. Here another implication of our union with Christ is argued by the apostle. The form of statement is closely similar to that of Romans 6:3. In Romans 6:3 Paul says: "As many as were baptised into Christ were baptised into his death", and in Galatians 3:27: "For as many as were baptised into Christ did put on Christ". It would be just as legitimate to insist that there is reference to the mode of baptism in Galatians 3:27 as in Romans 6:3. But in Galatians 3:27 the figure used by the apostle to set forth the import of baptism into Christ has no resemblance to immersion. It is the figure of putting on a garment. The plain inference is that Paul is not alluding to the mode of baptism at all. And neither may we suppose that he is in Romans 6:2–6. We should be faced with contradictory testimony as to the mode of baptism if we supposed that these passages allude to it.

In I Corinthians 12:13 we have the same effect. "For by one Spirit have we all been baptised into one body." The figure here is the making up of one unified organism and is quite foreign to the notion of immersion.

The only sane conclusion is that in none of these cases is reference made to the mode of baptism.[19] The emphasis is plainly upon the meaning of baptism into Christ, that is to say, of union with him. Indeed, so paramount is the thought of union with Christ that the allusion to the rite of baptism need not be considered as overt. While it might not be proper to say that allusion to the rite of baptism is not at all present in the use of the word "baptise" in these passages, yet in such expressions as "baptised into Christ", "baptised into his death" (Rom. 6:3; Gal. 3:27), and "baptised into one body" (I Cor. 12:13), it is not the rite of baptism that is in the foreground but rather the idea of union with Christ. "Being baptised into" is a way of expressing "union with". To be "baptised into Moses" (I Cor. 10:2) is to be bound to Moses in the fellowship of that covenant of which Moses was the mediator. In a word, it is to be a disciple of Moses. Paul protests to the Corinthians that they were not baptised "into the name of Paul" (I Cor. 1:13): it would have meant that

[19] James Bannerman does not sufficiently take into account the data provided by the passages concerned when, with reference to Romans 6:3–5, he says: "There are two things which seem plainly enough to be included in this remarkable statement. *In the first place*, the immersion in water of the persons of those who are baptized is set forth as their burial with Christ in His grave because of sin; and their being raised again out of the water is their resurrection with Christ in His rising again from the dead because of their justification . . . And *in the second place*, their burial in water, when dying with Christ, was the washing away of the corruptness of the old man beneath the water; and their coming forth from the water in the image of His resurrection was their leaving behind them the old man with his sins, and emerging into newness of life. Their immersion beneath the water, and their emerging again, were the putting off the corruption of nature and rising again into holiness, or their sanctification" (*op. cit.*, pp. 47 f.). Many commentators have found in Romans 6:4 an allusion to immersion. But see for the contrary: Edward Beecher: *op. cit.*, pp. 86 ff.; Moses Stuart: *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (Andover, 1835), pp. 272 ff.; Charles Hodge: *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (Philadelphia, 1864), p. 305; Robert Wilson: *op. cit.*, pp. 286 ff.

they had been baptised into the discipleship of Paul rather than into that of Jesus. To be "baptised into Christ" is to be bound to him in the bonds of that union that makes us the beneficiaries of all the blessings of redemption and pledges us to his Lordship. The rite of baptism is the sign and seal of this union. But the langauge of the symbol and seal becomes so closely attached to that which the symbol represents that this language may be used to express that truth when the symbol itself has receded into the background of thought. Hence in these passages which have been considered it is not the rite of baptism that is in the foreground. Indeed, reference to the rite may have receded almost to the point of disappearance. It is union with Christ that claims the thought, and the language of baptism has been appropriated to give emphasis to that thought as well as to express the fulness and richness of the union involved.

General Conclusion. We have seen that the two pillars of the Baptist argument for the necessity of immersion, when examined in the light of the evidence provided by the Scriptures themselves, do not rest upon solid foundations. The usage in respect of βαπτίζω and its cognates does not show that these terms imply immersion.[20] There are very few instances where it can be shown that they refer to immersion, and there are many instances where it can be shown that they refer to actions performed by other modes than that of immersion. βαπτίζω, therefore, does not mean to immerse. The collateral Baptist argument drawn from similitude to the burial and resurrection of Christ has been shown to rest upon an arbitrary selection of one or two texts, and the invalidity of this selection is demonstrated by the very passage which appears to give strongest support to the contention. βαπτίζω, we must conclude, is one of those words which indicate a certain effect without itself expressing or prescribing the particular mode by which this effect is secured.

[20] Even Calvin falls into the mistake of saying that "the very word *baptize* . . . signifies to immerse" (*Inst.* IV, xv, 19), though he argues in the same context that it is of no importance whether a person be wholly immersed or whether water be only poured or sprinkled.

III

The Church

Baptism is an ordinance instituted by Christ and is the sign and seal of union with him. This is just saying that it is the sign and seal of membership in that body of which Christ is the Head. The body of which Christ is the Head is the church (*cf.* Eph. 5:23–30). Hence baptism is the sign and seal of membership in the church. What then is the church?

The Church as Invisible

As has just been indicated, the church is the body of Christ. If so, it is comprised of those who are sanctified and cleansed by the washing of water by the Word, the company of the regenerate, the communion of the saints, the congregation of the faithful, those called effectually into the fellowship of Christ. The church is therefore circumscribed by the facts of regeneration and faith, facts which in themselves are spiritual and invisible. For this reason no man or organisation of men is able infallibly to determine who are regenerate and who are not, who are true believers and who are not. No man or organisation of human composition, therefore, is able to define the precise limits of the church in any one place or generation. The Lord knows them that are His and He alone perfectly and infallibly. Again, when we think of the innumerable company of those who, in all past ages of this world's history, have been called effectually by God's grace and translated from the power of darkness into the fellowship of God, we see even more clearly how impossible it is for man to measure the proportions or limits of the people of God. And, finally, when we contemplate the whole body of God's elect in all ages on to the consummation of the world we see most clearly that only God can comprehend such a body of redeemed and sanctified persons. For these reasons, if for no others, we must recognise that there is an aspect of invisibility that attaches to the concept of the church.[21]

[21] In order to avoid the misconstructions and misconceptions frequently associated with the distinction between the church visible and invisible it is

It is to be admitted that such an attribute is not expressly predicated of the church in Scripture. It must also be used with great care and with the requisite qualifications. We may not properly speak of two churches, one visible and the other invisible. What Scripture designates as "the church" is never regarded as something wholly invisible. But since a distinction must be drawn between that which is visible to and observable by men, on the one hand, and that which is fully and perfectly perceptible to God alone, on the other, there is an attribute of invisibility which must be recognised as belonging to the church. To be quite concrete, our Lord himself did distinguish between those who might be disciples of his and yet not truly disciples (ἀληθῶς μαθηταί, John 8:31) and between those who were in him by profession and external connection and yet not vitally and permanently (John 15). Our approach to this question of the church must take account of the fact that every one who has a place in the organisation which is visible and known to men is not by that mere token necessarily united to Christ by regeneration and faith. It is this distinction between that what is visible to men and what is known and viewed only perfectly by God that is guarded by saying that there is to the church an aspect of invisibility. We cannot think properly of the church unless we recognise that the church is constituted by a relation to Christ which in itself is spiritual and invisible and that nothing observable by men can be the absolute and final criterion of that relation. The Lord knows them that are His.[22]

more proper to speak of the church as invisible and the church as visible or of the aspects of invisibility and visibility attaching to the church rather than of the visible church and the invisible church. The terms visible and invisible are aspects from which the church may be viewed. James Bannerman states this well: "When we speak of the Church invisible and the Church visible, we are not to be understood as if we referred in these designations to two separate and distinct Churches, but rather to the same Church under two different characters. We do not assert that Christ has founded two Churches on earth, but only one; and we affirm that that *one* Church is to be regarded under two distinct aspects" (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 29). But Bannerman does not appear to carry out this emphasis consistently in his subsequent discussion. He proceeds to define the visible church and the invisible respectively in terms of distinctions which do not appear to be borne out by the usage of Scripture itself.

[22] *Cf.* Calvin: *Inst.* IV, i, 2.

The Church as Visible

While the church in its strict and proper signification is the company or body of those united to Christ in the spiritual bonds of effectual calling and saving faith and is therefore known only to God who alone infallibly discerns as well as determines who His people are, yet it must not be thought that the church, as Scripture knows it, is ever an invisible entity. The church may not be defined as an entity wholly invisible to human perception and observation. The church is the company or society or assembly or congregation or communion of the faithful. This concept has a variety of applications. It may refer to a company or congregation of believers in one house (*cf.* Rom. 16:5; I Cor. 16:19; Col. 4:15; Phm. 2). It may refer to the company of believers in one city (*cf.* Acts 8:1; 11:22, 26; 13:1; 14:27; 15:22; 18:22; 20:17; Rom. 16:1).[23] It may refer to the company of believers in a province (*cf.* Acts 9:31). Very frequently the word is used in the plural to designate the plurality of churches, that is to say of units, scattered throughout a certain area of lesser or greater geographical proportions (*cf.* Acts 14:23; 15:41; I Cor. 16:1, 19; II Cor. 8:1; Gal. 1:2, 22; I. Thess. 2:14), or scattered throughout the whole world (*cf.* Rom. 16:4, 16; I Cor. 7:17; 11:16; 14:33, 34; II Cor. 8:18; 11:28; II Thess. 1:4). Sometimes it is used in the singular, not in the sense of a particular company of believers in one place, but in a generic sense to designate the people of God in their unity and totality (I Cor. 10:32; 12:28; 15:9; Gal. 1:13; Eph. 1:22; 3:10, 21; 5:23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32; Col. 1:18, 24). This last feature of New Testament usage provides us with the concept of the church catholic or universal. A thorough study of this usage would evince that there are several aspects from which the church catholic, or the church considered generically, may be viewed. It would be going too far afield to undertake such a study now. But a brief examination of the passages cited above from Paul's

[23] *Cf.* James Bannerman: *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 13 f. for a treatment of the data which show that the *church* in Jerusalem, for example, did not apply "to a single congregation of believers, but to a plurality of congregations, connected together as one body or Church by means of a common government".

epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians will show how expansive and inclusive the word "church" is in such connections.

What needs to be particularly observed in connection with the New Testament is that whether the church is viewed as the unit or company of believers in a home or town or city, or whether it is viewed as the broader communion of the saints scattered throughout a province, or the whole company of believers scattered throughout the world, it is always a visible observable entity. Union with Christ and the faith through which that union is effected, though in themselves invisible and spiritual facts, are nevertheless realities which find expression in what is observable. Faith always receives registration in word and action. This is just saying that those united to Christ form the communion of the saints and the congregation of the faithful. And what is even more relevant and important is that by the appointment and prescription of Christ as the Head of the church there is the institution which by its very nature as an institution of Christ in the world is a visible and observable entity. The people of God do come together and associate with one another for purposes of collective testimony and worship, for the administration of divinely instituted ordinances, for mutual edification, and for the exercise of divinely instituted government and discipline. The very constitutive idea of the church, namely, union with Christ and the union of believers with one another in the body of Christ, as an idea realised in the history of this world, necessarily involves visible union and communion. We cannot think of the church invisible as anything that exists in abstraction or apart from the overt expression which the spiritual and invisible facts of union and communion with Christ demand. Hence visible association and organisation are implicit in the very nature of what constitutes the church. Such organisation is effected by the efficacious and continuous working of the Head of the church through his Word and Spirit, and human agency and responsibility which are exercised in pursuance of Christ's institution bear the seal of his authorisation and command. All of this is implied in our Lord's word, "Upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. 16:18). In a word, the

church is Christ's church. It is established and preserved by him, and its continuance as an entity to be administered in accordance with his institution is guaranteed by the fact that he is Head over all things to his body the church.

As was indicated above, human agency and responsibility are operative in the church. One of the ways in which this agency is exercised is the administration which is committed to men. There is government and discipline in Christ's church and such are administered by men, in accordance with Christ's appointment. The question arises at this point: how does this administration on the part of men relate itself to those spiritual and invisible facts by which the church is constituted? Men are not omniscient, and they are fallible. What is the prerogative of fallible men in reference to this all-important phase of the administration exercised by them, namely, the inclusion of members in, and exclusion from, the visible church? In other words, what are the criteria by which men are to judge in the exercise of this responsibility which is committed to them? The church is not a haphazard assemblage or organisation. It is the communion of the saints and has specific character determined by the specific character of those constituting it and by the specific purposes for which they are associated together. It is not a voluntary society in the sense that the members and officers may by their own prerogative or discretion devise the terms and conditions of association. These terms are prescribed by the Head of the church: the church is the institute of Christ.

What we find in the New Testament is that the constituting bond of communion was common faith in Christ and that the condition of admission to the fellowship was this same common faith (*cf.* Acts 2:38–42; 8:13, 35–38; 10:34–38; 16:14, 15, 31–33). This faith, however, did not have any automatic way of evidencing itself and, consequently, could become effective in gaining admission to the fellowship of the saints only by confession or profession. This means that faith was registered by confession, and the criterion by which the church exercised its administrative responsibility in the admission of members was confession. In its essence this confession was that Jesus was the Christ, the Son of God, and that he was Lord. Such a confession had far-reaching implications for faith and con-

duct even within the sphere of human judgment. Mere lip confession, contradicted by other evidence either in the realm of faith or conduct, could not be accepted for entrance into or continuance in the fellowship of the saints. We may, therefore, define the confession as an intelligent and consistent profession of faith in Christ and of obedience to him. It is obvious that such confession falls within the orbit in which human discrimination and judgment may be exercised. It is not the prerogative of man to search the heart of another. But it is the prerogative of man to judge in reference to public confession or profession. This, therefore, is the criterion in accord with which human administration is exercised. And what needs to be emphasised here is that this is so by divine institution. It is not the expedient of proven experience. And it is not simply a necessity arising from the limitations inherent in human nature. It is by divine institution that the church, as a visible entity administered by men in accordance with Christ's appointment, must admit to its fellowship those who make a credible profession of faith in Christ and promise of obedience to him. To exclude such is to arrogate to ourselves prerogatives which do not belong to us and it is to violate the institution of Christ.

This profession, though it is a profession that only a true believer can honestly and truly make, is, nevertheless, of such a nature that those who do not have true faith may make it to the satisfaction of those responsible for that administration whereby admission is secured into the fellowship of the church (*cf.* Acts 8:13, 20–23). We are here faced with the anomaly that the visible entity which is called the church may comprise within its membership those who do not really and truly belong to the body of Christ. Even when human vigilance is exercised to the fullest extent of its prerogative, people may be admitted to the church, and necessarily admitted as far as human administration is concerned, who do not really belong to the church of Christ. This is an anomaly which must be fully appreciated and we must not make attempts to eliminate it. There are two dangers we must avoid and into which we are too liable to fall.[24]

[24] For a history of thought and debate on this question in New England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, centering particularly around what has been called the Half-Way Covenant, *cf.* Williston Walker: *The*

The first danger is to construe the confession as not a confession of true and saving faith but simply of intellectual and historical faith.[35] In this way it might appear that the dis-

Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism, Chapter XI, (New York, 1893), pp. 238–339.

[35] The position developed in the pages which follow is that of the Reformed Churches in their representative and classic expressions. It is set forth, for example, in the Westminster Standards. The Westminster Confession says: "Sacraments are holy signs and seals of the covenant of grace, immediately instituted by God, to represent Christ, and His benefits, and to confirm our interest in Him: as also, to put a visible difference between those that belong unto the Church, and the rest of the world; and solemnly to engage them to the service of God in Christ, according to His Word" (Chapter XXVII, Section I). And the Larger Catechism even more explicitly says: "A sacrament is an holy ordinance instituted by Christ in his church, to signify, seal, and exhibit unto those that are within the covenant of grace, the benefits of his mediation; to strengthen and increase their faith, and all other graces; to oblige them to obedience; to testify and cherish their love and communion one with another; and to distinguish them from those that are without" (Question 162). With reference to baptism the Confession says: "Baptism is a sacrament of the new testament, ordained by Jesus Christ, not only for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible Church; but also, to be unto him a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his giving up unto God, through Jesus Christ, to walk in newness of life" (Chapter XXVIII, Section I). And the Larger Catechism: "Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, wherein Christ hath ordained the washing with water in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to be a sign and seal of ingrafting into himself, of remission of sins by his blood, and regeneration by his Spirit; of adoption, and resurrection unto everlasting life; and whereby the parties baptized are solemnly admitted into the visible church, and enter into open and professed engagement to be wholly and only the Lord's" (Question 165). *Cf.* the Shorter Catechism, Questions 92 and 94.

William Cunningham with his usual thoroughness and erudition has dealt with this question and has set forth the classic Reformed position in distinction from the Lutheran position and also in distinction from deformations and aberrations that have crept into Churches professing the Reformed confession (see the essay, "Zwingle and the Doctrine of the Sacraments" in *The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation*, 1866, pp. 262–291). Of particular interest is the quotation from Martin Vitringa in which we have a summary of the doctrine of the Reformed Churches on this point (*ibid.*, pp. 264 f.). The quotations also from Samuel Rutherford, George Gillespie, Thomas Boston, and John Erskine are most pertinent and instructive. See also Charles Hodge: *Systematic Theology* (New York, 1873), Vol. III, pp. 562 ff.

crepancy between the fact that the church consists of those who are members of the body of Christ and the fact that many may be admitted into the fellowship of the visible church who are not truly members of the body of Christ is removed. It is a false solution. There is no warrant whatsoever for supposing that the confession which we find in the New Testament, by which members were admitted into the fellowship of the church, was a profession of mere intellectual or historical belief. It was the confession of like nature with that which Peter made at Caesarea Philippi, a confession which elicited from our Lord the benediction, "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven" (Matt. 16:17). It is most instructive in this regard that the confession of Peter provided the occasion for the most significant disclosure made by our Lord respecting the church: "Upon this rock I will build my church" (Matt. 16:18). However we may interpret the word "rock" in this utterance there can be no question but that the church confession is the kind of confession made by Peter. And this means that the confession requisite for membership in the church is the confession of Jesus as the Christ, as the Son of God, as Saviour, and as Lord. It is a profession of true and saving faith.

It is not by any means the prerogative of those who administer the government and discipline of the church to determine whether the profession made is a true and sincere profession of such faith. A judgment of this kind would exceed the warrant of men. But it is the prerogative and duty of those who rule in the church of God to make plain, both in the instruction and examination of candidates for admission, what the meaning of the profession is and to insist that only the regenerate, only those united to Christ by faith, can truly make the profession required. There is thus the fullest scope for the examination of candidates in ascertaining the intelligence and consistency of the profession made, in instructing candidates respecting the nature of the Christian confession, in dissuading those who do not have true faith from making the profession which they cannot sincerely and honestly make, and in maintaining the purity of the church against the entrance of the ignorant and profane. But this examination, it

must be remembered, is not conducted on the premise that to the officers of the church or to the church as a communion is given the prerogative to determine who are regenerate and who are not. It is conducted, rather, on the basis that to the ministry of the church belongs the obligation to insure as far as possible by instruction and warning that only those united to Christ will make the confession which only such can truly make. It is the function of the church to demand an intelligent, credible, and uncontradicted confession that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God.

The second danger that must be avoided is the tendency to define the church in such a way as would seem to eliminate or at least tone down the discrepancy or anomaly with which we are dealing. This again is a mistake. Our definition of the church must not be framed in terms of an accommodation by which we make provision, *within our definition,* for the inclusion of hypocrites, that is to say, of those who profess to be Christ's but are not really his. Our definition of the church must be framed in terms of the constitutive principle, to wit, that the church consists of those who are united to Christ and are members of his body. It is the communion of saints. And it is precisely that body of believers in fellowship with Christ and with one another, associated together in the world in accordance with Christ's institution, which is called in the New Testament "the church" and is what we often call the visible church. We may not abandon this constitutive principle, we may not accommodate our definition in order to make allowance for the fact that some make the profession who do not have the faith and who enter into the fellowship without the bond that constitutes it.[26]

[26] It is very easy to fall into this kind of accommodation when we begin to apply the distinction between the church as invisible and the church as visible. And, indeed, it may appear to be necessary in order to avoid other pitfalls, especially the pitfall of the Romish doctrine of the church. In the esteem of the present writer this appears rather conspicuously in James Bannerman's excellent work, *The Church of Christ.* His definition of the visible church is framed in terms that do not appear to be supported by New Testament usage (*cf. op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 29 ff.). The terms in which Bannerman develops the distinction between visible and invisible and frames his definition of the visible church seem to provide us with a very simple and effective polemic against Rome. The controversy with Rome

Perhaps no passage evinces this more clearly than Paul's salutation to the church at Corinth in his first epistle: "Paul called to be an apostle of Christ Jesus through the will of God, and Sosthenes our brother, to the church of God which is at Corinth, to them who are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints, with all those who call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, their Lord and ours" (I Cor. 1:1, 2). However we may construe the precise syntactic relation which the expression, "the church of God which is at Corinth", sustains to the two clauses which immediately follow, it would be exegetical violence to think that the church of God at Corinth may be construed in other terms than the "sanctified in Christ Jesus" and the "called to be saints", as also those at Corinth who "call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ". In other words, this provides us with Paul's concept of the church at Corinth, namely, those sanctified in Christ Jesus and called to be saints, and he does not conceive of the church in broader terms so as to distinguish between the church and those sanctified and called. In this epistle this is all the more illumining because in chapter 5 he proceeds to deal with those who had made the Christian profession and who were in the fellowship of the church but who by reason of gross sin were to be excluded from its communion. In dealing with the incestuous person he demands the delivering of "such a person unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh" and adds, "Know ye not that a little leaven leavens the whole lump? Purge out therefore the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, as ye are unleavened" (vss. 6, 7). He continues the subject of discipline and says, "If any one that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or a thief; with such an one no not to eat" (vs. 11). Paul recognises that people bearing the Christian name and therefore admitted to the fellowship of the church might be proven to be or turn out to be profane persons having no inheritance in the kingdom of God (*cf.* 6:9, 10). He commands that such

must, of course, be unabated, but it does not appear to be sound to conduct this controversy on the basis of a definition which does not find its counterpart in the Biblical usage with reference to the church.

be put outside the fellowship of the church (*cf.* 5:13). He recognised the facts which arose from the sinfulness and infirmity of fallen human nature. But the instructive feature of this epistle is that when Paul addressed the church and conceived of it he did not construe the church at Corinth in such terms as would allow for the inclusion, in what he defines as the church, of those persons who might have borne the Christian name and been admitted to the communion of the saints but who were not sanctified in Christ Jesus and called to be saints. Paul recognised that there was old leaven in the church at Corinth, leaven which needed to be purged out. But when he addresses the church he does not address it as a community to be defined in terms of old leaven and new unleavened bread. He does not define the church in terms which would make allowance for both elements. No, he addresses the church as those sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints, and who call upon the name of the Lord Jesus Christ. Other salutations of Paul are to the same effect. I Thessalonians 1:1 and II Thessalonians 1:1 are particularly relevant. He salutes the church at Thessalonica as "the church of the Thessalonians in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ" (I Thess. 1:1; *cf.* Rom. 1:7; II Cor. 1:1; Eph. 1:1; Phil. 1:1; Col. 1:2).

It is true that hypocrites may secure admission to the church. As we have seen, the very administration which Christ has instituted for the admission of members allows for that. There are disciples who are not truly disciples, and there are branches in the vine which are not vitally and abidingly in the vine. But while we fully recognise this fact we must at the same time distinguish between the constitutive principle in terms of which the church is defined, on the one hand, and the *de facto* situation arising from the way in which Christ has chosen to administer the affairs of his church in the world, on the other. The inclusion and exclusion are in the hands of fallible men. This administration is of divine institution. Hence those who are not Christ's gain admission.[27] Here is

[27] *Cf.* Calvin: *Inst.* IV, i, 7 and 8.

In refraining from the attempt to define the church in terms of an accommodation that will make allowance for the inclusion of hypocrites we are

the anomaly. We have to recognise and contain it. It persists in its sharpness because we refuse to define the church in lower terms than the body of Christ and the communion of the saints. It is that definition that creates the anomaly and we may not revise the definition in order to relieve the tension. For the anomaly in this case is just one way in which the discrepancy between God's secret and infallible operations, on the one hand, and the way by which He has pleased to administer the means of grace in the world, on the other, appears. This discrepancy manifests itself in other connections. And we must not attempt to remove the discrepancy by eliminating or modifying the truths which create it. In this case it means that we must continue to define the church as the body of Christ, the *congregatio fidelium*, the *communio sanctorum*.

Baptism is the sign and seal of membership in the church. It is administered, therefore, to those who make the requisite confession of faith in Jesus. According to our Lord's institution in the great commission baptism in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is an integral part of the process of discipling the nations and is therefore an essential mark of discipleship. Baptism is not an addendum to discipleship but that by which discipleship is consummated. And discipleship comes to fruition and receives its vindication in the observance of all things which Jesus has commanded. In the terms of the great commission the church consists of those who are disciples. Since discipleship is not consummated without baptism we must regard baptism as an indispensable mark of the church. The person who refuses baptism and declines the reproach of Christ, which it entails, cannot be received as a member of Christ's body. And the organisation which discards baptism and thereby evinces its rejection of the authority and Lordship of Christ cannot be accounted a branch of the Christian church.

following the same lines as would have to be followed in defining the kingdom of God. We are not forgetful of the parables of the tares and the wheat and of the drag net. There is a mixture in the kingdom, and Christ will at the end gather out of his kingdom all things that offend and them which do iniquity. But we may not *define* the kingdom of God in terms of accommodation to this *de facto* situation. We must define it in terms of the rule and realm of righteousness, life, and peace.

The Church Generically One

It is necessary to distinguish between the form of the visible church under the Old Testament and its form under the New. Such a distinction is implied in the words of our Lord to Peter: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it" (Matt. 16:18). Jesus was referring to the new form which the church was to assume in consequence of his own messianic work. He calls it "my church". Full allowance must be made for the new form of structure and administration established by the death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. Nevertheless the distinction does not warrant the denial of the existence of the church under the Old Testament, nor of the generic unity and continuity of the church in both dispensations. In addition to the fact that the organisation of the people of God in the Old Testament is expressly called the church (Acts 7:38), we must bear in mind that the church in the New Testament is founded upon the covenant made with Abraham. The specific covenant administration under which the New Testament church operates is the extension and unfolding of the Abrahamic covenant. This is distinctly the argument of the apostle Paul in the epistle to the Galatians when he says, "they which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham" and that the "covenant, confirmed beforehand by God, the law which was four hundred and thirty years afterward does not make void, so as to make the promise of no effect" (Gal. 3:9, 17). It is the blessing of Abraham, a blessing secured to him by the covenant administered to him, that comes upon the Gentiles through Christ (Gal. 3:14). The church as it exists in the respective dispensations is not two organisms. It is likened to one tree with many branches, all of which grow from one root and stock and form one organic life (Rom. 11:16–21). Paul again reminds us that while the Gentiles were at one time "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel and strangers from the covenants of promise", yet now in Christ Jesus they are "no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God, being built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the

chief corner stone" (Eph. 2:12, 19, 20). There is generic unity, continuity, and identity. Only within this generic unity may the specific distinctions be recognised and applied. It is putting the matter mildly when we say that there are principles, common to both dispensations, which are operative in, and must be recognised as applying to, the distinct forms which the church assumed in the respective dispensations. Perhaps no other datum is more relevant and conclusive to establish the unity and continuity of the church in both economies than the fact that the New Testament is the expansion and unfolding of the Abrahamic covenant, that all nations are blessed in terms of the promise given to Abraham, "In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed" (Gen. 12:3), that Abraham is the father of the faithful, and that New Testament believers of all nations are Abraham's seed and heirs according to promise. It is this basic and underlying unity of the covenant of grace and of promise that establishes the generic unity and continuity of the church. In terms of covenant union and communion the church is but the covenant people of God in all ages and among all nations. The promise which epitomises the unity, and which summarises the constitutive principle, of the church is, "I will be their God, and they shall be my people". This is the promise of grace upon which rests the communion of the people of God in all ages. It applies to the New Testament as well as to the Old and to the Old no less than to the New. It is also the bond that unites them inseparably together.

(to be concluded)

ADVERBIAL — *u* IN SEMITIC

EDWARD J. YOUNG

TWO Hebrew adverbs, פִּתְאֹם and שִׁלְשֹׁם are characterized by their ending ם֑—. Different explanations of this ending have been offered. As an interesting curiosity we may note that Joh. Simon listed פִּתְאֹם with a group of other words ending in *-m*, believing that in each case the *-m* had an intensive significance.[1] Some of the words so listed were אֱמֶת, דֹּרוֹם and even עוֹלָם and שָׁלוֹם. As to שִׁלְשֹׁם he suggested that it was compounded of שָׁלוֹשׁ and יוֹם. This same suggestion had evidently been made also by Gesenius,[2] although Roediger notes that the word is of the form פִּתְאֹם. As to פִּתְאֹם Gesenius suggests that it is written for פִּתְעֹם, the ע having changed into א, and that it is from פֶּתַע and the adverbial ending ם֑—.[3]

In the second edition of Gesenius-Kautzsch-Cowley פִּתְאֹם is treated as an adverb formed from a substantive by the addition of the formative syllable ם֑—, and the *o* is thought to be probably obscured from an original *â*.[4] At the same time the possibility is admitted that the word may be a noun used adverbially. What is of interest for our present purpose is this suggestion that the *o* really represents a shift from original *â*, since this word is discussed in connection with adverbs formed with the suffix ם֫—, and the impression is given that both these suffixes ם֫— and ם֑— contain an *a* vowel. If this were actually the case, it would be very interesting to consider why in the adverbial suffix the *a* should appear both as ם֫— and also as ם֑—, and this question is largely left unconsidered in the grammars.

According to Bauer and Leander both פִּתְאֹם and שִׁלְשֹׁם exhibit a locative *-u*.[5] They admit, however, that their explanation is doubtful.

[1] Joh. Simon: *Arcanum Formarum Nominum Hebraeae Linguae*, Pars Prior, Halae Magdeburgicae, 1735, pp. 585 f. and Addenda.

[2] In the third volume of Gesenius: *Thesaurus Philologicus Criticus Linguae Hebraeae et Chaldaeae Veteris Testamenti*, Lipsiae, 1853, p. 1430.

[3] *Op. cit.*, vol. II, 1840, p. 1141.

[4] A. E. Cowley: *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar as Edited and Enlarged by the late E. Kautzsch*,[2] Oxford, 1910, p. 295.

[5] Hans Bauer and Pontus Leander: *Historische Grammatik der Hebräischen Sprache des Alten Testamentes*, Halle, 1922, pp. 529 f.

At the same time they do have the merit of recognizing the Ḥolem as a *u* vowel.

Joüon treats the two words separately.[6] שְׁלֹשׁוֹם he regards as having been borrowed from the Akkadian, *ina šalši ūme.* As to פִּתְאֹם he thinks that it stands for *pit'ām* through a weakening of the ע of פָּתַע and a compensatory lengthening of the *a.*

However, in most of the discussion of these words hitherto, there appears to have been a failure to recognize the fact that the ם־ in words such as יוֹמָם, חִנָּם *etc.*, has arisen under stress of the accent from the adverbial accusative *–am.* On the other hand, when adverbial *–um* is accented, it appears in Hebrew as ם֑—.

The true identity of the Ḥolem in פִּתְאֹם was, as far as I know, first pointed out by Mr. Matitiahu Tsevat in a seminar conducted by Dr. Cyrus H. Gordon. It is that the Ḥolem represents an original *u.* and the ending ם֑— is adverbial in force. In reality the ending corresponds to adverbial *–um* of Babylonian, found, for example in *qirbum bâbilī* ("within Babylon"). In all probability this is also the explanation of שְׁלֹשֹׁם.[7] The – *u* in such cases has adverbial force.

As is well known, and as has long been recognized, the adverbial *–u* appears in Akkadian,[8] The vowel often appears in combination

[6] P. Paul Joüon: *Grammaire de l'hébreu biblique,* Rome, 1923, p. 268.

[7] J. Barth (*Die Pronominalbildung in den semitischen Sprachen,* 1913, p. 130) says: "Demonstratives *m* sehe ich in dem postfigierten Element der determinierten Zeitbestimmungen: äth. *tĕmāl-em* 'gestern', *gês-am* 'morgen, der nächste Tag', hebr. שִׁלְשׁוֹם 'ehegestern'." In a recent review of Gordon's *Ugaritic Handbook* (*Journal of Biblical Literature,* Vol. LXIX, Dec. 1950, p. 387) W. F. Albright remarks: "Actually, as proved by the Amarna references which De Langhe cites, there is an adverbial ending *–um-ma,* corresponding probably to Old Accadian *–um* (cited by De Langhe), and certainly to Hebrew *–ōm* and Arab. *–umma* (*cf. hᵃlōm=halumma, pit'ōm*)." However, the Ḥaṭeph Pathaḥ in *hᵃlom* does not represent an *a* vowel, and hence the two words themselves are not to be equated.

William L. Moran has also called attention to the adverbial ending. "The latter (*i. e., parāsum* (*–ma*) *iprus*) shows the old adverbial ending *–um* found in expressions like *qerbum Bābili and lītum Dagan,* and therefore literally means 'with deciding he decided' " ("The Use of the Canaanite Infinitive Absolute as a Finite Verb in the Amarna Letters from Byblos" in *Journal of Cuneiform Studies,* Vol. IV, No. 3, p. 172).

[8] Thus, Delitzsch had long ago written (*Assyrische Grammatik,* Berlin, 1889, p. 220), "Ein mit Pronominalsuffix verbundenes, von *ina, ana* oder *ištu* abhängiges Subst. kann dadurch gleichsam adverbialisiert werden, dass, unter Weglassung der Praep., ein langes û zwischen Nomen und Suffix eingefügt wird". The *u,* however, is not long, but short.

with *–m* to form the ending *–um*, and the word may then be employed in place of a preposition. Thus, for example, instead of saying, *ina qereb bâbilī* ("within Babylon") we may also say *qirbum bâbilī*. When employed with the suffix the *–m* is assimilated, and we have such forms as *qir-bu-uš-šu* and *qi-ir-bu-uš-ša*.

This phenomenon is fairly common in Akkadian, and we may also note the following examples, *ṣîru-uš-šu-un* ("against them"),[9] *ṣi-ru-uš-šu* ("against him").[10] In his grammar Ungnad also adduces the following: *libbû šamê* for *ina libbi šamê* ("in the heart of heaven"), *šaptuḳki* for *ina šapti-ki* ("by thy lip") and *edênuššu* ("he alone").[11]

The adverbial ending *–um-ma* is also quite common. Thus: *eqlum me-ri-èš-tum-ma-a-at* ("the field is under cultivation"),[12] *šú-ur-ru-um-ma* ("immediately").[13] In the Nuzu texts many examples occur with *–um-ma epêšu*.[14] Thus, *ḫa-du-um-ma epêšu* ("to stab"),[15] *ḫe-is-mu-um-ma epêšu* ("to tear"?),[16] *ḫu-šu-um-ma epêšu* ("to inflict physical injury such as breaking an arm").[17]

We find this same adverbial *–u* in the Ugaritic infinitive absolute. The following examples, taken from Gordon's *Ugaritic Handbook*, may be noted.[18] *Rḫb. rḫbt* ("thou art indeed hungry"), *ġmu. ġmit* ("thou art indeed thirsty"), *yspi . spu* ("he indeed eats"), *bt . krt . bu . tbu* ("she enters the house of Keret"). The enclitic *–m* may also be added, *e. g., mtm . amt* ("I shall surely die"), *brkm ybrk* ("he

[9] Ashurbanipal's First Egyptian Campaign 3.

[10] Sennacherib's Second Campaign 10; Third Campaign 4.

[11] Arthur Ungnad: *Grammatik des Akkadischen*[3], 1949, p. 79.

[12] Cyrus H. Gordon: "Šamši-Adad's Military Texts from Mari" in *Archiv Orientální*, vol. xviii (1950–, No. 1–2, p. 207).

[13] Letter of Tušratta to Amenophis III, No. 3, line 27.

[14] A full list is given in Cyrus H. Gordon: "The Dialect of the Nuzu Tablets" in *Orientalia*, Vol. VII, 1938, pp. 20–31. This idiom is used with Hurrian loanwords. *Cf.*, also, Gordon: "Evidence For The Horite Language From Nuzi" in *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, No. 64, Dec. 1936, pp. 27 f.

[15] *Publications of the Baghdad School* (*American Schools of Oriental Research*), Vol. IV, "Proceedings In Court", transcribed by Edward Chiera, Text 337:20.

[16] *Ibid.*, 331:16.

[17] *Ibid.*, 331:5, 8.

[18] Cyrus H. Gordon: *Ugaritic Handbook*, 1947, I, p. 68. Note also the interesting use of *ka-ša-du-um-ma ak-šu-dam*, *Archives Royales De Mari*, III, *Correspondance de Kibri-Dagan*, par J. R. Kupper, Paris, 1950, No. 7, lines 7, 8.

verily blesses"). In each of the above cases the infinitive absolute ends in *–u*, and also has adverbial force.

That the adverbial *–u* appears also in Arabic seems to be clear. Certain nouns in Arabic when used in the accusative without nunation have the force of prepositions.[19] The absence of the nunation in such cases is generally accounted for on the grounds that these words are really constructs and so followed by a noun in the genitive. It should be noted however that many of these words are also employed with Ḍamma and also without nunation. In this case it does not seem possible to explain the absence of nunation upon the grounds that the word is in construct, since the Ḍamma remains even when the word follows a preposition.[20] Hence, we have such combinations as مِنْ قَبْلُ, مِنْ بَعْدُ, مِنْ حَيْثُ, *etc.*

In the grammars these phenomena are noted, but little attempt at explanation is made.[21] The correct explanation appears to be that we have here the adverbial *–u*, and that the words have the force of true adverbs.

It has not been the purpose of this present paper to make an exhaustive survey of the occurences of the adverbial *–u* in the Semitic languages. The purpose, rather, has been to call attention to the presence of the phenomenon, which has long been recognized in Akkadian, but not generally recognized in other Semitic languages. Here then is but another evidence of the importance of the study of comparative Semitic linguistics.[22]

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[19] *E. g.*, قَبْلُ *before*, عِنْدَ *with*, *etc.* For a complete list see William Wright: *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, Vol. I, 1933, pp. 281 f.

[20] The word is now regarded as a true adverb, and apparently for this reason has no nunation.

[21] Ewald had noted that the *u* was an adverbial termination. "*Adverbium* si e nomine derivatur praeter terminationem accusativi plenam aliam breviorem habet, vocalem simplicem *u* . . . illud *u* contra adverbium per se stans et hactenus nominativo similius indicet" (*Grammatica Critica Linguae Arabicae*, Vol. I, Lipsiae, 1831, p. 345).

[22] I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Cyrus H. Gordon for helpful suggestions made during the course of preparation of this article.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

R. A. Knox: *Enthusiasm. A Chapter in the History of Religion, with Special Reference to the XVII and XVIII Centuries.* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1950. viii, 622. $6.00.

The author calls this volume "the Book", the kind of book which "is the whole of a man's literary life" (p. v). When something like this happens in connection with a member of the Knox family, the result is bound to be worth attention. With the death of Bishop E. A. Knox, one of the most vigorous and most respected leaders of the Evangelical wing of the Church of England vanished from the terrestrial scene. He left behind him three sons who have enlivened England these many decades past. E. G. V. was for years editor of *Punch*, the master of ceremonies of English humor as well as a contributor himself; Wilfred L. offered many learned New Testament studies to the grist of discussion from the standpoint of an Anglican Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge; our present author, Ronald A., is a monsignor of the Roman Church and one of the more sparkling of the cultured apologetes for that faith in England. His pen is ever busy and he has just completed, singlehanded, a translation of the entire Scriptures.

As a master of English phrase, Ronald Knox stands high. "The satirist of the *Provincial Letters* was a man, I think, who was hard put to it all his life to restrain his fidgets" (p. 201); Luther became "the father of a national establishment whose gross humours his theology of imputed righteousness did nothing to purge" (p. 398); "Herrnhut was to eighteenth-century Protestantism much what Moscow is to twentieth-century Socialism; you feared to accept its alliance" (p. 406); "nothing reveals the preconceptions of a mind like its exclamation marks" (p. 482); "I think Whitefield was one of those men who possess genius unalloyed with any vestige of good taste" (p. 490); and, finally, of the theological differences between Wesley and Whitefield, "never were theologians so resolved to make a molehill out of a mountain" (p. 496).

As may be observed from the foregoing, these flashes sometimes have more wit than wisdom. This phenomenon is further apparent in lengthier passages. For example, there are several pages concerned with the genius of Luther and the Reformation which conclude with the statement that

"the theology of grace and good works" was "a by-path, and some would say a blind alley, . . . into which all the great figures of the Reformation followed him (Luther); so that to us this controversy appears integral to the very nature of Protestantism, whereas in fact it is a side-issue" (p. 130). I can only murmur humbly, Comment superfluous, in the light of all that has been said on the subject. Indeed, Knox sometimes reminds one of a Communist who knows more about what Americanism is than any one else. At the risk of being hoist by my own petard, may I add that even his judgments of Catholicism do not invariably appear to me to strike the mark. Controversy does not always weaken a church, and to blame the unreadiness of the Roman Church in France to face the Revolution on St. Cyran and the Jansenist efforts smacks a little too much of Greek generosity (p. 229). May even a Protestant make bold to say that but for criticism from some source, Jansenist or other, the ethical level of the French Church would have been even less ready than it was to face the hostility of the Revolution?

Knox's incisive critique would be more certain of a hearing if he would refrain from slapping his opponent occasionally with the broad side of his sword. A person who has heard of the institutions at Torre Pellice, Rome and elsewhere in Italy is not likely to be factually impressed by the statement that "the Waldenses have survived as a kind of museum-piece, ruminating, in the valleys of Piedmont, the memories of an inconsiderable past" (p. 390). It soothes the literary palate, but is it true?

Once in a while we stumble over a slip which has nothing to do with denominational distinctions. If Ray Strachey were a male as the "Mr." prefixed and the masculine pronouns (pp. 575 f.) imply, she could hardly have borne a son and a daughter to her husband, Oliver Strachey, whatever the religious views of her grandmother.

But enough of such matters lest the reader be turned aside from the rich possibilities of learning much and wisely from this book. It is already apparent that the literary graces of the book are abundant, and these are often turned to good account. The comparison of Jansenism and present-day religion is a stylistic masterpiece which conveys a wealth of learning (pp. 228 f.). (If only examination questions which begin "Compare . . ." were answered with one-quarter of the felicity and factuality of this paragraph!) Quietism is a doctrine the inward spirit of which is a bit elusive for the quick and facile grasp. Knox's analysis of it (esp. pp. 273 ff.) is splendidly accomplished. The study of the essential drives of George Fox and the Quakers is unusually good. The fact is noted that the great men of early Methodist evangelicalism took the Calvinist side (p. 457).

One of the crowning merits of the book is the clarity with which it differentiates between the Radicals and the Lutheran and Calvinist Reformers. Even though Knox sees little merit on either side, listen to this: "To the enthusiast, the Bible is infallible when interpreted by an inspired person. To the Reformers, it possessed an inherent infallibility, and needed only clarification, which was a matter for the learned" (p. 134). Speaking of George Fox, he says, "It is, indeed, difficult to dispense with the sacraments if you accept the plain words of Scripture as your rule of faith. But Fox's attitude towards Scripture was . . . not that of the Reformers . . . . Fox could not look upon the Bible as a collection of title-deeds, from which you derive your warrant for this or that; he was living *in* the Bible, his prophecies, his convincements, his power of reading hearts, were simply the continuation of what had been going on sixteen centuries before" (pp. 152 f.).

There is an interesting analysis in connection with the discussion of the genius of Jansenism. "At first sight there appears to be no reason why belief in a doctrine of grace which approaches toward Calvinism should go hand in hand with very strict moral standards; you could argue the other way. But the secret of it is surely this. If you believe in the Fall as a shattering blow that unmade man to his very essence, then in the first place you are surprised that man should be in a condition to attain salvation at all — it must be mere grace . . . . And in the second place you begin to suspect common human virtues . . . . Thus you conceive that some level of conduct and of prayer very much above the ordinary must be needed, as the passport to heaven" (pp. 209 f.). In that passage you can see Calvinism being Romanized before your very eyes! It should be read in full, not in these snippets. The magic of the words is almost irresistible. The essential character of Roman moral theology is rather clearly visible between the lines of the discussion of Pascal's *Provincial Letters* (pp. 213 ff.). Protestant moral theology has no need of adopting the Roman principles but it would much more nearly approach doing God's work in the world today if it would show a greater measure of the understanding and sympathy which often flow from the Roman confessor of the better sort.

Ronald Knox is the child of an evangelical household but his book offers little evidence of that fact. He has been an able and devoted student in the Roman school. The book from its foundation up is built in accordance with the principles of the Church which recognizes the paramount authority of the Bishop of Rome. The influence is all-pervasive. A grand sense of humor helps the atmosphere (for example, p. 97, line 29). But one cannot see much ground for objecting to Puritan discipline in Puritan states where

"sin became a crime, to be punished by the elect with an intolerable self-righteousness" (p. 133), when one is a devoted upholder of a Church whose principles of civil intolerance are constantly being expressed even by more intelligent members in such words as "the Catholic Church, being convinced that she is the one true church, claims for herself alone the right of freedom" (F. Cavalli in *Civiltà Cattolica*, April 3, 1948). The duty of recognizing a distinction here is not to be shirked, if one is fair. But, may the point be made in this way? Which is less tolerable: to be forced to refrain from playing bowls on Sunday, or to be forbidden to obey the divine commandment to proclaim publicly the gospel as set forth in the Holy Scriptures? The former took place in Massachusetts Bay, the latter is the current situation in Spain. The reader of the book must constantly remember that everything he reads is based upon Roman presuppositions. Usually this is easy enough. In fact, some passages would not be thoroughly intelligible to one who had no acquaintance with the technical terminology of Catholic devotion. But in other places, as, for one example, in the evaluation of the Moravian piety, a reminder is in order.

The plan of the book is to concentrate attention upon the enthusiastic phenomena, whether Protestant or Catholic, of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hence the attention to earlier movements, while extensive, is on a smaller scale and things that happened after 1800 receive very little attention. It is Jansenism, Quietism, the Quakers, and the Methodist movement which, therefore, occupy about two-thirds of the volume. The sources used are to a large degree secondary, but Bossuet's Correspondence, the *Spiritual Guide*, Madame Guyon's *Autobiography*, Wesley's *Journal* and other primary works are extensively utilized. The secondary sources seem to be responsible for a slip like the statement that the Paulicians held an Adoptionist Christology (p. 81). This is contradicted on pages 93 and 125, and probably reflects a reference to the views of the Thonraki as expressed in the celebrated document published by Conybeare in the nineteenth century, *The Key of Truth*. Other shadings also undoubtedly reflect secondary sources.

There are excellent opportunities for self-criticism afforded to evangelicals by this book. If for no other reason it ought to be widely read. Who could fail to recognize the lineaments of some modern missionary societies and certain educational institutions in the description that begins in the middle of page 448? There is probably not one American evangelical out of a thousand who would not richly benefit from checking himself against the "five main weaknesses" that Knox presents as characterizing the "whole Jansenist approach" (p. 188). Even if there are a hundred, the reviewer

would have thought the book a bargain (if he had had to pay for it) for the benefit he received from this procedure.

The analysis of enthusiasm as Platonism with, in some of it more prominent manifestations, a liberal admixture of Augustine is very helpful (pp. 579 f.). The enthusiast himself has no time for intellectual inquiry. As Knox says, "It is this by-passing of an historic tradition in favour of a personal experience that has created the modern religious situation in England, and to some extent in the English-speaking world" (p. 589). But "in the long run the issue is" *not* "between some kind of authority and unrestrained private judgment" (p. 577). It is between biblical authority, expressed in the historic tradition, interpreted by private judgment and everything else. If this seems too lax to Mr. Knox, he could ask himself whether the fear of enthusiasm is cheating him out of a legitimate foretaste of "the liberty of the glory of the children of God".

The great merit of the book is to provide everybody with ample evidence of the difference between "enthusiasm" — the evangelical world today is full of it — and a sane, factual, historic, biblical Christianity. In the long run the latter is the only thing that stands up under the tensions of modern life.

There is a bibliography of some usefulness and an excellent index.

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Karl Jaspers: *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. iv, 188. $3.00.

Existentialism as represented by Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre is notoriously atheistic. On the other hand, the standpoint of Søren Kierkegaard, the fount from which current existentialist streams issue, was certainly even if ambiguously oriented toward Christianity. In view of the polar opposition between atheistic existentialism and existentialist Christianity, it is natural to expect a standpoint of mediation, making a vigorous effort to bridge the gulf between the two extremes of existentialist thought. Such a position is represented by Karl Jaspers in *Der Philosophische Glaube*, for which the indefensibly misleading English title *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy* has been adopted by the translator and publisher. The original title suggests a dialectical synthesis between philosophy and faith, reconciling the antithesis between the unbelieving philosophy of

Heidegger and Sartre and the unphilosophical and even anti-philosophical faith of Kierkegaard and Barth.

Three questions suggest themselves to the reviewer:

1. Is Jaspers' philosophical faith Christian?
2. Is Jaspers' philosophical faith theistic?
3. Is Jaspers' philosophical faith rational, is it philosophical faith?

Jaspers is, on the whole, admirably candid in his statements as to the relation of his philosophical faith to Christianity. His position is that, although it contains fundamental content of permanent validity indispensable for philosophy, historic Christianity in any recognizable form must be abandoned. This contention permeates the entire book but is rendered explicit in the chapter on philosophy and religion, where he contends that the claim to exclusivity, admittedly an original element in Biblical religion, is catastrophic for men and must be fought against, although it is also the case that "Biblical religion is one of the well springs of our philosophy, and in it we gather irreplaceable truth" (p. 88). The claim to exclusivity embraces such elements as the denial that all men are children of God, the belief that only believers in Christ have eternal life, the Deity of Christ and his atoning sacrifice. In view of this rejection of the distinguishing features of Christianity, we may conclude that the Biblical religion which Jaspers commends is at most Judaism rather than Christianity. This is confirmed by a glance at the elements of Biblical religion which Jaspers accepts as valid for philosophical faith, *e. g.*, the idea of the one God, the realization of the absolute nature of the decision between good and evil in finite man, love as the fundamental actualization of the eternal in man, the idea that the ultimate and only refuge is with God (pp. 107 f.). Jaspers' formulation of these principles may or may not be adequate, but in any case nothing distinctive of Christian faith is to be found in any of his formulations.

Jaspers' argument against the exclusive claims of Biblical religion is worthy of exposition and examination for which space is at present lacking. It will be sufficient to observe that he asserts that "the absoluteness of historical truth implies the relativity of every formulation of it, and of all its historically finite manifestations" (p. 91). This assertion, significantly accepted by the "Neo-Orthodox" theologians as well as by existential philosophers, involves the paradox that universally valid statements are always based on relative standpoints and methods, while historical or existential truth is absolute but not qualified by universal validity. The Kantian antithesis between universally valid scientific judgments and

judgments of faith in the spheres of history and value is here fatefully evident. Jaspers is unquestionably correct in recognizing the incompatibility of this epistemological perspective with historic Christianity. It is deplorable, however, that he spoils such solid logic by an emotional tirade against the intolerance of historic Christianity, which he asserts but does not demonstrate to be the inescapable consequence of the claim to exclusivity. The *reductio ad absurdum* of Jaspers' contention here is to be detected in his own admission that his position requires to be intolerant of historic Christianity. His adroit rationalization is that one must be intolerant only of intolerance (which of course does not refer to one's own admitted intolerance), or in other words one must tolerate all who agree with one's own "liberal" relativistic attitude. But it would appear to follow from his principles that the masses of humanity who have some sort of dogmatic absolutistic outlook may be ruthlessly suppressed, Christians not excluded. Why this view should be designated tolerance is just a trifle difficult to discern. What is illuminating in this discussion is the self-contradictory character of the conception of tolerance derived from a relativistic view of truth. This self-destructive trait of the "liberal" view of tolerance, which has been so persistently directed against orthodox Christianity, becomes apparent as soon as a thinker as consistent as Jaspers pushes the implications of the view to the limits.

One point has been established by Jaspers' own confession: his philosophical faith is not Christian in character. We may now turn to the question: even if it is not the true faith of Christianity, is it at least an authentic religious faith in the sense of theism? The argument of *Der Philosophische Glaube* contains much evidence to support a *prima facie* judgment of affirmative quality. Jaspers' analysis of Being as a whole, which he terms "das Umgreifende", translated by "The Comprehensive", culminates in a reference to "transcendence". Jaspers' statement as to the meaning of transcendence runs as follows: "Transcendence is the being that never becomes world but that speaks as it were through the being that is in the world. There is transcendence only if the world does not consist only of itself, is not built upon itself, but points beyond itself. If the world is everything, then there is no transcendence. But if there is transcendence, perhaps there is something in the world's being that points to it" (pp. 12 f.).

It is refreshing to discern in Jaspers a German philosopher who frankly reflects the one-sided doctrine of immanence that has been characteristic of most of the German philosophy of at least the last 150 years. Jaspers stands to Schelling or even Hegel in much the relationship in which Barth stands to Schleiermacher on the issue of transcendence and immanence.

As with Barth so with Jaspers, however, two questions can be raised if not definitely resolved: 1. Is transcendence without immanence a revival of the deistic doctrine so deadly to all vital piety? and 2. Is even a one-sided deistic transcendence not rooted in unconscious or half-conscious presuppositions of an immanentistic character?

Jaspers is not unaware that his doctrine is suspect on the first count. He writes: "To religion the God of the philosophers seems threadbare, pale, empty; it disparagingly calls the philosophical state of mind 'deism' " (pp. 78 f.). This of course is no evidence of deism on the part of Jaspers, except for a psychologist who delights in accusing men of being involved in something for no other reason except that they repudiate it violently. Even such psychologists sometimes stumble on some truth and it may be that in the present case it is worth while to probe further. Jaspers' rejection of supernatural Christianity while accepting a kind of "Biblical Theism" is akin to the 18th century deistic preference of natural (*i. e.* an attenuated Biblical) religion to full-blooded revealed religion. This may be symptomatic, but it is not demonstrative, for pantheists have been known to accept some abstracted and isolated points of Biblical religion while rejecting the full-orbed system of revealed truth (though, for the pantheist, rejection has frequently assumed the form of acceptance with "re-interpretation"). A study of Jaspers' more extended treatment of transcendence in his massive logic might be required before the allegation of deism can be disposed of. His view eludes precise definition in a brief work such as that before us, unless we could infer that the very designation of transcendence, as one among many modes of "The Comprehensive", implies that God is one ingredient of reality alongside of other ingredients, at best a *primus inter pares*, but not absolute Being, Being itself, the Source, Sustainer and Sovereign of all created reality. As to the presupposition of immanence, the vague but evidently self-identical all-inclusive category of "the Comprehensive", suggests an orientation ultimately pantheizing in character, even though "God" be alloted a restricted place in the scheme, much as some absolute idealists made allowance for a finite God within the Absolute. Presumably this is not Jaspers' intent, but how it is to be avoided within the framework of his system of categories, he fails to make clear in his work. Perhaps it is the reviewer's fault, not Jaspers', but the reviewer remains perplexed after reading the book as to whether Jaspers' philosophical faith is authentically theistic or whether it hovers in the void between deism and pantheism.

If Jaspers is essentially either a deist or a pantheist, he is in any case neither an 18th century deistic rationalist nor a 19th century pantheistic

rationalist nor even a romantic pantheist of the optimistic breed. He is rather a child of our time, if not a flaming irrationalist or "orthodox Kierkegaardian", at any rate a pathetically schizophrenic intellect, clutching desperately at the rational which he himself terms "nihilism". Jaspers' preoccupation with "nihilism", so typical of mid-century existential thought (*cf.* Heidegger's analysis of "Nothingness" in *What is Metaphysics?* and Sartre's systematic work *L'être et le néant* (*Being and Nothingness*)), is rendered explicit in his chapter on "Philosophy and Anti-philosophy". Perhaps the most wholesome note struck in the entire volume is the confession at the close of this profound and penetrating analysis of the forms of nihilism that "we must never overconfidently suppose that we have overcome it" (*i. e.* nihilism) (p. 155).

More than any other contemporary existentialist, Jaspers appeared concerned to save reason, to salvage as much as possible of the Perennial Philosophy from the debacle that has overtaken us and of which we appear on the brink of reaping the uttermost harvest. The concluding chapter on "The Philosophy of the Future" exhibits Jaspers' urge to conserve the entire classical philosophical tradition, while exposing that tradition to the acid criticism of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Is there in Jaspers' attitude to philosophical reason in the existential chaos of our and his own today and tomorrow, something of the Nazi youth's brand of faith in National Socialism, when in reply to his mother's word: "My boy, you don't believe that yourself", he said resolutely: "No, I don't believe it, but one has to believe it"? (p. 162). Behind the rationalistic camouflage of our western philosophical tradition from which even an existential thinker like Jaspers has not completely emancipated himself, there is evident a tremendous insecurity in view of the threat of blank nothingness and utter meaninglessness impending over Western civilization, or rather over the entire world. It is much to be doubted whether reason provides any solid ground for the sort of philosophical faith that he advocates. Certainly there is not the least scintilla of support for it in revelation. Jaspers' faith is, in the last analysis, a faith in man, intimated in the central chapter entitled "Man", in which the last lurking place of existentialist faith, the free will of man or the autonomy of human personality, exhibits the spectacle that modern man is not yet quite completely disillusioned. For Jaspers to praise Pascal's insight into the grandeur and misery of man, among other concessions made to the Augustinian outlook on human nature (pp. 52–54), is inadequate as long as it is supposed that any ultimate autonomy can be guaranteed to man by a "transcendent" Deity. There is a truly Biblical sense in which man's existential freedom is the gift of God's trans-

cendence, and it is to be hoped that Jaspers may eventually find his way to that resting place. So far, it is clear that he is not even on the right road, though it is no small encouragement to observe that he is aware of the road and makes an effort to reckon with it.

It is the reviewer's opinion that accuracy of translation has more than once been sacrificed in a futile effort to make some sort of respectable English out of German philosophy. A more literal rendering would perhaps make Jaspers' meaning somewhat more intelligible in spots.

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Roland H. Bainton: *Here I Stand.* New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press. 1950. 422. $4.75.

In a day when Protestants no longer protest — or if they do, they protest against sending an American envoy to the Vatican or against special favors shown Catholics by civil authorities and the press — it is a distinct contribution to the Protestant faith to bring forth a life of Martin Luther. It was Luther whose gifted tongue and ready pen inspired that great protest against *both* the political machinations *and* the spiritual darkness of the Roman Church from which we have derived our heritage as Protestants. Therefore, to recall to our minds the issues with which the Reformation was concerned is to perform a service of great value to a sleepy and indifferent Protestantism. Such a service has been performed by Dr. Roland H. Bainton in *Here I Stand.*

Dr. Bainton, who holds the Titus Street Professorship of Ecclesiastical History in the Yale Divinity School, is one of the foremost Reformation scholars in this country — a fact which in itself lends considerable worth to this work. Of equal importance to the impact which this book will have upon the reading public is Dr. Bainton's mastery of the concise, dramatic style. Though he is dealing with a body of material almost unparalleled in biographical research, Professor Bainton never descends to the pedantic nor does he permit himself or his readers to become entangled in a maze of critical problems. From the nearly one hundred over-sized volumes of Luther's works Dr. Bainton has drawn a picture of the great Reformer's mental and spiritual struggle which is neither cumbersome in its reach nor laborious in its effort at giving a complete portrayal of its subject. The tense drama and the heaving tumult which characterized Luther's struggle,

first with himself and then with the Church, is reproduced with remarkable fidelity in the crisp directness of the author's style. This style of *Here I Stand* is strongly reinforced by the numerous reproductions of rare contemporary woodcuts and engravings — many of them from Dr. Bainton's own collection. These illustrations help to create and maintain within the reader something of the currents of thought and feeling which prevailed in the midst of the historic struggle.

In the early chapters of the book — chapters which he entitles The Vow, The Cloister, and The Gospel — Dr. Bainton presents in rather convincing detail the circumstances and events of Luther's early years which prepare the way for an understanding of his subsequent activities. The atmosphere of home and school and the impact of medieval religion upon a bright and sensitive child are factors which Professor Bainton clearly suggests had their influence in setting into motion the forces which ultimately stirred Luther to revolt against Rome. The description of Luther's parents is as stark and effective as are the accompanying woodcuts. "The atmosphere of the family was that of the peasantry: rugged, rough, at times coarse, credulous and devout. Old Hans prayed at the bedside of his son, and Margaretta was a woman of prayer" (p. 26).

Dr. Bainton engages in a brief but penetrating analysis of medieval religion which he characterizes as deliberately inducing tensions "playing alternately upon fear and hope. Hell was stoked, not because men lived in perpetual dread, but precisely because they did not, and in order to instill enough fear to drive them to the sacraments of the Church. If they were petrified with terror, purgatory was introduced by way of mitigation as an intermediate place . . . . If this alleviation inspired complacency, the temperature was advanced on purgatory, and then the pressure was again relaxed through indulgences" (p. 28). This interplay of tensions, says Dr. Bainton, was the prevailing atmosphere in which the ordinary man of Luther's day lived, and in all of these factors, he points out, there is nothing whatever to set Luther off from his contemporaries. The attempts to discover some peculiar factor in Luther's experience which made him react as he did in later years are set aside as quite unfounded in fact. On the other hand, Dr. Bainton discovers in the fact of Luther's extraordinary sensitivity the one element which accounts for the great Reformer's reaction. Whereas other men heard the threats and promises of the Church mingled with the closer sounds of earth, Luther, with singular intensity, heard their antipathetic clamor to the exclusion of every other sound. Thus, constantly torn between hope and despair and consumed with the feeling of his need for additional grace, Luther took refuge in the cloister. Says Dr. Bainton,

"The meaning of Luther's entry into the monastery is simply this, that the great revolt against the medieval church arose from a desperate attempt to follow the way by her prescribed" (pp. 35 f.).

That same intensity of response to the Church's demands for the saving of his soul characterizes Luther's years as a monastic. The experiences of this period of Luther's life reveal clearly the fact that by disposition and training the Reformer was not a child of the new Humanism which fostered so much other contemporary dissatisfaction with Rome. In a few brief paragraphs Bainton gives a forceful picture of Luther's efforts to achieve holiness by self-abnegation, but "the trouble was that he could not satisfy God at any point .... Luther simply had not the capacity to fulfill the conditions" (p. 46). Or, as Dr. Bainton points out in another place in the words of Dr. Staupitz, Luther did not have the capacity to fulfill those conditions as Luther's own intense sensitivity demanded. Said Staupitz to Luther: "Man, God is not angry with you. You are angry with God. Don't you know that God commands you to hope?" (p. 54). Had Luther been endowed with a duller conscience he might never have been awakened to the gross inconsistencies of the path to heaven the Church had staked out for him. It was not a skeptical attitude which led Luther to revolt, but was rather one of faith. This Professor Bainton makes very plain in his account of Luther's trip to Rome, for though as he says, "Luther had gone to Rome with onions and returned with garlic", nevertheless he went as one of the faithful and was diligent to seek there all the benefits the holy city could confer.

The chapter on The Gospel recounts with moving simplicity the climactic steps of Luther's monastic struggle. Luther's assiduous confession, added to his search for holiness by self-denial, and his attempt to climb the mystic ladder to union with God are all treated by Dr. Bainton with great sympathy. In his account of Luther's turning to the Scriptures there is preserved something of what must have been Luther's breathless delight as his search led him into the light. The language of the biographer seems to catch Luther's new feeling toward the gospel in one single sentence: "The gospel is not so much a miracle as a marvel, and every line is suffused with wonder" (p. 63).

The middle section of *Here I Stand* (pp. 68–214) is a fast moving, highly dramatic recounting of the attacks which Luther made upon the walls of the papacy — an account which fairly vibrates with interest as it seeks to maintain the tempo of the crises which continually crowded Luther and which he himself forced. It is impossible to comment upon all the excel-

lencies of this section and yet stay within the bounds of a review. However, it must be said that here Dr. Bainton displays masterful skill in writing a history of those times which is at once technically sound and singularly readable. In relatively few pages he has made those eventful times "come alive" for the lay reader of church history.

Bainton's discussion of Luther's attack on indulgences is worthy of particular notice. He includes sufficient details of interest about the practical working of the indulgence trade of the 16th century to keep the reader's attention, but not too many to weight the account unduly. With a characteristic facility for converting the raw material of history into objects that sparkle with meaning for modern readers, Dr. Bainton refers to indulgences as "the bingo of the 16th century". Here, as in all his dealing with the weaknesses of both Luther and the papacy, Dr. Bainton evinces a good-humored critical attitude which knows no pseudo-reverence for the parties in question. He is not at all restrained by fear of affront to Catholic dignities, and one can almost see the twinkle in his eye when he remarks of Leo, whose indulgence proclamation began the tumult, that he was "as elegant and as indolent as a Persian cat .... The duties of his holy office were seldom suffered to interfere with sport. He wore long hunting boots which impeded the kissing of his toe" (p. 74).

Luther is admittedly an extremely controversial figure, yet Dr. Bainton does an excellent job of maintaining a balance with respect to the Reformer. He treats Luther with evident sympathy, yet not with blind reverence. Luther's references to the pope as Antichrist are often an occasion of reproaching him for his intemperate language. Bainton, however, is careful to point out that Luther viewed the Antichrist in a collective fashion and thus he did not necessarily speak evil of a particular pope, but rather of the institution of the papacy (p. 111). Nor does Dr. Bainton allow the charge that Luther was an evil, disruptive or self-centered revolutionary. The great Reformer would not retreat before his opponents because "Luther, who had so trembled before the face of God, had no fear before the face of man" (p. 135).

In at least two other particulars Dr. Bainton displays a sympathetic evaluation of Luther's thought and activities. On several occasions Luther was guilty of using incendiary language and inciting to violence. On the occasion of his reply to Prierias Luther asked: "Why do not we rather assault them (*i. e.*, the Romanists) with arms and wash our hands in their blood?" (p. 149). He afterwards explained that he really did not mean what the words imply. Says Professor Bainton: "The disavowal was

genuine. His prevailing mood was expressed in a letter to a minister who was prompted to leave his post. Luther wrote: 'Our warfare is not with flesh and blood' " (*idem*). Likewise, some have questioned Luther's motives in seeking a delay in his reply to Eck at Worms. But Dr. Bainton holds that Luther was genuinely terrified at the realization of his responsibility, so much so that he could not answer (see p. 183). Yet Luther's lapses are not passed over without notice. In his interview with Cajetan Luther was confronted by the cardinal with his denial of the Church's Treasury of Merit. Of Luther's reply Dr. Bainton says it "was both rude and irrelevant. Luther blustered because he was cornered" (p. 95).

A brief word must be included about the account of Luther's trial at the Diet of Worms. This chapter bears the title of the book itself and it epitomizes the spirit of the whole work. Dr. Bainton has brought together in this chapter the hatred of the papalists, the irritation and impatience of the emperor, the fears and courage of the Reformer. In a terse style he effectively recreates the tension and interplay of forces that made Luther's appearance before the Diet such a significant occasion. Dr. Bainton's comment on the authenticity of the words which form the title of the book serves to underscore the drama which inheres in this account. Says he: "The words, though not recorded on the spot, may nevertheless be genuine, because the listeners at the moment may have been too moved to write" (p. 185).

The last section of the book concerns itself with the work of Luther in implementing in Saxony the Reformation which he had begun. Here Professor Bainton deals with Luther's thought and work as it crystallized and appeared in concrete form in the reform of the mass and the translation of the Scriptures. This portion of the book loses none of its vitality while dealing with the more subtle movements of Luther's thought, for it (like the rest of the work) presents that thought as it was forged in the heat of conflict and by the pressure of circumstances. Luther's position on the universal priesthood of believers insofar as it affects the secular callings is handled most appealingly. Luther dignified every task of life so that even the meanest tasks become opportunities of serving God. This teaching of Luther is handled with considerable delicacy of feeling for the value of the Reformer's contribution at this point. With comparable fairness, Dr. Bainton deals with the difficult problem of Luther's relation to the Peasant Revolt. Although he in no wise excuses the great Reformer for his unfortunate blast against the peasants, Bainton is careful to point out that Luther had often declared that he would not support the private citizen in arms, however just the cause. He also records that Luther's

tract was late in leaving the press and appeared just at the time the peasants were being butchered, whereupon Luther sent out another tract appealing to the nobles to use clemency (see p. 281).

One of the warmest chapters in the book is that which deals with Martin Luther's marriage to Katherine von Bora and with their subsequent family life. In this chapter Dr. Bainton comes as closely as possible to an understanding of Luther, the man. When we read of Katie's ministrations to his many illnesses and of her assuming responsibilities that had before been a weight about his neck, we begin to feel some of the difficulties under which this valiant figure labored. The anecdotes related betray an occasional irascibility on Luther's part toward his family which he dearly loved and these help us to feel the unremitting pressure which bore down upon him. In this aspect of Luther's life Dr. Bainton discovers an important contribution of Luther which may often be overlooked. "The Luther who got married in order to testify to his faith actually founded a home and did more than any other person to determine the tone of German domestic relations for the next four centuries" (p. 298). Luther wrought a change in the attitude toward marriage which is no less revolutionary than his reforms in theology. Says Dr. Bainton: "He began to portray marriage as a school for character. In this sense it displaces the monastery, which had been regarded by the Church as the training ground of virtue and the surest way to heaven" (p. 300).

While it is unquestionably true that *Here I Stand* is an outstanding contribution to the life and faith of the church, it is so because of its extremely simple and concise style. This is a biography which should have a tremendous appeal to the ordinary layman. By the same token, from a theologian's point of view, Bainton's presentation of Luther's doctrine and position often leave much to be desired. It may be countered that *Here I Stand* was intended to be a *life* of Luther and not a study of his doctrines — a fact to which we readily give our assent. Nevertheless, Luther's unique position in history and his most valuable gift to us as Protestant Christians is the new insight he gave to the church in doctrinal matters. Consequently, it would seem that a fuller exposition should have been given of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith in particular. This is not to say that such teachings are passed over in this volume, but in this one particular especially a more complete unfolding of Luther's meaning seems to be required.

This same difficulty appears in what Bainton has to say of Luther's view of the church. There exists some doubt in the reviewer's mind as to the actual position which represents Luther's best thought on the nature

of the church. Was the territorial church Luther's controlling thought, or did he continue to cling to a more individualistic view of the church? This question is never satisfactorily answered by Dr. Bainton because he does not dip as deeply into Luther's writing on this subject. At least, the reader's cup is not so full on this occasion.

The method of listing references deserves some comment. No footnotes or numbers indicating references appear on the pages of the biography itself. All references are listed in a separate section at the back of the volume. This, of course, makes for a neat page of print throughout the book. However, it does increase the difficulties of tracing references and anyone but the more casual reader might prefer to have the reference appear with its occurrence in the text. The rather extensive bibliography should prove helpful to the serious student of Luther. There is, it may be noted in passing, a typographical error which occurs twice in the book — on pages 109 and 238 — the reference to the "sectaries" appears as "secretaries".

A word in closing. *Here I Stand* is a notable piece of biographical work whose style and content recreate in a high degree of accuracy the atmosphere, feeling, thought and activity of its subject, Martin Luther. Not the least part of its success in this matter is Dr. Bainton's own vigorous style which at so many places gives pulse and movement to the material he presents. Dr. Bainton is thoroughly familiar with the Luther materials, and, as a consequence, the raciness of Luther's own language — its blunt forthrightness — pervades the whole book. "Lutherisms" abound throughout its pages and the contemporary drawings with which the pages are liberally sprinkled provide the reader with a feeling for the times. The volume is well bound and very tastefully printed in an extremely legible type. We commend it heartily to every class of reader — historian, theologian and layman. It cannot but make each reader aware of the importance which Luther attached to his Reformation principles. May it be the means of stirring many readers to a consciousness of their solemn responsibility before God to establish their lives upon sound principles and to join in the fellowship of Luther who said, "My conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and I will not recant anything, for to go against conscience is neither right nor safe. God help me. Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise. Amen."

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E. G. Schwiebert: *Luther and His Times*. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 1950. XXIII, 892 and LXV plates. $10.00.

It may be significant that two biographies of Martin Luther should come from the press almost simultaneously. Dr. Schwiebert's *Luther and His Times* saw the light of day at almost the same time that Professor Roland Bainton's *Here I Stand* was offered to the public. We are fortunate to have added to the body of our English writings on Luther two such distinguished volumes. Though they are rather different in style and scope, both the volumes represent a major contribution, not only to church history, but to our appreciation of the significance of Luther and his work for our own life and times. It is to be fervently hoped that these works will stir the church from her lethargy to a renewed contest for purity of doctrine and piety of life.

Dr. Schwiebert brings to his task a life-long interest in Martin Luther and hence a strong sympathy for his subject. His Master's thesis was written on the subject "Martin Luther as a Preacher", and for the last ten years he has engaged in intensive research on Luther both here and in Germany. But more than this, he served for three years as assistant to the late Preserved Smith of Cornell University. While he does not evidence the penetration and originality of his mentor, Dr. Schwiebert is possessed of a similar historical sense and scholarly integrity.

Luther and His Times is a monumental piece of work. As its title implies, it is not merely a life of Luther; it is in many respects a chronicle of Luther's times. The author's aim has been to provide the reader with a biography of the Reformer and at the same time to lead him in search through the society, religion and politics of Luther's day for new clues to understanding Luther's development and to feeling the impact which he made on his contemporaries. Here within the scope of one volume is a compendium of material not only on Luther, but on the period of the Reformation itself. The ample references, together with the extensive bibliographical data, bring within the ken of the reader of this volume a considerable part of the material relevant to Luther and his times.

The chapters of the book are divided into five parts, beginning with those concerned with the European scene. The first chapter, as one might expect, deals with the background of the German Reformation as it appears in the growing need for reform as the power of the papacy developed in the church.

It is in this first chapter that we are introduced to what Dr. Schwiebert considers the new approach of his work. He insists that the German Ref-

ormation be regarded as a "very involved movement, the work not of Martin Luther and a few fellow professors, but of an army of people, some 22,000 students, priests, monks, and laymen carrying the Gospel message to the German people" (p. 3). What Dr. Schwiebert does is to correct a popular misconception that Luther singlehanded went forth to do battle against the papal armies. So indeed it appears to the casual reader of history, but as one follows the author of this volume through his examinations of the University of Wittenberg, of the imperial organization and its many difficulties, and of the qualities of a most important figure in the drama, Frederick the Wise, the conviction grows that the "picture becomes almost kaleidoscopic in its confused complexity". To just what extent Dr. Schwiebert succeeds in demonstrating his thesis is a matter for subsequent consideration.

The second chapter is devoted to a delineation of the political affairs of the day — the Age of Charles V. The cumulative effect of Dr. Schwiebert's account of the complications of the imperial organization and commitments can readily be summed up in a word of commiseration for the emperor. Poor Charles! deeply involved in rivalry with Francis I of France over territorial claims in northern Italy, mistrusted and misunderstood by his Spanish subjects, opposed by the papacy in his aspirations to the imperial throne and threatened by the Turks in the east, he was in the midst of all this confronted with an irritating dissension in his German territories which had arisen over the disputed doctrines of a Wittenberg professor of theology. Thus distracted by a multitude of problems which more immediately threatened his throne, Charles delayed and moved cautiously in Luther's case and thereby the Reformation was given time and favorable circumstances to establish itself.

The chapter on the history of Saxony is rather involved, but the narrative is related with evident skill, and in spite of its complexity, the reader may follow it with a minimum of confusion. It is not exactly clear how such details are all contributory to the "Luther story" though they are certainly of interest as general background material.

A reconstruction of the 16th century atmosphere is included which is of indubitable value in affording the reader a rather realistic picture of the environment which Martin Luther knew. The descriptions — both contemporary and reconstructed — of the 16th century towns go far toward conveying a feeling of participation in the economic and social life of that day.

Dr. Schwiebert presents the man about whom he writes — his heritage, personal qualities and early development — in the section he calls "The

Protagonist". At the outset of his dealing with Luther Schwiebert makes a statement regarding his conception of the Reformer which is rather typical of his whole treatment of his subject. "Following the last seventy-five years of Luther research some very fundamental changes have been made in our conceptions of Martin Luther. Catholic historians have been forced to be far more cautious and less abusive; while Lutheran scholars discovered that much of the traditional Luther could not be substantiated, and the original Luther must be re-established on the basis of sound historical evidence" (p. 102). This fairness and honesty with respect to so controversial a figure is one of the commendable features of this work.

The information which the author provides concerning Luther's boyhood, his early education, and his university experience is quite exhaustive, yet in no sense is it dull nor laboriously presented. It is interesting to discover in the more detailed treatment which Dr. Schwiebert gives to this period of Luther's life a confirmation of the view advanced by Professor Bainton in his work mentioned above that there was nothing in Luther's experience save that of a normal Catholic youth, and that it was Luther's deeply serious and reflective nature which accounts for his later course. One characteristic mark of the scholar Dr. Schwiebert evidences himself to be appears in this connection. Several accounts are given of the circumstances surrounding Luther's entrance into the monastery at Erfurt. Dr. Schwiebert quotes the dubious accounts and proceeds in sober and systematic fashion to compare them with Luther's own statements. Here, as in numerous places, he is very careful to give the reader all the information at present available.

In order to still the disquietude which had often surged in the young Luther's mind about the state of his soul, he gave himself to the monastic life. But, as the world has long known, the more earnestly Martin Luther tried to follow the Church's prescriptions for salvation the more hopeless became his state of mind. In the monastery he tried to reconcile the Church with the Fathers, and the Fathers with themselves. Schwiebert includes at this point a brief analysis of the various positions of the Schoolmen from which any reader may easily discern the justice of Luther's remark to Melanchthon about the "inconsistencies in the disputations". An integral part of Luther's search for holiness in the monastery is his trip to Rome. In this account we not only learn many of the conditions of Luther's journey, but also get clear insight into the chicanery and superstition which was rife in the Eternal City. Schwiebert does not even mention the erroneous tradition that when Luther reached the top step of the Sancta Scala he thought of the words of the prophet: "The just

shall live by faith". Throughout the fifty pages of this chapter the reader is provided with ample material to demonstrate the confusion in Luther's mind and to prepare the way for understanding his turning to the Scriptures alone for their instruction.

Part three is concerned with the University of Wittenberg, and is one of the most original parts of this work and at the same time one of the least interesting. The description of the town of Wittenberg is exact and perhaps more complete than any similar record. Its unique value lies in the fact that it is brought into direct association with the man for whom the town is most remembered. The University also is described in a rather minute fashion. Its situation in the town, its accommodations, its library and its finances are all dealt with in the greatest detail. Since the great Reformer figured so prominently in this town and in the university for such a long period of its most active years, these details are extremely informative of the relation which Wittenberg bore to the world of Luther's day. Though this fact is readily acknowledged, it does not enliven the material. In an effort to give contemporaneity to the financial records of the university, Schwiebert translates the values of Luther's day into those of 1913 on the basis of Preserved Smith's estimates. The reviewer is skeptical, however, of the value of such a comparison. What do the values even of 1913 mean to us in 1950?

It is evident from Luther's early training that it was not from a Humanistic tendency (in the ordinary sense of Humanism) that Luther was led into the course he ultimately followed. Dr. Schwiebert regards Luther's work as the result of what he calls Biblical Humanism, which embodied a search for the original standards of Christianity. Says Dr. Schwiebert: "Erasmus, Reuchlin, Luther, and Melanchthon . . . saw in the classical languages the *media* for the rebirth of primitive Christianity in all its pristine purity" (p. 275). This Biblical Humanism was one of the chief influences in shaping Luther's development, and at the same time Luther was one of the chief contributors to the rise and development of Biblical Humanism. In this connection Schwiebert reiterates his previous assertion that Luther was brought up a staunch Roman Catholic and he continued so to regard himself. Though "he had begun to drift from the pale of the Roman Church as early as 1506, . . . he did not realize the full extent of his departure until the Leipzig Debate in 1519" (p. 282). There is no evidence of any invidious motive in Luther's action save his consuming desire to discover and come to terms with God. "In rediscovering the God of the Bible, Luther had to evolve a whole new theology. It is not exaggeration to say that Luther virtually 'lifted himself by his own bootstraps' from one world to another . . . . The rediscovery of the world of St. Paul and

the spirit of early Christianity was a long and painful undertaking, for it required a mastery of Greek and Hebrew, the languages in which the original Bible had been written" (pp. 280 f.). This concept which Schwiebert advances seems quite sound and is determinative in evaluating the forces inherent in Luther's reform.

Under this influence Luther was led into the serious study of Greek and Hebrew and thus to his tremendous "Tower Discovery" of the doctrine of justification by faith alone. The story of that discovery is well known, but Dr. Schwiebert makes a somewhat original contribution when he connects that discovery directly with the winning of Luther's colleagues at Wittenberg to this same view. This is intended to bear out the author's previous contention that the Reformation was not just the work of Luther alone. True it is that it was Luther's discovery and that it was he who led the Wittenberg faculty into agreement with him. But Schwiebert's point is that the simple fact of their agreement is a factor of tremendous import to the Reformation. "That this heretical uprising was not just the case of one man was sensed by the Sorbonne a few years later, when, in condemning Luther's writings, this distinguished faculty pointed out that in Wittenberg there was not just one viper in the bosom of Mother Church, but a whole nest of vipers" (p. 302).

The chapters dealing with the early attempts to silence Luther and with Frederick the Wise's position in the conflict are deserving of special commendation. Luther's contacts with Eck prior to those which centered about the Leipzig Debate, and his interview with Cajetan are treated with great fairness to both the Catholic and Lutheran parties. It must be admitted, however, that Schwiebert's loyalty to Luther does at times prevent him from revealing to the full Luther's weaknesses. At this point in his book *Here I Stand*, Roland Bainton calls attention to Luther's quibble over the statement of the bull *Unigenitus* concerning the Treasury of Merit. Schwiebert passes over this without a reference to Luther's cavil. It is quite foreign to Dr. Schwiebert's attitude toward Luther to say with Bainton, "The reply was rude and irrelevant. Luther blustered because he was cornered."

The inside story of the tempting and bribery of Frederick the Wise is fully and fascinatingly told. The reader's admiration for the Elector is greatly increased when one is brought to realize the pressures he withstood and the blandishments he refused in his loyalty to his theologian whose theology he as yet did not fully understand.

In accord with the view set forth in the opening chapter, Dr. Schwiebert focuses attention on the discussion of papal primacy in the Leipzig Debate. The record of that debate is given with painstaking fullness and Schwie-

bert's description of Carlstadt, Luther and Eck as debaters greatly increases the reader's grasp of the atmosphere of that encounter. Luther's capacity to cite passages from the Fathers and from Scripture appears with dramatic emphasis in this chapter. For on several occasions when Eck had quoted a passage Luther, without previous preparation, was able to correct Eck's interpretation by establishing it properly in its context. But the fact which Schwiebert deems most significant and the one which receives his most careful attention is the fact that Eck led Luther into a denial of papal primacy. Schwiebert insists all along that Luther did not realize he was drifting from the pale of the Roman Church because he did not view the papacy as essential to the organization of the primitive church. Of this debate Schwiebert says: "The Leipzig Debate greatly accelerated Luther's theological development .... During all of his conflict with the Roman critics over the *Ninety-Five Theses* and his other polemical writings he had insisted that he was a good Roman Catholic. In the Leipzig Debate ... Eck's blind, fanatical acceptance of a position that seemed untenable on the basis of the clearly revealed Word of God made Luther realize that the whole Roman hierarchy rested on a very flimsy foundation. He determined that the principle of *Sola Scriptura* would have to be the basis for testing all decisions of church councils and the official decrees of the Papacy as recorded in Canon Law" (p. 416).

The evidence which Dr. Schwiebert presents is more than sufficient to prove his contention that Luther's break with Rome did not stem from any will to revolt or from any more ulterior motive than to achieve purity in the church. Luther came to his decision to break with Rome only gradually because he did not at once see the true character of the Roman Church in relation to his new understanding of the true church. "Catholic historians have tried to prove that Luther's new definition of the Church was the direct result of his break with Catholicism; on the contrary, Luther's new understanding of the true Church inevitably led to a rejection of the Roman Church" (p. 454). This raises the question of what Luther considered the true nature of the church — a vitally important question since from it stems a whole branch of the Christian church. It is Schwiebert's contention that for Luther the only church worthy of the name is the invisible body of believers, rather than an institution. The view that Luther's organization of the Territorial Church is due to remnants of Catholicism probably stems from an attachment of the views of post-Luther theologians to the views of Luther himself. It would seem that Schwiebert makes his point at this juncture, though a more thorough examination of the actual sources would be more convincing.

The well known trial before the Diet at Worms and the months spent at the Wartburg Castle are handled with thorough fullness, With the return from the Wartburg, Schwiebert launches into the last section of his work in which he treats with evident sympathy the efforts of Luther at applying his reform principles. It is in this period of Luther's life that his prodigious powers become most apparent. In earlier years his energies were directed only to the establishment of his claims against Rome. In these last years of his life Luther marked out the paths the Reformation Church would follow in almost every sphere. The crowning achievement of this period was Luther's translation of the Bible into German. What Schwiebert has to say about Luther's principles as a translator is perhaps not new, but he adduces ample evidence to make his comment convincing. "It is clear", says Schwiebert, "that Luther always attempted to grasp the meaning of the original and then to recast it into the clearest possible German expression" (p. 652).

Certain remarks seem in order upon the manner in which Schwiebert deals with popular accusations against Luther. Perhaps the most frequently voiced accusation against Luther is that he incited men to violence in the struggle and urged his followers to use forceful means to bring about the reform. But with one or two notable exceptions Luther gave no countenance to violent measures. It is acknowledged that Luther made use of strong and sometimes abusive language, but he was rather consistent in his opposition to spreading the faith by force. Schwiebert quotes Luther as follows: "I will preach it, teach it, write it, but I will constrain no man by force, for faith must come freely without compulsion" (p. 541). These were Luther's words to the Wittenbergers who in his absence resorted to the forceful imposition of reform. Schwiebert even calls Luther's policy one of "patient tolerance and reliance on the Gospel" (p. 543).

How then are we to interpret Luther's incendiary language in his reply to Prierias? Says Schwiebert: "There is no doubt that here Luther used language which was far from becoming to a theologian. But to argue on the basis of this one passage that Luther actually favored an attack by armies on Rome is hardly in keeping with good historical criticism. Considering the total of Luther's references to the use of arms in the interest of reform, this outburst cannot be upheld as typical" (p. 465). Also, "Melanchthon pointed out how zealous Luther had been in the defense of the Gospel, asserting that Luther had never been violent for personal reasons. Only when someone exalted the Papacy above God or made light of the precious Gospel, had he raised his voice in righteous indignation" (p. 464). Schwiebert points out with some justice that Luther's poor

health and the pressures of his duties were contributory to much of his ill-tempered remarks on certain occasions. Likewise, his coarseness must be viewed in the light of the coarseness which was general at that time. Schwiebert acknowledges Luther to have been no diplomat — he allows that he was probably too blunt and outspoken, but these constitute no great crimes.

In two notable instances, however, it is to be feared that Schwiebert allows his Lutheran sympathies to get in the way of his customary forthrightness. He views altogether too lightly the conciliation of Melanchthon at Augsburg and he passes over too quickly the lapse of Luther in the affair of Philip of Hesse's "Turkish Marriage". A fuller treatment of this incident might tend to obviate suspicions that no satisfactory answer may be given. It is necessary also to revert to Schwiebert's view that the Reformation was a complex movement in which Luther was the commanding officer rather than the sole champion. This volume certainly provides abundant evidence of the involvement of a great host of people in the reform movement, but even with his thesis before him Schwiebert cannot hide the impression that it was in fact the great Reformer who carried everyone and everything on his shoulders.

However over-sympathetic Schwiebert may have been in a few instances, this is no condemnation of his work. The figure about whom he wrote was one who commands the highest respect and, in many instances, honor. The author of this volume is not to be criticised if he is enthusiastic in his praise. Preserved Smith, who did not share Schwiebert's natural ties with the Reformer, provides ample justification for our author's high view of Martin Luther when he says: "His grandest quality was sincerity. Priest and public man as he was, there was not one line of hypocrisy or cant in his whole being. A sham was to him intolerable, the abomination of desolation standing where it ought not. Reckless of consequences, of danger, of his popularity, and of his life, he blurted out the whole truth, as he saw it, 'despite all cardinals, popes, kings, and emperors, together with all devils and hell.' Whether his ideal is ours or not, his courage in daring and his strength to labor for it must command our respect" (p. 747).

Luther and His Times is well supplied with illustrations, including woodcuts, contemporary drawings and old maps. There is a section of sixty-five excellent plates, portrayals of most of the Reformation figures and locations rich with Lutheran associations. The book is attractively bound — in every respect a valuable addition to the scholar's shelf.

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Paul S. Minear: *The Kingdom and the Power. An Exposition of the New Testament Gospel.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press. 1950. 269. $4.50.

This volume merits consideration because it is representative of a current trend in New Testament studies and yet is remarkably unstereotyped, both in conception and execution, in giving expression to its contemporaneous point of view. This trend is usually characterized as a return to a concern with Biblical Theology. As such it has been marked by an emphasis upon the "unity" of the thought of the New Testament in correction of the centrifugal tendencies of many studies, especially of the earlier decades of the present century. And it has been stimulated by the movement represented by such influential persons as Kierkegaard, Barth and Niebuhr to treat and evaluate the message of the New Testament in theological terms rather than merely as a significant phase of the development of religion. American Biblical scholars are at present sharply divided in their reaction to this movement. Many prominent critics, who perhaps may be characterized as radical liberals, regard it as reactionary and are quite impatient with it. It has considerable virility, however, and its representatives give no signs of quaking and turning to flight under the impact of such criticism. In Dr. Minear, who for a decade was a professor at Garrett Biblical Institute and now is associated with Andover Newton Theological School, it has a competent and singularly eloquent spokesman and champion.

The representative character of this book is observable from the subtitle with its reference to *the* New Testament Gospel. The New Testament proclaims a single message in spite of its diversity and complexity, though we are warned not to adopt any interpretation which would force its thoughts "into a formal, external harmony" (*cf.* p. 11). Both because of the exceptionally comprehensive utilization of New Testament data and language, and because of the rhetorical heights to which the author soars, one is not readily afforded precise information as to what exactly this single message is. Certain summary statements such as the following assist one to find one's way:

> When Jesus' disciples called him 'Lord,' they pointed to a single event with a triple implication: God had made him Lord by raising him from the dead; God had raised them with Jesus to be servants of this Lord; God had begun a new creation, transforming the world into a Kingdom under the sovereignty of this King (p. 83).
>
> The key event is to be found, according to the gospel, in the victory of the Lamb that was slain; the key person is he to whom God gave

> all wisdom and glory, dominion and power. To those who share in the suffering and the triumph of the Lamb, he communicates his wisdom and glory. They give their witness to his power to transform their whole existence: their hearts and minds, their relationship to God and the devil, and all their associations with men (p. 231).

If one is to understand Minear, however, it will be essential to evaluate such affirmations in the light of their larger context.

He begins his exposition with a vivid portrayal of the apparent hopelessness of the prisoner John on Patmos, who despaired of finding one who could open the scroll, and depicts his state of mind as typical of modern man confronted with the riddles of life. Though "we all need to know with surety the underlying purpose of our tortuous paths" (p. 20), our civilization is "befuddled by its own ventriloquists as they shout their uneasy omens" (p. 25). In particular man today is confronted with a double predicament; with the *relativity of the historical action* and the *relativity of the historical actor* (*cf.* pp. 28 f.). No wonder then that men ask, "To whom shall we go when our seers and sages share our own bewilderment?" (p. 30).

But the Lamb opens the scroll, and "transforms John's mourning into joy" (pp. 31 ff.). Ephesians, the work of another prisoner who risked life for these convictions, contains the same note of jubilation, and indeed the New Testament as a whole agrees with these claims.

> Each of these prisoners was powerless, despised, and alone. Yet each announced that God had committed to him a secret hidden from the beginning of time. He insisted that others might grasp this secret only on the terms that God has laid down. He declared that the character of this secret had been unveiled in the crucifixion and resurrection of an obscure Galilean. He asserted, with unwavering conviction, that all future developments and all human situations lie within the span of this one mystery. What daring! What madness! How unprecedented! How offensive! (p. 35).

Thus man's double predicament is met. The act of raising Christ from the dead has as its consequence "a new age", and thus the problem of the relativity of the historical event is overcome. But in the same event the problem of the relativity of the historical actor is overcome as disciples become new men by being made alive with him (*cf.* pp. 41 f.).

> In one act and word, God has overcome the double relativity without erasing it. He has acted in a localized event in such a way as to disclose the purpose of all events, so that in their response to this event men define their relationship to God, or, rather, he defines the only true relatedness to him. Furthermore, he has acted in this event in such a way

> as to correct the astigmatism of the eyes, so that mortal man, in the midst of his transiency and provincialisms, may comprehend the plot of the whole story (p. 41).

The rest of the volume develops these viewpoints and evaluations in detail and always in an arresting and stimulating fashion. But I must enter upon an analysis and critique of Minear's viewpoint rather than indulge in further exposition and summary. The difficulty of arriving at a fair judgment concerning the author's meaning is considerably enlarged by the consideration that he quite deliberately employs the vocabulary of the New Testament in expounding its message. I doubt in fact that any modern interpreter of the same general viewpoint has approached Minear in this regard. He is aware that in doing so he is likely to be charged with binding the gospel unduly "to its obsolete clothing", and that other risks are involved (*cf.* pp. 12, 45, 231 f., 259 f.). But he justifies his approach in a way which, though in part winning assent and admiration, is also very revealing.

In defense of what to many moderns will appear as archaism, the author indicates three "major reasons for reviving such concepts as that of the two ages, and that of Satan":

> First of all, the historian as a historian must make his goal that of entering fully into the thought-world of the period that he is studying. In the second place, a perennial source of misunderstanding the Bible is too great haste in translating the more alien patterns of thought into terms that are more congenial to our present outlook. Therefore, to use again those alien patterns is a needed check upon our self-centeredness and complacency. In the third place — and this the most important reason — the New Testament categories (e. g., Satan) are still negotiable currency because they provide useful pointers to a reality that transcends the distinction between ancient and modern (p. 260).

This final reason, indicated as the most important, is perhaps as illuminating as any in the entire book regarding the author's ultimate evaluation of the message of the New Testament. As one goes through the book, and considers the formulations concerning Christ and the kingdom, the impression is given that Minear is approving not the message itself but certain principles or values supposedly beyond the actual teaching but to which the teaching is thought to point.

The interpretation of Jesus Christ is appropriately enough crucial. I will not dwell on such considerations as that the birth narratives are held to involve "imaginative interpretations of earlier events in the light of later developments" (p. 51) and the basically non-messianic and skeptical judgment that "acceptance of his message and appropriate action

was the only form of recognition that Jesus sought" (p. 62). Since the Lordship of Jesus through the resurrection is given central place in his formulations of the message, as has been noted above, one may perhaps most profitably inquire as to what this really means for our author.

It becomes quite clear that he denies, or is completely indifferent to, the "physical" resurrection of Jesus. He says, for example, that "the disciples spent little time in conjecturing what happened to the physical body of Jesus. They were strangely unconcerned with objective, external proofs of a miracle that had made all things new" (p. 67). This second sentence is conspicuously contradicted by such evidence as we possess relating to the concerns of the disciples; and one may well ask why they should have been engaged in forming conjectures regarding the physical body of Jesus since, as Jews, they would have conceived of the resurrection in no other terms. As R. H. Lightfoot has recently acknowledged, "to the Jewish mind resurrection implied full and complete restoration to the physical life and vigour previously enjoyed in this world".*

On the background of the author's understanding of the resurrection, one may estimate what is meant by the exaltation and Lordship of Jesus. Minear declares that God "exalted his humbled servant, Jesus, and gave to him a name above every other name, in heaven or on earth". Thus, reversing the world's judgment, God "performed a mighty act which brought the Kingdom nearest to men at the very point where it had seemed most distant. At the place of lowest descent God gave his final *Amen* to Jesus' faith as that with which God was well pleased, to Jesus' hope as the highest fulfillment of God's own promise, to Jesus' love as the measure of God's merciful treatment of men. In naming the Crucified as King of the new age, God validated Jesus' teachings as the transcript of his eternal purposes" (p. 66; *cf.* p. 85). One may question whether there is anything here that transcends the "Easter faith" of Harnack. A transforming event is said to have taken place, but this seems only to be a way of saying that in some mysterious fashion there developed the conviction that God's seal of approval had been placed upon a pattern of faith, hope, love and humility which found expression in the life of Jesus upon earth.

These judgments concerning Jesus are bound up with a total view of history which is expounded largely in Biblical terms. As one might expect in the modern context of discussion and debate, the message is set forth in the perspective of eschatology, concerned as it is with the coming of

* In *The Gospel Message of St. Mark* (Oxford, 1950), p. 108.

the kingdom and the new age. On these matters Minear is often stimulating, and in particular his analysis of the kingdom is worthy of attention (*cf.* especially pp. 219 ff.). And one must acknowledge that the distinction between the present evil age and the age to come is often qualitative, and involves much more than succession. But Minear, like so many of his contemporaries, operates with a conception of history and time which disallows of eschatology in the most basic sense of the term as a radical transformation of the present world through the actual return of Christ. I cannot begin to do justice in this review to the ramifications of Minear's discussion of this matter. But it may be advantageous to illustrate his approach by one quotation, where he warns, "Let us remember that the Day of the Son of Man is other than the days of man's calendar. And let us also remember that this Day does not dawn for all men at the same instant by the objective clocks of the world. The term 'day,' as we have seen, is a qualitative image which articulates the dynamic momentum of divine-human relationships" (p. 129). This passage underscores the fact that for Minear the significance of eschatology is exhausted by its usefulness in setting forth an activistic conception of the divine-human encounter.

If space permitted, it would be worthwhile to analyze more particularly the doctrines of God and man which come to expression in this book. My impression is that, in spite of the title of the book, the author stops far short of maintaining the sovereignty of God, and that, in spite of his profoundly sympathetic concern with the needs of men, the foundational New Testament judgments of corruption and guilt are missing. Thus also one can account for the absence of any doctrine of the atonement that goes beyond the idea of moral influence. The volume oftentimes, one might even say pervasively, dwells impressively upon the New Testament teaching concerning various subjective aspects of salvation, and brings into sharp focus the extent to which we are called upon to imitate Christ who humbled himself and who, when he was reviled, reviled not again. But the teaching that he "his own self bare our sins in his body upon the tree" and "suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God" is wholly passed over or at most is obscurely cited. It is profoundly distressing that the great objective facts and verities of the gospel which, according to the New Testament constitute the indispensable foundation of the Christian life and hope, are apparently viewed as expendable.

Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, therefore, the movement represented by this volume does not constitute a real return to Biblical Theology. Though one may profit from detailed observations and em-

phases, the method is found wanting both in its handling of the Bible and in its theological judgments. If its radical critics took more thorough account of its elements of basic agreement with their own approach, they would have less reason to charge it with being archaic and reactionary.

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Ben Zion Bokser: *The Legacy of Maimonides.* New York: Philosophical Library. 1950. ix, 128. $3.75.

"From Moses until Moses (Maimonides) there arose none like Moses", has been a saying among the Jewish people for over seven centuries and is indicative of the great influence he has exerted among them. Our author echoes the praise of other Jewish writers who regard him as the "Jewish counterpart of the Greek philosopher (Aristotle)",[1] and as "one of the greatest minds produced by Judaism since the close of the Talmud".[2]

Moses ben Maimun (1135–1204) was his name, but he later came to be known as Maimonides and Rambam (the letters r, m, b, m, being the initials of Rabbi Moses ben Maimun). He was born in Cordova, Spain, fled to North Africa because of fanatical Mohammedan persecution, spent a little time in Palestine, and finally settled in Egypt where he died. In his early twenties he was a mature scholar and became eminent in Talmudic law, Mathematics, Medicine and Aristotelian philosophy. At the age of forty-five he finished a monumental work, the *Mischne Torah* (Second Torah), in which all Jewish laws and customs are explained. About the year 1190 he completed his second important work, the *Moreh Nebukim, Guide to the Perplexed.*

The significance of the man is not merely in his intellectual attainments, but in what he attempted to do for Judaism, namely, to provide a philosophical basis for its existence and survival. In his day Maimonides was faced with the fundamental opposition between Aristotelianism or scientific naturalism and the religion of the Old Testament. For the benefit of his fellow Jews who were beset with doubts as to the faith of the fathers, he sought to bring about a reconciliation between them, for

[1] See I. Friedlaender: *Moses Maimonides,* Reprint from the *New Era Illustrated Magazine* (New York, 1905), p. 43.

[2] See S. Zeitlin: *American Jewish Year Book 5696,* "Maimonides" (New York, 1935), p. 61.

he believed, according to Bokser, that "the life of reason and the pious devotion to the truths of revealed religion are not incompatible loyalties", but are "on the contrary complementary channels through which we are to seek truth" (p. 16). To this day there are Jewish thinkers, of whom our author is one, who believe that Maimonides succeeded in his effort, and thereby provides the secret of Jewish survival.[3]

It is easy to see in the devotion of Maimonides to Aristotelian logic and metaphysics that he would be charged with rationalism, and that his adherence to traditional orthodoxy would be attributed to a desire merely to appease believers (p. 123, n. 4). But these charges are stoutly denied. In support of this denial appeal is made to the fact that Maimonides cited biblical texts to prove his views and professed belief in the very words of Scripture as divinely authoritative. It is held that Maimonides was well aware of the threat to traditional religion posed by Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world, and therefore defended with reason the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. However, his real appeal for faith rested on the Scriptures as the necessary complement to the truths attained by reason (p. 51). Maimonides says: "I intend to show that the theory of the Creation, as taught in Scripture, contains nothing that is impossible .... I am convinced of the correctness of my method, and consider either of the two theories — viz., the Eternity of the Universe, and the Creation — as admissible, I accept the latter on the authority of Prophecy, which can teach things beyond the reach of philosophical speculation".[4] An interpreter of Maimonides sees in this position the forerunner of the Kantian "Practical Reason" because religious certitude is based upon philosophic probability and inner religious knowledge.[5]

In order to prove identity between Aristotle and Scripture, Maimonides resorted to the allegorizing of Scripture. The literal meaning of the Bible was for the common man, but there was a profound sense for the educated. He applied this view rather extensively, but particularly had in mind the anthropomorphisms which he explained as rhetorical devices to convey abstract thought (p. 63). He concluded that all attributes are anthropomorphisms since God as absolute and incorporeal is beyond definition. Even essential attributes were only permitted if regarded as identical with God's essence, but since God's essence is unknowable, nothing can be said concerning these attributes. A passage from the *Guide* reads as

[3] See S. Zeitlin: *op. cit.*, pp. 95–97.

[4] *Guide to the Perplexed*, trans. from the original Judeo-Arabic by M. Friedländer (London, 1910), p. 178.

[5] I. Friedlaender: *op. cit.*, p. 46.

follows:[6] "You must understand that God has no essential attribute in any form or in any sense whatever, and that the rejection of corporeality implies the rejection of essential attributes. Those who believe that God is One, and that He has many attributes, declare the unity with their lips, and assume plurality in their thoughts. This is like the doctrine of the Christians, who say that He is one and He is three, and that the three are one."

By identifying God's unknowable essence with his essential attributes, Maimonides thought he was able to remove perplexing theological difficulties, as for example the problem of free will and divine foreknowledge. He held that human freedom is in no way affected by God's omniscience, because we cannot say how God knows or what he knows.

One would wish that Bokser had dealt with Maimonides in more critical fashion, but he has succeeded, within short compass, in presenting the salient features of his thought. There is a high purpose discernible in this attractively written book, namely, that through the study of Maimonides the modern man may find a way from naturalism to faith. But it must be said that the synthesis of biblical religion and reason is impossible. It is evident that in the work of Maimonides the Bible has suffered. The text of Scripture has been distorted to convey a sense agreeable to the philosophers and doctrines adduced which have no textual support (*cf.* pp. 81–83, 87). This amounts to a denial of God's absolute authority over His creatures. Only when men acknowledge their utter inability, and commit themselves in the totality of their being to God's Word, can there be righteousness and peace of soul.

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ed. Vergilius Ferm: *A History of Philosophical Systems.* New York: The Philosophical Library. 1950. xvi, 642. $6.00.

The volume before us is the result of a cooperative enterprise. Various specialists have written brief articles on the field of their specialty. These articles together cover the whole field of the history of philosophy.

There is one obvious advantage of this method of dealing with the history of philosophy. It allows for a much wider range of interest than is possible for a book written by one author. There is greater justice

[6] Trans. by M. Friedländer: *op. cit.*, p. 67.

done to such systems of philosophy as are written in foreign, and particularly in Oriental, languages. Then, too, there is greater justice done to such subjects as lie on the periphery of philosophy proper. So, for example, A. Cornelius Benjamin, an expert in the philosophy of the sciences, contributes an article on the field of his special interest. The same is true of the philosophy of religion. As his earlier publications show, the editor of this volume has for some time been much interested in this field. It is he who has written the article on this subject.

There is also one obvious disadvantage in the presentation of the history of philosophical systems by the method under consideration. There is no one philosophy of history that serves as a criterion for the evaluation of the various systems that are brought under review. If one reads a history of philosophy by Ruggiero, the Italian Idealist, one learns how Plato, Kant or Hegel looks from where Ruggiero sits. If one reads a history of philosophy by Vollenhoven, the Dutch Calvinist, one learns how Plato, Kant or Hegel looks as seen through Calvinistic eyes. Such unity of approach is naturally impossible by the present method. There is great variety and little unity.

It is quite impossible to deal with the content of all the various contributions to this book. Our interest may more profitably be centered on one or two articles that have a bearing on religion and particularly on Christianity. The editor himself writes an article on "Philosophies of Religion" and another on "Early Christian Philosophy". A few remarks may be made about each of these articles in turn.

In the former article Ferm bewails the fact that the subject of the philosophy of religion has so seldom been dealt with by those who are competent to carry on mature and disciplined inquiry (p. 598). Men have all too often worked "under the constraints of their own religious cultus" (p. 599). Indicating his own approach he says: "The field of the philosophy of religion may be defined as an inquiry into the general subject of religion without bias to any particular one, employing the tools of critical analysis and evaluation. It is a part of free philosophical inquiry using data from whatever source" (*idem*). And "even though the chorus in praise of 'faith' and 'communion' and 'authority' and 'revelation' is still strong" Ferm is confident that things will sooner or later improve "for the simple reason that reason itself is man's only way of ever coming to non-dogmatic terms with the world" (pp. 605 f.). When that happy day arrives, "religions will no longer seem divided into hard and fast divisions. All of them will be seen to be essentially plural, as plural as is the Christian religion in all its varieties" (p. 606).

If we were not accustomed to seeing men handle the "religious consciousness" of man in some such way as is suggested by Ferm we might be amazed at its utterly uncritical character. Together with many of his contemporaries the editor of this volume simply takes for granted that "reason" is the instrument of a perfectly normal man. It assumes that there is no such thing as sin as defined in terms of the Bible. How would Ferm go about *proving* that there is no such thing as sin? He doesn't bother to ask himself that question. He is not interested in "the more sombre features of Protestant orthodoxy" (p. 605). His "descriptive" method would not allow for the possibility that Protestant orthodoxy might be true. And this in spite of the fact that description pure and simple is impossible. A criterion of evaluation is always assumed by every one who thinks he merely describes the phenomena of the religious consciousness. It is not mere description but negative evaluation, and that on purely non-rational ground, which operates within the "reason" to which Ferm so confidently appeals. Is it this same non-rational attitude, or is it merely lack of acquaintance, that accounts for the absence of any reference to the Calvinistic philosophy of D. H. Th. Vollenhoven and H. Dooyeweerd?

The same bias that controls Ferm's method when dealing with the philosophy of religion also controls him when he deals with early Christian philosophy. It is to be expected that Tertullian should come in for some "neutral" description. "It was Marcionism that Tertullian denounced in five volumes of writings and, before that, all forms of heresies. Against them he took his stand upon the scriptures. To argue with authorities, he held, was to deny them. A philosopher is always in quest of something; the believer, on the other hand, has ended his quest even though what he believes may be absurd . . . Thus did a spirit of antirationalism enter into Catholic orthodoxy and a rule of faith take the seat of honor" (p. 147).

It is apparently his unreasoned assumption of the normalcy and ultimacy of human reason and therefore his equally unreasoned hostility to "authority" that accounts for his inability to see any unity in the thought of St. Augustine. He cannot even find anything like a steady direction of development in Augustine's thought. Apparently impressed with the many-sided character of the genius of Augustine he, none the less, basically thinks of Augustine as unable to find integration in his thought. To Ferm it is evidence of dual or multiple personality if one holds to the possibility of a philosophy that takes the authority of Scripture into account. "There is no Augustinian 'system' for a very simple reason:

there is no one Augustine. His personality was a criss-cross of many currents, much like Paul before him, like Luther and George Fox after him" (p. 152). How is it possible that a man should be "at times a philosopher free to speculate and again a subject devoutly loyal to his tradition and church" (p. 153)? No better illustration could be given of how the supposedly scientific *description* of a philosopher of genius, like Augustine, turns out to be no description at all. The subject to be described disappears as he is being described. The student of this descriptive article does not as much as get a glimpse of the greatest of Christian philosophers. But then it is assumed that those who are Christians cannot engage in rational inquiry; the student must take this on the authority of Ferm.

C. VAN TIL

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H. H. Rowley: *From Joseph to Joshua. Biblical Traditions in the Light of Archaeology.* London: Oxford University Press. 1950. xii, 200. 12/6.

This volume contains the Schweich Lectures of the British Academy for 1948, and, without question, will take its place as one of the most significant of recent Old Testament studies. The title of the book clearly indicates the scope of its contents, and the subject chosen, namely, the period from Joseph to Joshua, is surely one of the most difficult and complex to face the student of the Old Testament. The author, as is stated in the Preface, has been interested in this period of Biblical history for more than a quarter of a century.

It is needless to say anything about the quality of Dr. Rowley's scholarship. He is easily one of today's leading Old Testament scholars. A mere cursory glance at the present work will astound the reader with the amount of erudition and wide reading of the author. Dr. Rowley seems to have read practically everything of importance upon his subject. The volume contains an excellent bibliography, comprising twenty-three pages, and this feature will prove of real value to the serious student.

The work is divided into three chapters, which are entitled respectively, "The Extra-Biblical Evidence", "The Biblical Traditions", and "Synthesis". He is indeed brave who would seek today to summarize the material covered by the first chapter of this volume, and we can but express our admiration at the manner in which it is here handled. After

a few pages of introductory material (pp. 1–12), the author turns to the question of the date of the downfall of Jericho. His treatment is a fine example of *multum in parvo* for in remarkably brief compass he adequately covers the subject. The conclusion at which he arrives is stated in the following sentence: "I would emphasize, however, my complete suspense of judgement on the question of the date of the fall of Jericho" (p. 17).

Rowley accepts the late thirteenth century date for the fall of Lachish and Debir (pp. 17–19). On the other hand he thinks that, because Ai is an embarrassment to every view of the Exodus, and because there is not yet sufficient evidence to fit it into the picture, it must be left out of account (pp. 19 f.). The results of Glueck's explorations in the Negeb and Transjordan are accepted, namely, that there was no settled population there before the thirteenth century, although it is pointed out that there is evidence which would seem to require a modification of this position (p. 21). Also, the evidences of a break in the cultural development of Palestine at the end of the thirteenth century and the fall of Canaanite cities at that time is noted (p. 23). The treatment of the Amarna letters is sound, and we are particularly pleased with the discussion of the vexed problem of the Habiru. We agree with the author's statement, "If the equation is maintained (*i. e.*, Habiru=Hebrew), it must be on the basis of non-philological evidence" (p. 52). Much else is also discussed in the first chapter, and the serious student will find here a competent analysis of the problems posed by the extra-Biblical evidence.

The author adopts an estimate of the Biblical material which differs radically from that of the reviewer. He says, "The Biblical traditions cannot be uncritically treated as regulative for the settling of the question, in view of our uncertainty as to their history before they reached their present form" (p. 2). We believe, however, that to regard the Biblical texts as regulative is not to treat them uncritically. We believe that these texts are trustworthy in their witness, and that truly scientific and critical reasons compel us to accept them as trustworthy. At the same time, although we approach the Bible from a standpoint so different from that of the author, we regard his discussion as extremely valuable.

The second chapter begins with a consideration of the difficult fourteenth chapter of Genesis, and concludes that, in so far as it can be used, it seems to point to the seventeenth century for the migration from Ḥarran (p. 66). We are unable to accept this conclusion — and we are happy to note that Rowley does not press the use of this chapter for ascertaining the date of Abraham — for it does not seem to us possible at present to identify the kings given in Genesis fourteen.

After the discussion of Genesis fourteen there follows a valuable consideration of chronology. A challenge is thrown out to those who hold to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, a challenge to which we shall later return in this review. "In particular it is hard to understand why those who maintain the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch should attach no importance to the statements it contains about the father and grandfather of Moses" (p. 70). What the author means is that in his opinion these statements are in conflict with the numbers of Exodus 12:40.

In the last chapter the results of the previous investigation are stated. A fifteenth century Exodus of all the tribes under Moses is said to be out of the question (p. 109). The same thing is asserted for a thirteenth century Exodus of all the tribes (*idem*). The problem, however, is more than that of the date of the Exodus. It is that "of relating the entries to one another and of explaining how all the tribes came to be Yahweh-worshipping and why they thought of themselves as related to one another. The Descent into Egypt and the Exodus must be considered together in any satisfying view" (pp. 109 f.).

According to Rowley the entry of the Hebrew tribes is reflected in the Amarna texts. The activity in the south mentioned in these texts he relates to the Biblical account of an entry from Kadesh-Barnea, after a sojourn there for thirty eight years (p. 111). In this incursion the Kenites also were included (p. 112). These groups were the Habiru of the Amarna texts.

At the same time other groups (the SA-GAZ of Amarna) were entering Palestine from the north, and the whole age, *i. e.*, the Amarna period, is to be connected with the age of Jacob (p. 113). The activity of the Habiru at Shechem is connected with the incident of Simeon and Levi recorded in Genesis thirty-four, and the curse, condemning them to be "scattered in Israel", is thought to indicate that they did not retain their hold on Shechem (p. 114). Through this incident at Shechem the author is led to place Jacob in the Amarna age. The same period is said also to furnish the background for the account of Joseph (p. 116), and several arguments are presented to show its fitness to do so.

About 1360 B. C. Joseph was joined in Egypt by Levites and perhaps also by Simeonites, who were scattered after the affair at Shechem (p. 123). The Pharaoh of the oppression is considered to be Rameses II (p. 129). Since, however, there is no archaeological evidence extant for the date of the event of the Exodus, and since Rowley thinks the thirty-eight years a "specious precision" intended to yield a total of forty years for the period of the Wilderness, he would bring the actual event of the

Exodus to about 1230 B. C., and the entry into Palestine under Joshua two years later (p. 133; see Appendix, p. 164).

The above has been merely a very brief sketch, intended to give the reader only a general idea as to the nature of the volume. The work constitutes a distinct challenge to conservative students, and we sincerely hope that it will cause many such to devote their attention to this important period of Biblical history. We freely confess that we ourselves cannot at present fit the archaeological and Biblical material into a satisfactory pattern. We agree with the words of the late Melvin Grove Kyle (who placed the Exodus *circa* 1275 B. C.), "These difficulties are antagonistic, but it will not do to argue that they are impossible. We need to learn all the facts. When all have been obtained, and properly correlated, they will be found to be entirely compatible" (*The International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia*, Vol. II, p. 1056B). We would add further that, when all the facts are known, the consistency and accuracy of the Biblical statements will, we believe, readily be seen.

Meanwhile, there are certain considerations which have been weighing more and more heavily in the mind of the present reviewer. 1. It appears to be impossible at present to identify the kings mentioned in Genesis fourteen. 2. The identification of the Habiru of the Amarna texts with the Hebrews of the Bible seems more and more to be an impossibility. 3. It often seems to be a principle of the Biblical chronologies to omit links which may not immediately serve the writer's purpose. For example, in Joshua 7:17, 18 from the family of Zarchi, Zabdi is taken, and from the house of Zabdi, Achan. Now, it might appear from this that Achan was the son of Zabdi. This, however, was not the case, for we are immediately told that Achan was the son of Carmi, who was the son of Zabdi.[1]

The same appears to be true of the genealogy of Exodus 6:18–20, with respect to which Professor Rowley throws out his challenge to those who believe in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. If only this brief genealogy were extant, we might then draw the conclusion that Kohath, father of Amram, was the grandfather of Moses. This is the conclusion which Professor Rowley draws, and upon the assumption that Moses was eighty years of age at the time of the Exodus, and was born about eighty years after the Descent, he reaches a total of one hundred sixty years for the Sojourn in Egypt (pp. 70 f.). We believe, however, that the Amram mentioned in Exodus 6:18 and the one mentioned in verse twenty

[1] In Joshua 7:24 Achan is called the son of Zerah.

are two different persons. According to Numbers 3:27, 28 the descendants of Kohath in Moses' time, which kept the service of the sanctuary, numbered eight thousand six hundred males (the women and children not being included). If we assume that one-fourth of these were the children of Amram, it follows that Moses had almost 2150 brothers. Yet from Exodus 18:3, 4 we learn that Moses himself had only two sons. Consequently, in the light of these verses from Numbers, it seems to us necessary to assume that in the brief genealogy of Exodus 6:18–20, two different men by the name of Amram are mentioned, and that a number of intervening names have been omitted.

Although we are unable to agree with the conclusions reached in this volume, we feel deeply indebted to the learned author for presenting so much valuable material in compact form. He has lightened the labors of all who would study these important problems and so deserves the gratitude of every serious student of the Old Testament.

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Edward J. Carnell: *Television — Servant or Master?* Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1950. 196. $2.50.

This book is "an attempt — however inadequate — to sum up what appear at this point in history to be the major virtues and vices of television" (p. 6). The standard by which the author judges television is "that world view upon which western culture rests: *Christianity*" (p. 7). Dr. Carnell's task is not an easy one. Happily, he executes his purpose with something more than inadequacy.

The book possesses several virtues. Not the least of these is an abundance of factual information about television itself. Those who do not own a set can learn a great deal about television simply by reading this book.

More important among its virtues, however, is the book's positive approach to its problem. It is unwilling to turn TV over to the devil. It encourages the reader to use video to the glory of God. This approach is rather rare in a day when the conservative element of the church is too willing to consign the media of entertainment to the kingdom of darkness. Following this approach, the chapters on the potential blessings of TV are particularly enlightening. The reader gains such a wide view of

the possible services of video to mankind that he is perforce saddened by the thought that it will probably not attain to its finest possibilities, since, as a commercial enterprise, it must cater to the tastes of its users. Dr. Carnell makes some valuable and practical suggestions as to how Christians may bring their influence to bear upon TV and thus help to raise the level of its programs. It is praiseworthy that he does not call upon the church as an organization to do this, realizing that the church has another task assigned to it by God, namely, the preaching of the gospel, but upon God's people as an organism forming the kingdom of God in its broader relationships to the world.

Christian parents will find some excellent advice in this book on the training of children in the use of television in the home. Here again we find a wholesome positive approach. Dr. Carnell urges spiritual insulation rather than spiritual isolation. In reaffirming this timely solution of a pressing problem, he neglects neither the Biblical principles of Christian liberty nor that which is usable and applicable in child psychology.

While the author accents the positive, he by no means ignores the negative. He suggests the possible harmful effects of video on the life of man in general and on the life of the Christian man in particular. The TV user will do well to heed these warnings.

The book, for all of its good points, is not without its defects. Dr. Carnell has filled his book with Scripture quotations to support his assertions; that, of course, is good. The interpretations, however, which the author places upon some of the quotations do not seem to this reviewer to be entirely correct. The parable of the unjust steward, for example, is interpreted as teaching that the children of light ought to be as skillful as the children of darkness in the use of the things of this world. "One of the points to the parable is that those who fear God may, at times, be less skillful in the handling of earthly matters than the one who has never had his understanding opened to the eternal truths of the gospel" (p. 41). The correct exegesis seems rather to be that the children of light ought to be at least as diligent in spiritual matters as the children of darkness are in the affairs of this world. Another example that may be cited is the use of II Corinthians 5:14. This is quoted to support the statements that "it is love for Christ which binds the hearts of believers to one another and to their Lord. Love is the only reason for regular church attendance" (p. 134). The verse actually is speaking of Christ's love for us as a constraining force, rather than our love for Christ.

Another defect of the book is an occasional lack of precision in its theological formulations. In the repeated use of "flesh", for example,

one is never quite certain whether the author is employing the word to describe so-called "animal" tendencies in man or to denote the Biblical concept of human nature under the dominion of sin. "No one is quite so indistinguishable from the animal as he whose passions fly out of control and who lives on an indulgence of the flesh" (p. 141). Other statements have the flavor of autosoterism. "It is a belief of the children of light that God has sown the seeds of religion and divinity in the hearts of all men, but that such seeds are germinated only when men turn to self-examination, confession, and conversion" (p. 129). Such assertions as "in both cases a deliberate effort is made to corrupt the image of God in man by sexual temptation" (p. 144) and "if television men use the new medium to increase hatred, lust, or selfishness, therefore, they, by colliding with the will of God for man, become wicked and unworthy men" (p. 20) would seem to deny the total depravity of man by implying that men by their actions may now *become* wicked and corrupt. Also, it may be mentioned that the author's view of the Sabbath and its duties is far from satisfactory. "The Bible, indeed, sets down no law that one *must* go to church twice on the Lord's Day. But for that matter there is no law that one must go to church at all. We are living under grace, not the beggarly elements of the law. Our only law is love. It is love for Christ which binds the hearts of believers to one another and to their Lord. Love is the only reason for regular church attendance" (p. 134). Since Dr. Carnell elsewhere in his book maintains the validity of the Ten Commandments and their authority over man, it is passing strange that he nowhere appeals to the Fourth Commandment in calling for an observance of the Lord's Day. It is the humble opinion of this reviewer that if more careful attention had been paid by the author to the precise theological formulations of the Westminster Confession of Faith and Shorter Catechism, the book would have been preserved from aiding and abetting the prevalent decay of sound theology, a decay which poses a far more serious threat to the welfare of America than any that television itself, for all its shortcomings, is likely to produce.

Another doubtful feature of the book is the author's advice on the use of television in the propagation of the gospel. "The practical ways in which television can be used are endless. Ingenuity is all that is needed. Snappy, well-rehearsed Children's Day programs would make a homey subject. Dramatic societies can pool their talents to portray great scenes from the Bible or from the history of the church. Christian movies will naturally be excellent on TV. Cartoons can be drawn for children. Christian magic, flannelgraph work, scientific research, and band or orchestra

effects will go well. And one of the most promising outlets that even a local church can sustain is to devise a telecommercial, a sixty-second drama from life which vividly advertises both the gospel and the church which preaches it" (p. 93). To support this thesis Dr. Carnell turns to Hollywood. "As an immortal triumph of artistry and showmanship in religious filming, one cannot easily think of a production which has surpassed Cecil B. De Mille's *King of Kings*. For over two decades this magnificent film of the Christian gospel has warmed the hearts of people" (p. 94). Thus is the church urged to bring forth an artistry in the presentation of the gospel that will match the skill and equal the interest value of the world's entertainment programs. To be sure, the highest skill ought to be brought to the *preaching* of the gospel itself. Nevertheless, all window dressing must be abandoned. We cannot, and we ought not, compete with the world in showmanship, if for no other, at least for the simple reason that the church is not in the show business. If the gospel is again to turn the world upside down, as it did in the day of Paul and again in the day of Calvin, it will do so by means of the *unadorned* declaration of the doctrines of grace with the power of the Holy Spirit. Conditioned as we are in our time to elaborate schemes for attracting people to the truth of God's Word, schemes which involve extensive use of advertising, music, psychology, and sometimes even several tons of electrical equipment to illustrate the doctrine of the new birth, it will be a discovery nothing short of amazing, but one of the direst necessity, to learn that both the apostle Paul and the reformer Calvin made no effort to attract people to the truth, but relied with heart and soul upon the truth itself to do its own attracting when blessed by the efficacious grace of almighty God.

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J. N. D. Kelly: *Early Christian Creeds*. London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co. 1950. xi, 446. $5.75.

This is a well-nigh indispensable book to any one concerned with the development of the creeds of Christianity. Nothing like it has appeared, in English at least, for a half century or so.

The volume treats of both the history, and the teaching, of the creeds of the church which spring from the great initial period of creed building. Attention is focussed on the Old Roman Symbol, the Nicene, Nicaeno-

Constantinopolitan, and Apostles' Creeds, though in the process a great many other creeds of the period are brought under discussion. In the course of the review the leading positions maintained by students of credal development during the last two generations are brought under the critical lens and helpfully examined. The work is therefore at the same time a volume of reference for the subject and a sane and helpful original contribution to its advancement.

The author is Lecturer in Patristic Studies at the University of Oxford and Vice-Principal of St. Edmund Hall whose history has, in certain respects, a more vigorous connection with protestant Christianity than that of some of the other collegiate constituents of the University.

It adds to the usefulness of this volume to find that the author has his feet rather firmly planted on the ground and is not inclined to take off on sudden flights into fairyland just for the beauty of the ride on some new hobby-horse. An early example of this is his unwillingness to follow the latest "white hope" of American devotees of the Basel shrine, Oscar Cullmann, in his thesis that the primitive faith of the church is expressed by single-clause, Christological creeds which were only later expanded into binitarian and trinitarian affirmations (pp. 25 f.).[1] This is related to Kelly's true observation that an "emphasis on the transmission of authoritative doctrine . . . is to be found everywhere in the New Testament" (p. 8). "The early Church was from the start a believing, confessing, preaching Church", not simply an unorganized group with a "pure religion of the Spirit" (p. 7). The list of trinitarian formulae in the New Testament (pp. 22 f.) will be useful to the relatively amateur pastor who may find himself concerned with the subject.

The author is also to be commended for his demonstration that "there was no one original stock from which all creeds derived" (p. 204). They were living growths from various local usages. Broad distinctions between the Eastern and Western types there were. In the East a greater diversity manifested itself; in the West the dominant influence of Rome is apparent as soon as the process of growth can be studied.

Although Kelly is careful to keep his work within the bounds he has set himself — a history of early Christian *creeds* — this volume may be considered, for the moment, as a member of a triad of books, appearing in English within the last three years, which have to do with the doctrinal

[1] Something approaching this thesis is even to be found in the recent work of the Jesuit professor at Heythrop, Joseph Crehan, entitled *Early Christian Baptism and the Creed* (London, 1950) (*cf.* pp. 143 f. therein).

problems of the fourth century Christian church.[3] It is a happy rarity to have three such able works, dealing in part with the same matters, appear in such close temporal proximity, one Protestant, one Catholic and one, seemingly, non-Christian. The brilliant and novel suggestions of Jones are very helpful at times, and the relative conservatism and fullness of presentation of Bardy in the Palanque volume make it the best up-to-date summary account of the period now available for reference. However, these facts only bring out more clearly the judicious and balanced character of Kelly's judgment. Judiciousness, independence and the ability to hew out a new track for thinking are not always combined in one man. The account of the adoption of the Nicene creed in the council of 325, of its antecedents, and of the subsequent course of events is an example of this. The section on "The Homoousion" (pp. 242–254) should be particularly useful to students of credal language.

One conclusion affirmed vigorously is that "declaratory creeds, stereotyped in form and officially sanctioned by local church authorities, had no currency in the second and third centuries" (p. 95). The creeds of the days antedating the second generation of the third century were interrogatory, not declaratory (pp. 48 f.). This, however, does not mean that the Old Roman Symbol, the ancestor of our Apostles' Creed, does not antedate, say, 230. It can be traced to the closing decades of the second century at least (pp. 101, 127–130). But it was originally in interrogatory, not declaratory, form. Kelly's analysis of the Holl, Harnack, Lietzmann scheme of the evolution of this creed is again an excellent example of balance of judgment (pp. 119–126).

Another *crux* of credal study is fully discussed in the light of previous work in chapter X. This is the question as to the origin and early history of what is today popularly called "the Nicene creed". That this creed, traditionally associated with the second ecumenical council (381), is not simply a modified version of the creed of the Nicene council of 325, Kelly not only allows but ably confirms. He is not prepared to go along with Hort and Harnack in denying responsibility for this creed to the council of 381. On the other hand, he will not uncritically accept Eduard Schwartz's view that the Constantinopolitan creed was a new creed adopted by the council of 381 as a quasi rival or successor to the creed of 325. Rather, affirms Kelly, it is most likely that the creed of 381 is an

[3] The other two are A. H. M. Jones: *Constantine and the Conversion of Europe* (London, 1948) and J. R. Palanque *et al.: The Church in the Christian Roman Empire*, vol. 1 (London, 1949) (a translation of a section of the great French Fliche et Martin).

already existing creed, touched up, but definitely designed to reaffirm the authority of the Nicene faith (p. 325).

The making of creeds, whether in its early, not fully conscious, stage or in its later elaborate development, was a basic and vital activity of the church. Action not founded on belief, if long continued, will prove meaningless, confusing and vain. There are no fruits without roots. Times come in the history of the church when a period of creed making is needed. At other seasons there is, among the wise, an abstention from creed making activity and an emphasis on creed teaching. Today belongs to the latter category. It is possible that a period of creed making is not far off. But now it is of first importance to master the art of applying the meaning of the great creeds of the church to modern living. This volume which interprets some of them to us is a generator of enthusiasm for creeds in an age where they are frequently misunderstood and even maligned. One whose mental furniture is alive enough to be curious about the expression of convictions will be grateful for it.

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Louis Berkhof: *Principles of Biblical Interpretation* (*Sacred Hermeneutics*). Grand Rapids: Baker Book House. 1950. 169. $2.50.

The president emeritus of Calvin Seminary has provided in this book a very useful and sane introduction to the study of Biblical hermeneutics. This work should be of service in helping many to interpret the Bible in the way that the Bible itself demands and requires. Written as it is from the point of view of one who believes the Bible's own teaching with regard to itself and who sees the implications of that teaching for the interpretation of the Bible, it is able to give a theistic treatment of hermeneutics, a treatment that is true to the Bible and that is derived from the Bible. The distinctive character of President Berkhof's work may be observed, among other places, in the chapter on theological interpretation. Although it might be possible to hold that the materials which are considered in this chapter are involved in any adequate grammatical and historical interpretation, the author feels that it is necessary to give them a separate place and emphasis.

This book is particularly fashioned for study purposes. It frequently addresses questions to the reader and gives references in the Bible and

in hermeneutical literature for consideration. Some of the material is in condensed or syllabus form, and might be expanded and developed in class discussions. If this manual were to be studied widely today, whether privately or in classes, it should help to correct some of the unscriptural and erratic hermeneutical practices of our times.

Comparatively brief though the book is, it covers a considerable area and offers much profitable material. After a brief introduction, Berkhof proceeds to sketch the history of hermeneutical principles among the Jews and in the Christian Church. He then deals with the matter of the correct view of the Bible, and in this connection treats of the inspiration of the Bible, unity and diversity in the Bible, the unity of the sense of Scripture, the style of Scripture, and the exegetical standpoint of the interpreter — the relation of the interpreter to the object of his study. He finally devotes three important chapters to the subjects of Grammatical Interpretation, Historical Interpretation, and Theological Interpretation.

Perhaps some details can be modified in subsequent editions. A number of typographical errors occur. The quotation on page 96 from Burton's *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* does not take into account the fact that Burton is dealing specifically in the passage quoted with the Adverbial Participle of Attendant Circumstance and that Burton himself in another connection deals with the Aorist Participle of Identical Action (§ 139) and with what might be called an Aorist Participle of Coincident (though not Identical) Action (§ 149).

JOHN H. SKILTON

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Massey Hamilton Shepherd, Jr.: *The Oxford American Prayer Book Commentary*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1950. 1,100. $10.00.

Following close upon the four hundredth anniversary of the *Book of Common Prayer* of the Church of England comes this commentary on the descendant of that book as used by the Protestant Episcopal Church in America. Produced by the Oxford Press, it is another example of fine book making. Adding to its attractiveness from the point of view of printing is the fact that it reproduces the pages of the chancel size (7 by 5 inches) Prayer Book. These appear on the left with the text of the book in smaller type on the right.

The book is what it purports to be, a *commentary* beginning with the title page of the Prayer Book and continuing through the entire book, page by page, with the exception of the Psalter. The commentary includes the historical origins of all the Prayer Book services, tracing the sources of its formularies, in so far as it is possible to recover them. It discusses in moderately non-technical language the liturgical principles and practices as set forth in the Book and also with considerable emphasis the exegetical and theological implications of both the rubrics, collects, creeds and prayers which have been composed and adopted by the Church through the centuries and also the Canticles, Epistles and Gospels which are portions of the Scriptures printed in the Prayer Book for use in the various services of worship.

A study of the Prayer Book, its history, development and revisions, is a study in church history. It reveals the fact that the Reformation in England was intimately associated with political conditions and was never completed in the sense of achieving a thorough Protestant Reformation. The Prayer Book contains a strong emphasis on the place of the Scriptures in worship; many passages which teach that salvation is by faith alone; a Protestant emphasis upon congregational participation in worship which is therefore called "common". It also contains an emphasis upon the peculiar responsibilities of the officiating "priest"; Scripture lessons from the Apocrypha; prayers for the dead; statements which can easily be interpreted as teaching baptismal regeneration; the doctrine of the "real presence" in the elements of bread and wine in the Holy Communion. All this material looks Romeward.

The author approaches his interpretation of this diverse material in a typically "Anglican" fashion. In conformity to the traditions of his Communion, he seems to see his Church as a *via media*, Protestant and anti-Roman on the one hand, while being Catholic and sacramental on the other. He sympathizes with that sentiment in the Protestant Episcopal Church today which does not like the name "Protestant Episcopal" (p. i). We are not told that there is pressure for adopting "American Catholic" by the strong and growing Anglo-Catholic party in America. In discussing the "Invocation" in the Communion service and the more Protestant English form contrasted with the more Roman Scottish form, an accurate analysis is made in the statement, "The American Book's form, as adopted in 1789, is a skilful compromise between the English and the Scottish wording" (p. 81). In Morning and Evening Prayer there is "The Declaration of Absolution" with the rubric "To be said by the Priest alone, standing". The Puritans were not the only ones who have seen in

this a decidedly Roman principle. The history of the struggle between Catholic and Reformed concepts is illustrated right here where in 1604 there was added to the title the phrase "or Remission of Sins" to mollify the consciences of the Puritans and then in 1662, in reaction against further Puritan agitation, they "deliberately substituted 'Priest' for 'Minister' in the rubric" (p. 6).

One cannot comment on the *Book of Common Prayer* without giving much attention to the Scriptures because the Book is so largely Scripture, not only in Psalter, Epistle and Gospel portions, Bible canticles and responses, but also in collects and prayers which are rich in Biblical language. Our author is exceedingly reverent toward the Bible and much of his exegesis is conservative as seen in the discussion of the General Confession (p. 6); the Ten Commandments (p. 69); the Nicene Creed (p. 71). However, the spirit of inclusiveness, of compromise, of mediation is seen once again. This time it is not so much between Romanism and Protestantism as it is between Modernism and Orthodoxy. "The Bible is the inspired record of God's revelation of Himself" (pp. x ff.) is the kind of statement which lends itself to interpretation to the satisfaction of diverse parties. We are told that the lectionary has been shaped by the "great advance of Biblical studies and the general change in attitude towards the content of the Bible during the past century" (p. vii). One does not have to wonder what "change in attitude" is meant. The position is taken that the Christian Church calendar stems from Jewish festivals which "were related to the movements of the heavenly planets and the seasons of nature, but after the Babylonian exile Jewish leaders reinterpreted their Calendar as a series of historical commemorations of significant events in the life of the people of God" (p. xlvi). Further, "It has been thought by many critics that this story of the healing of the ten lepers is a reworking of the account of Mark i.40–5, in a tradition of the early Church that had a distinct anti-Jewish bias" (p. 209). After thus accepting much of modern higher critical reconstruction, our author commends a daily study of the Bible using the lectionary "in his private meditations and prayers, and thus unite his own devotion and study of God's Word with the daily prayer of the whole Church" (p. xlv). In discussing the elimination of the observation of "saints' days" for all persons as not Biblical and the introduction into the American Book of 1928 of "A Saint's Day" and the "Feast of the Dedication of a Church", our author expresses his commendation saying that these "are initial steps away from the one-sided Biblical emphasis of the Prayer Book Calendar" (p. xlix). The retaining of lessons

from the Apocrypha despite strong Puritan objection is justified on the basis of ancient custom and that they are read along with Scripture "for example of life and instruction of manners" (p. xlv). Such an attitude toward the Scriptures and such contradictory statements show that lack of a unifying system of theological understanding which must inevitably characterize the Church built upon compromise and inclusiveness.

The writer stresses the sinfulness of man, the oneness and completeness of the sacrifice of Christ but interprets the atonement in terms of moral influence: "It is our faith in God's love, as it has been manifested to us in His Son that is the certain ground of our eternal hope." (p. 329)

Praying for the departed in the words, "grant them continual growth in thy love and service" is not criticized but rather is weakly defended: "To what extent our prayers for them may help and assist them is a mystery" (p. 74).

Baptismal regeneration is calmly accepted, as it is clearly taught, "The Bidding and Thanksgiving (in the Baptismal Service) state the two positive graces of Baptism, regeneration and incorporation into the membership of the Church" (p. 280). It is noted that this has been a major subject of controversy and that it was largely the basis for the organization of the Reformed Episcopal Church in 1873.

The book contains a wealth of historical material and many an accurate analysis of developments but there is failure, as for example, when it fails to interpret changes in the Book of 1552 from that of 1549 as movements in the direction of a clearer Protestantism. This they certainly were. This is why reference to "manual acts" on the part of the priest in consecrating the elements in the Communion are omitted in 1552 and not, as the author states, because many priests understood this to be the custom (p. 80).

The Book of Common Prayer reflects the history of the Church of which it is a part. It reveals the quasi-Reformation through which that Church has passed. We believe that it was left for the Reformed Episcopal Church in 1873 to carry forward fully the principles of the Protestant Reformation within the Anglican family of Churches and to produce a Prayer Book thoroughly consistent with that position. At a number of places light could have been shed upon the *Book of Common Prayer* by reference to the Reformed Episcopal Book but no such reference is made.

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Matthew Spinka: *Nicholas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1950. 220. $3.50.

One of the most vigorous displaced minds of an age studded with intellectual discontent was that best known Russian thinker of our era, Nicholas Berdyaev (1874–1948). By this biography and survey of Berdyaev's writings, making generous use of Russian sources, Dr. Spinka, professor of Church History at Hartford Theological Seminary, has placed contemporary scholarship in debt. Genuinely fascinating is his account of the life and thought of this creative revolter, alike against Eastern communism and Western capitalism, and against much more in the modern world, in the name of a blending of Christianity and existentialism in which the latter clearly gets the upper hand.

Dr. Spinka at times makes penetrating criticisms of Berdyaev's views, especially his doctrine of "uncreated freedom", which has always been a major source of complaint. At other times, he too easily identifies what Berdyaev retains of Biblical theology as the essence of the latter, as though the Russian thinker's compromises regarding man's origin, fall and nature touch nothing Biblically central; again, he seems little aware of Berdyaev's basic epistemological predicament, which involves him in a far more tangential relationship to historic Christianity than the writer acknowledges. But in bringing together this material, with the competence of a philosophically-sensitive historian, he has performed a real service.

The account of Berdyaev's early years is intriguing: his revolt against the military tradition in which he was reared, his reading of the German philosophers at the age of fourteen, his intolerance of all authorities, religious as well as others, his exile at twenty-seven used to pen a volume integrating Marxism and Kantianism as against positivism, his acceptance of Marx's critique of bourgeois capitalism but Marxism's intolerance of his revisions, his abandonment after studies in Germany, under the neo-Kantian Windelband, of idealism for "mystical realism" as more religious, and his vision of an ecumenicity of neo-Christianity to synthesize religion and culture. Then came Dostoevsky's influence. Berdyaev "accepted Christ" by a mystical leap of faith, not on rational grounds. He intensified his critique of the scientific positivism of educated Russians. Critical of the Russian Orthodox Church for its social indifference and political subservience, he sought to win the intellectuals to religion by opposing the Christian rule of love and freedom to the compulsion of socialism and Marxism. The Revolution had only replaced the Czarist imperialism by a new slavery; both rejected God and spiritual values.

Berdyaev's bold criticisms went long unpunished, reflecting the latitude of the government in that day. But during World War I he was charged with blasphemy; Siberian exile loomed as a possible penalty. The trial dragged through the war. Berdyaev, while bombs fell nearby, wrote scorching criticisms of the anti-spiritual leaders of the Revolution which had to be published in Germany because of Russian censorship. Nothing less than spiritual transformation was needed; communist collectivism in revolt against moral values no less than capitalism destroys human personality by converting men into things. He opposed the extreme leveling of society on the ground that men differ in their endowments and insisted the Bible supports communism only when distorted. Rearrested in 1920, he stated his religious, philosophical and ethical objections to communism in a forty-five minute address, stressing that he was not a political opponent. His freedom was thereupon confined to Moscow, where he expanded his lecture activity. In 1922 he was banished, went to Berlin, where the International Y.M.C.A. financed his founding of the Religious Philosophical Academy.

The post-revolutionary Berdyaev then experienced the Revolution "spiritually"— he wanted no longer a return of the old order, for its decline was necessary, and a more radical change was needed. Once he had thought the kingdom of God could be ushered into history akin to Anglo-Saxon social gospel hopes; now he swung to historical pessimism, and indicted all such dreams as utopian. The Revolution was a phase of the Renaissance, a part of its judgment, which only a more spiritual Middle Ages could undo. Though the kingdom cannot be realized in history, the obligation to achieve it as far as possible remains.

The interlude in Germany came during the theological and philosophical upheaval there, when existentialism was in the air; Berdyaev's interactions will be considered later. In 1924 he removed to Paris, founded a religious-philosophical review, and published his best-known works, many since translated: *Freedom and the Spirit*, *The Fate of Man in the Modern World*, *Solitude and Society*, *Slavery and Freedom*, *The Divine and the Human*, *Toward a New Epoch*, some wearily similar, some quite unsystematic, all vigorous. He organized the Paris meetings of Russian Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant intellectuals, and worked actively for an ecumenical union of all Christian groups. In 1942 he became ill, and died in 1948.

The central concepts of Berdyaev's theology are human freedom, the supreme value of human personality, and the reality and validity of values — concepts which have formed the major interest of many a Renaissance idealist's outlook. They drove him away from Hegel, who

deprived man of personality and, by eliminating man and placing the Absolute at the center of history, encouraged the substitution at the center of other non-human factors, *e. g.*, the impersonal economic factor of communism (p. 69). They drove him to oppose dialectical materialism, and, for its depersonalization of man, capitalism. Against both collectivist and democratic-equalitarian political forms he proposed a "free theocracy" (p. 42). Obliteration of man's personality leads to the radical antihumanism of Nietzsche and Marx. No monism, idealistic or materialistic, can save significance for human personality and freedom. Hence Berdyaev asserts a dualism, not ontological (spirit and matter) but metaphysical and ethical (the freedom or slavery of the human spirit) (p. 190); his view appears in this respect akin to personalistic idealism.

Berdyaev's view of man is rooted far more in the Kantian and existential traditions than in Biblical theology; he remains imbued with Kantian and post-Kantian idealism except for its monism and antipersonalism (p. 96). In his earlier writings he had criticized Kant for losing passage to the eternal; his postulation of the metaphysical led to positivism, so that one had to choose between Kantianism and Christianity (p. 73). But Kant's establishment of the reality of the autonomous noumenal realm is praised in later writings as providing the necessary presupposition for existential philosophy; Kant did not penetrate much into the spiritual, but he prepared the way for the existential affirmation of the primacy of the noumenal world (p. 74). Kierkegaard challenged Hegelianism in behalf of man's real existence (p. 77). Kant's basing of noumenal experience on the moral sense does not go far enough; existentialism builds on the dual nature of reality and the dual mode of apprehending it (p. 98). Existentialism elaborates the primacy of freedom over being and necessity, of the existential subject over the objectified world (p. 99). The subject is primary, is the only real center of existence, the ontological object a secondary product of thought, a rationalized concept; existence creates essence (p. 100). The subject alone is free, the object contingent and determined (p. 101). Hence man is defined by Berdyaev within the noumenal, contributing to the act of knowledge; he is continuous with the supernatural, despite Berdyaev's ethical dualism, in a way more representative of the idealistic than the Biblical tradition.

Berdyaev's treatment of epistemology bristles with interest. In the spirit of Kant, we are told that understanding is not exclusively conceptual (p. 101). Kant rightly taught that scientific objects are comprehendible, but not so God; if comprehendible, he would not be God (p. 103). God is understood only in an existential encounter, affording

an intuitive mystical vision of the eternal. Religion translates, often in conceptual terms, what is mystically given, immediately and intuitively, in the encounter. This distinction between apophatic, ineffable, non-conceptual apprehension and cataphatic (rationalized) definition is central to Berdyaev's thought (p. 106). This far, the reader will discern, there is a considerable similarity to the neo-supernaturalistic notion of an immediate paradoxic encounter with God, the doctrinal statement of which is a human rationalization. But Berdyaev's epistemology represents also a fundamental break with that of Barth and Brunner. This existential knowledge of God becomes for Berdyaev the basis for mysticism, which they reject (p. 103). Whereas Barth and Brunner — even if evangelical theology is unsatisfied that they actually succeed — profess to regard the Bible as a conditional norm over against the revelational encounter, Berdyaev asserts frankly that the inner intuitive awareness takes precedence over the historical revelation in the Bible or the experiences of prophets and apostles (p. 105). What Berdyaev seems not to suspect, any more than Barth and Brunner, is that the divorcing of the revelational content from an inscripturated revelation gives existentialism no safeguard from the movement from theism to atheism. Berdyaev rejects existentialism like those of Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, because in them the integral image of man vanishes (p. 77) on nothing more solid than postulational ground. The noumenal world assertedly is not, like the phenomenal world, scientifically knowable, but Kant's premises are accommodated to an existential philosophy which makes the spiritual realm and human personality primary (p. 192). What the post-Kantian tradition never seems to realize is that there is no escape from an agnostic solution of the Kantian depreciation of conceptual knowledge of the noumenal realm except in terms of that propositional knowledge which God has communicated in a special way and inscripturated; the alternative is not personalism, but the very impersonalism against which Berdyaev struggles. It marks a hopeless state of confusion for theology when we are told that ineffable intuitions are necessarily given a conceptual formulation (p. 106) — see Berdyaev's criticism of predestination below despite his own conceptualization of the myth of "uncreated freedom"— and yet the content of religion is found in non-rational myth.

Before treating Berdyaev's solution for the world by transformation or redemption, the reviewer wishes to emphasize the profoundly unbiblical view of human freedom and worth which underlies the Russian thinker's formula. For his commendable protest against the depersonalization of man by the modern idealisms and naturalisms can hardly maintain itself

apart from a Biblical personalism. Berdyaev has no sympathy for the orthodox "depreciation" of human nature; belief in man's worth and high dignity, in a Kantian more than a Christian sense, shines through his view that human personality is the "highest hierarchical value in the world" (p. 139). His concept of spiritual freedom derives from Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, and became the criterion for judging man's nature and destiny (p. 115). He rejected the view that man's creation in the divine image included freedom, subsequently lost by the Fall, regarding it as a source of atheism because it assertedly makes God responsible for evil (p. 116). For God foreknew the results (p. 117). Augustine, Luther and Calvin denied man's freedom by the terrible solution, reducible to absurdity, of predestination, a rational construction which misconceives an apophatic intuitive spiritual insight incapable of conceptual formulation; ineffable experiences should not be translated into a conceptual theology which makes God appear unjust (p. 118). Berdyaev's alternative to the Biblical view of freedom is complex, reflecting Boehme's theosophy, with its ultimate origin of all reality, the Trinity included, in the abyss of the primal *Ungrund*, or pure, aimless will, understood not by discursive concepts but mystical intuition. This *Ungrund* comprises evil as well as good; evil is a necessary stage on the way to good. Berdyaev, however, places the primal freedom, or *Ungrund*, outside the Godhead, not itself evil but the pre-existent possibility of evil as well as of good (p. 119). God, as well as evil, is born from the *Ungrund* by a theogonic process (p. 120). The *Ungrund* too is a symbolic myth, transcending human concepts, hence belongs to mystical theology. The categories "Father", "Son" and "Spirit", referring to the Trinity, are likewise symbolic. The doctrine of God is constructed from an existential standpoint; authoritarian views claiming special revelation are rejected along with philosophic objectifications (p. 137). Man is a creation both of God and the *Ungrund*, for his freedom derives from the *Ungrund*, hence God is not responsible for its misuse (p. 120). But God created the world out of voluntaristic non-being (*cf.* Plato) possessing a potentiality of being, a desire to be; while undifferentiated, it was "beyond good and evil", but God's creative act brought about the moral differentiation between good and evil (p. 121).

Spinka thinks the doctrine of "uncreated freedom" unwarranted by his fundamental assumptions, but Berdyaev thought it fundamental enough to cling to it. Spinka gives some central criticisms to show the remedy is worse than the cure: (1) God's endowment of man with freedom does not make him responsible for its abuse; (2) Berdyaev's theory does not

free God from responsibility for using in creation the meonic stuff involving the consequences of freedom; (3) his theory substitutes a dualism for the Christian concept of creation; (4) his notion of a birth of the Trinity jeopardizes the eternal existence of the divine, for the Trinity is not eternal in its present form.

The problem of evil, a characteristically Russian problem, Berdyaev referred also to the indeterminate *Ungrund*; freedom presupposes both good and evil; evil derives not from matter, but is spiritual (p. 123). Evil is not real in the same sense as good, but is irrational; it is phenomenally real but, as a component part of the *Ungrund*, is not noumenally real in the full sense (p. 125).

Berdyaev's view of freedom is offered also in answer to the problem of suffering. Evil is the creation of the desires of men by objectification. God does not punish men for it (p. 125). He afflicts no man, wills that none suffer (p. 133). The sovereignty of God is a pre-Christian and non-Christian objectification of a political idea; God is a Deliverer rather than Sovereign (p. 126). God desires not rule over men, in a master-slave relation, but communion (p. 128). Even God may not use human personality as a means; all personality is an end in itself (p. 129). Suffering can be redemptive if accepted in the Christian spirit (p. 127).

God's intention for man is seen from the God-man. God yearns for man's loving return of His love. Christianity's uniqueness is the God-man, the divine incarnation (p. 134). In Christ God suffers in His longing for man, and shares in man's suffering by taking on himself the sins of humanity. Remission of sins depends on man's repentance; redemption wrought by God, the grace of the Holy Spirit, must be voluntarily received; salvation is divinely aided but not predestined. Berdyaev wants no salvation initiated, performed and consummated by God alone, for that would involve the salvation of men who do not want and refuse to be saved (p. 132). The juridical view of atonement is rejected; it legalizes spiritual concepts (p. 136). Redemption is not provided by a satisfaction of divine justice. Moreover, it covers all sins, even atheism (p. 136). It aims to do more than restore the unfallen man, it seeks a divine-human personality (p. 137), developed through loving "I-Thou" contact (p. 141). But this transformation is not to be regarded as conversion in the traditional sense; it is man's loss of freedom, rather than his disobedience that needs rectification (p. 113).

Redemption restores the human freedom lost in the Fall (p. 142). The redeemed man is united with the eternal Spirit in a God-manhood, a deification in which humanity is not lost (p. 143). Berdyaev's emphasis

on the release of such divine creative energy is employed as a remedy for orthodoxy's failure to stress the redeemed man's use of his powers toward the creation of a redeemed human social order, the gospel there being presented in terms alone of salvation from sin; the work of redemption stops short of the transformed man (p. 145). Redemption is thus viewed negatively instead of positively, halting short of the life of creativity (p. 146). Man's freedom can be expressed in two ways, the natural man's, demonic; the redeemed man's, divine. The creature's effort to create a personality is mechanically frustrated; God alone can effect personalities (p. 147). The task of creativity is to free life from dominance of temporal interests and the transformation of society.

Redemption of the world will not come by apocalyptic fiat at the end of history, nor will the Kingdom be realized within history, but society can be radically transformed by creative activity (p. 148). Personal transformation has a social responsibility; anything else is a satanic caricature of Christianity and values the idea of hell more than the idea of social transformation (p. 149).

Berdyaev champions the supreme value of human personality in opposition to the principle of majority determination inherent in Lockean democracy (p. 165). Not only is the majority voice of selfish men rarely the voice of God, but democracies are more often governed by a powerful minority rather than the majority (p. 166). The atomistic individualism of the democracies, which Continental thought regards generally as involving an inadequate social system (p. 96), is wrongly overcome in communism by forcible unification, instead of by free community in love (p. 167). No shift of political or economic factors is radical enough to effect a sufficient change. The ideal democracy is for the people but not of the people (p. 168). It is a cooperative society without class struggle with government umpiring the professional guilds (p. 169). Only a personalist socialism of the syndicalist type is ideal (p. 176). Spinka rightly notes that the same selfish nature which defeats democratic capitalism on Berdyaev's approach, could also destroy his guild pattern.

Renaissance self-assertion issued in capitalism (p. 173). Berdyaev's criticisms reflect little awareness of recent changes in the capitalistic economy from within and without (p. 174). Christianity's chief criterion is any civilization's contribution to spiritual values. Hence Berdyaev parted from Marx, but shared his critique of capitalism (p. 175). Capitalism has ceased to be individualistic and has become a managerially-controlled collectivism; communism has become State capitalism whose privileged classes exploit the worker (p. 176). Communism is socially (economically and politically) acceptable but not spiritually (p. 177).

Christianity gives time an ontological significance as the bearer of meaning (p. 178). Berdyaev distinguishes cosmic (cyclical), historical and existential time (eternity). The latter breaks occasionally into historical time, as the revelation of God in Christ, creating moments of existential reality (p. 179). The idea of progress is noumenal, and not automatic (p. 179). Without God, no goal of history is possible (p. 180). Christianity is the religion of the future, of the aeon of the Spirit; the end of the world means the triumph of existential living over all objectification by humanity (p. 180). The divine goal does not mean man's freedom is limited by a divine determinism (p. 181). Man may deny God to the bitter end. God's Kingdom will never be fully realized on earth; those sects which think they fully realize the divine ideal are guilty of spiritual myopia (p. 182). Jewish messianic hopes, early Christian expectations, and modern apocalyptic hopes of an earthly utopia, even Marxism, are misled; the Kingdom cannot be realized in time except partially in and through the ecumenical church, which must not, however, be identified as does Romanism with the perfect Kingdom (p. 183). The Christian has the positive duty of consummating history, of ending time, of ushering in the Spirit aeon (p. 184). Eschatology is creative; the end of objectified history comes by existential thinking and living. The "objectified" world and history must yield to an existential communion with men and God, which is the eschatological coming of the Kingdom (p. 195). Hence the redeemed man dynamically brings about the "end of time" by the end of objectification. Every moral act contributes to this ushering in of the aeon of the Spirit, in which men live in intensified personal relations with God and each other (p. 196). Physical death is a natural event; the spirit sometimes survives eternally (p. 185). Berdyaev shares Origen's view of a second chance beyond death (p. 179). Universalism does not take free will seriously enough; immortality is not a natural endowment, but is acquired, and the spirit need not survive repeated redemptive opportunities. Berdyaev is unclear whether the non-attainment of immortality implies annihilation (p. 186). Not only immortality, but resurrection, is affirmed — yet not a physical resurrection but transformation in terms of a spiritual body. The doctrine of hell is an objectification of man's sadism, a creation of the Western church (p. 187). So regarding purgatory and paradise (p. 187). Although universalism is rejected, Berdyaev expresses the hope that ultimately there shall be but one Kingdom, not a division of saved and damned (p. 188). The glorification of the redeemed is not merely a restoration to the pre-existent state, but a higher illumination (p. 189).

By way of comment not much remains to be said. It is futile to point

out that, at numerous points, Berdyaev shares views colored by the Eastern Orthodox bias, such as his antipathy for divine sovereignty, his view that the fall does not destroy man's freedom, his notion of God's suffering in the atonement, his emphasis on God-manhood and on an "eighth day" of creation. For that misses the point. Berdyaev makes no claim to present a Biblical theology; he is consciously in revolt against orthodoxy in any form, in the interest of a mystical Christianity sufficiently varied from the Biblical view to leave little doubt that we have only a philosophical theism. While Berdyaev did not dissociate himself from the church, he regarded orthodoxy as too parochial, and himself as a "free Christian" with no claim to churchly views (p. 115). His cooperation with the Christian Student Movement in Paris was short-lived because Berdyaev considered it, and liberal theologians as well, as too "rightist". World War II so unsettled his convictions that he questioned God's goodness and love, and intensified his revolt against traditional theology. His metaphysics had been unable to save significance for the appearances. There is a tragic symbolism in the circumstance that he died sitting at his desk.

Berdyaev had no real sense of the tragedy of human sin, neither in its Adamic nor contemporary dimensions, and no genuine awareness of the significance of special revelation and redemption. He is more candid than some recent existentialists, in that his appeal to the divine encounter is not offered as a front for an objective Biblical revelation. But, for all that, his view is still far too "Christian", for it feeds too much, even in the idealistic distortions, on biblical confidence in the reality of the spiritual and moral order, on the worth of human personality, on individual and social concern for one's fellow men — emphases which can sustain themselves only in a revelational and redemptive view — to experience the hunger of nihilism.

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J. M. Bates: *A Manual of Doctrine.* Christchurch and Dunedin: Presbyterian Bookroom. 1950. 247. 9/6.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand in 1949 approved the publication of this volume as a layman's textbook in Christian doctrine and as a basis for instruction of communicants (p. 10). We are also informed in the "Foreword" by the moderator of

the General Assembly that this is "the first such work to be published" by the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand (*idem*). It is gratifying to know that this branch of the Presbyterian Church is prepared to supply its lay people with a manual of doctrine which will help them to give a reason for the faith that is in them. This evinces an interest in doctrine and in doctrinal instruction which may well augur a revival of the doctrinal consciousness which has been characteristic of our Presbyterian tradition. With respect to the work of Mr. Bates we cannot but covet the ability which comes to light in the plan and content of this manual. As we should expect and as would be indispensable in a work of this kind, there is a simplicity of statement and development. But Mr. Bates does not serve us a stereotyped simplicity and he is not afraid to lead his readers oftentimes into areas of discussion which place considerable demands upon their thought and intelligence. That is surely as it should be even in the simplest manual. For how are people to grow in knowledge and understanding if all instruction is dished out to them on one level?

Our chief concern should be whether this manual is a faithful transcript of the faith once delivered to the saints, the faith to which the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand stands committed. In assessing any volume by such a criterion the basic question is the view entertained of the rule of faith. Mr. Bates is right when he says that "the source of all Christian doctrine is God" (p. 17), and he is also right when he insists upon the necessity of revelation if we are to know anything of God. He is also careful to remind his readers that it is the Bible which contains this revelation and that for Presbyterians the Bible as the Word of God is the supreme rule of faith and life (pp. 17, 20). It is at this point, however, that Bates's divergence from the historic position of his own Church becomes patent. Bates himself must be credited with the knowledge of this fact. But the lay people of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand should realize it also. And they should be placed in the position of being able openly and intelligently to come to terms with this difference. They must ask the question whether the view of revelation and of the Bible being presented to them in this volume is the same as that expressed in their official Confession.

For Mr. Bates it is apparent that the Bible itself is not the revelation or Word of God. It is, he says, "the record of what happened to numbers of people when they encountered God in various experiences of their lives" (p. 18). The Bible, he says, "is a channel of doctrine because it contains the record of the experiences and convictions of the men of God", the record of "particularly significant encounters between man

and God" (p. 20). The "Word of God" must therefore be distinguished from the Bible. The Bible is simply "the record of God's dealings with His children" (p. 21), whereas the "Word of God" is "the dealings themselves" (*cf.* also pp. 31, 54). "We cannot identify the Word of God with the written words of the Bible" (p. 56).

This view of Scripture will readily be recognised as that which has become widely current at the present time within protestant churches and is associated generally with the names of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. In a word it is that the Bible is not the "revelation" of God to men but simply the vehicle or instrument of revelation (*cf.* pp. 56 f.). It is in this light that we are to understand Bates when he says: "The authority of the Bible is the Word of God, and the Word of God is none other than God's self-communication in Christ through the Holy Spirit" (p. 57). And, strange to say, both the logic and the inconsistency of Bates' position are evident when he adds: "Where the words of the Bible are plainly the words of man it is not appropriate to speak of its authority in the religious sense" (*idem*).

This view of the Bible needs some analysis. It is, of course, true that the Bible records for us "the experiences and convictions of the men of God" and "significant encounters between man and God". But the Bible is far more than that and far more than that even when it *records* "significant encounters between man and God". The Bible is *itself* revelation. It is revelation even when it informs us of what took place in history and in the experiences of God's people. That is to say, when we are thinking simply of the record given us of the way in which God revealed Himself in ages past and of the content of such revelation, that record is much more than a record. It is an inscripturated record and inscripturation is itself revelation. It is not a mere human record; it is a divine record. And divine recording is divine revelation. But, again, the mere notion of divine *record* is not adequate. It is more than that; it is the inspired record of revelation given in the past *incorporated* into what is for us inscripturated revelation. And, of greater significance, the Bible cannot properly be construed if we take our point of departure from the notion of record. We must rather have the perspective which regards inscripturation as the method by which God made His revelation, the revelation of Himself and of His will, a permanently available deposit. It is the only way by which the special revelation from God to us men is now available. The Bible is the Word of God written. It is an organism of revelation which places us men who live subsequent to its

completion in the unique position of enjoying a privilege which no one in earlier ages enjoyed. To us men in this age the Bible is, in its compact unity and varied diversity, the completed revelation of God's mind and will. It is no mere record of revelations given in the past; it is God revealing Himself to us; it is God speaking to us, speaking to us, of course, in a written Word. That is the conception of Scripture formulated in the Westminster Confession of Faith. It has been repeatedly shown that this is the conception of Scripture entertained by Scripture itself and particularly by our Lord and his apostles.

It is true that the Bible came through the instrumentality of men. If human instrumentality bespeaks "imperfection" (*cf.* p. 39), then no part of the Bible is immune to this imperfection. For the Bible in its entirety came through human instrumentality. The consequence would be that at no point in the Bible could we have a perfect Word of God. Bates and those of like mind with him do not appear to recognise the logic of this position. When they appeal to any word of the Bible as the Word of God and treat it as divinely authoritative they can do this only on the assumption which they are most jealous to deny. They do it on the assumption that such words of the Bible are the Word of God, but they can do this only if they concede that a word which came through the instrumentality of men can be or can become the perfect Word of God. And this they can maintain only by surreptitiously dragging in a conception of Scripture which they are most jealous to controvert in their polemic against the plenary inspiration and infallibility of Scripture.

It needs also to be said at this point that the facile way in which Mr. Bates tries to dismiss the plenary inspiration of Scripture (pp. 53 f.) is not worthy of the fair and sober treatment which such an important question deserves. It is easy to set up the straw man of Scripture "being written down from dictation, as it were, by the Holy Spirit". It is easy to reject this "rather mechanical idea" of inspiration. But Mr. Bates should know and his readers should be given to know that the view which he is attacking, namely, that the whole of Scripture harmonises with itself and that "a unified body of doctrine" can be "distilled from it without any mutual contradiction between the parts" (*idem*) does not rest upon a theory of mechanical dictation. This way of dismissing plenary and verbal inspiration is, of course, common. But it is only a subterfuge. And to use it to undermine faith in Scripture as the Word of God written, especially the faith of those who are not in the best position to meet the attack, is exceedingly culpable.

It is true that God addresses the souls of men in the Bible and He speaks in the souls of men through the Bible. Our reformed theology has always recognised in this connection the necessity of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit in order to effectual conviction in the human heart. But it is confusion of the gravest kind to identify this internal operation of the Spirit with the Word of God or with the authority of the Bible (*cf.* p. 57). It is by the Spirit the Word of God is sealed with conviction in man's heart. But this enlightening and sealing function of the Spirit does not make that which is sealed the Word of God nor does it make Scripture authoritative. The Spirit brings home the Word with the authority which properly and antecedently belongs to it as the Word of God. It will not do to pawn off under the guise of appeal to the Holy Spirit what is in reality a denial of the doctrine of Scripture and of its authority. Nor will it do to pawn off such denial under such terms as "God's self-communication in Christ through the Holy Spirit" (*idem*). The doctrine of the Holy Spirit requires us to recognise the distinctions that inhere in His several operations. To fail to make the proper distinction here is to dishonour Scripture as the Spirit's handiwork and the internal testimony as that by which He seals in our hearts the authority of His handiwork.

When Bates comes to the presentation of the doctrine of the person of Christ we find that he is not able to get above the erroneous conceptions which shape his thinking in reference to the rule of faith. One gets the distinct impression that he posits the incarnation as the solution of a situation that exists in the relation of God to man quite irrespective of sin, that it is the humanness, the creatureliness of man, that makes the incarnation necessary. How else may we interpret the following? "If God Himself wished never so ardently to reveal Himself to man how could he do it in view of human incapacity to receive the divine? Anticipating later discussion we may say briefly that God met this situation by sending His Son, Jesus Christ" (p. 43). For this is Bates's answer to the question: "How can the finite, which is ourselves, become capable of the infinite, which is God?" (*idem*). One cannot but suspect that Bates is entangled in the confusion which fails sharply to distinguish between the metaphysical difference that exists between God and man, on the one hand, and the moral and spiritual disruption caused by sin, on the other. The Scripture represents the incarnation as the provision of God's love and wisdom to meet the exigencies of the latter, and it may not be represented as the solution to the antithesis between the infinite and the finite. And surely it is this lack of discrimination that permits Bates to write regard-

ing Jesus' recognition that God was his Father: "What is meant to have God as His Father is perhaps best expressed in (a) the thoughts of the Lord's prayer; (b) the fact that it is a *prayer*" (p. 70). Jesus indeed knew that God was his *own* Father. And Jesus prayed. But did Jesus pray the "Lord's prayer"? Do we need to be reminded that Jesus said to his disciples, "when ye pray say"? Our whole conception of Christ rests upon our recognition of the absolute distinction between the relation he sustained to the Father as the eternal Son and the relation the disciples sustained to the Father. Jesus did not pray with his disciples and address God under the one common designation, "Our Father". And what about the fifth petition? Suffice it to say that such a paragraph as that from which we have just quoted betrays a congeries of misconstructions and dislocations that makes us wonder if Bates has come to terms with what is central in the witness of Jesus. And to give another example, Bates cannot subscribe to the virgin birth of our Lord. He says: "The evidence is therefore inconclusive" (p. 100). He is willing to grant indeed that a virgin might have conceived but it is strange presumption when he says: "God could use the ordinary means and still realize His purpose" (*idem*). How do we know? How do we know that a natural birth would have been compatible with a supernatural person? The supernaturalness of the person born and the miraculous generation are perfectly congruous. Who has enough wisdom to say that it could have been otherwise?

There is much more in this volume that merits comment. But this will suffice to show that, notwithstanding the many commendable qualities which Mr. Bates has utilised in writing this manual and notwithstanding many fine passages, Mr. Bates has not furnished the people of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand with a textbook that will instruct and establish them in the faith once delivered to the saints and consonant with the testimony of Jesus. The publication of this manual no doubt reveals a revived interest in and demand for doctrinal instruction in New Zealand. Such a climate of interest presents a great opportunity. But if that interest is to be fostered and cultivated in a way that will promote our Christian and Presbyterian faith the direction will have to be drawn from another source than Bates's *Manual of Doctrine*.

JOHN MURRAY

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John Calvin: *Calvin's Calvinism. The Eternal Predestination of God. The Secret Providence of God.* Translated into English by Henry Cole. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1950. 350. $3.50.

The appearance of any work of Calvin will always be greeted with joy by the student of theology. It is greatly to the credit of the Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company that it has undertaken to reprint practically all the works of the great Reformer which had previously been translated into English. The present volume is a reprint of Henry Cole's translation of three treatises on Predestination and Providence. These treatises, although not the only ones which Calvin wrote on these subjects, form a welcome addition to those parts of the *Institutes* which also deal with these topics (I, xvi-xviii; II, v; III, xxi-xxiv). Needless to say, there is complete harmony between the teaching of Calvin's great masterpiece and the substance of the present works. Here, however, the tone is polemic rather than didactic: the first treatise is a refutation of the objections raised by Albertus Pighius and Georgius of Sicily, the second and the third treatises are directed against anonymous pamphleteers. The lines of argumentation followed in order to overthrow the doctrine of God's sovereignty were not very different four hundred years ago from what they are to-day. Thus the present volume has still remarkable relevancy in spite of its age. It may be worthy of special note that practically the whole of the third treatise is devoted to the refutation of the charge that Calvin held God to be the author of sin. This disposes of Arminianism and of Hyper-Calvinism in one blow!

It is unfortunate that Henry Cole's translation is often quite free and has a tendency to exaggerate the bitterness of the tone, which, even in the original Latin, seems sometimes unnecessarily violent to the twentieth century reader. One may also question the way in which the translator presumed to shuffle the materials at hand: *e. g.*, the conclusion of the first treatise was shifted by Cole to constitute a preface to the third treatise. Cole's prefaces seem uncommonly wordy and rhetorical. J. K. Popham's preface to the reprint of 1927 as well as to the present edition is more simple, although one is amazed to read in it the following statement:

> . . . his "Institutes," the earliest edition of which was printed at Basle in 1536, and was translated and published by the Calvin Translation Society in 1845. This colossal work comprises fifty-four volumes . . .

Now no English translation of the first edition of the *Institutes* was ever published. It is of the final edition (1559) that the Calvin Translation Society published in 1845 and 1846 a translation in three volumes. Alto-

gether this Society issued 52 volumes from 1843 to 1856; 46 volumes of Commentaries (Romans appearing in two different English translations), 3 volumes of Tracts, and the 3 volumes of *Institutes*.

The present work is clearly and carefully printed and well-bound. This may perhaps be the place to express the hope that, in addition to the fine work accomplished in reprinting previously translated works of Calvin and in addition to the volume *The Deity of Christ*, consisting of sermons recently translated by Leroy Nixon, Eerdmans might venture further into publishing hitherto untranslated treatises or homilies of the great reformer. This would be a great service to the cause of evangelical theology.

ROGER NICOLE

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K. Schilder: *Heaven — What is It?* Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1950. 118. $1.50.

On the title page of this volume we are informed that Dr. Schilder's book as originally written has been "translated and condensed". It is to be regretted that the English reader has not been given an unabridged translation of Schilder's work on *Wat is de Hemel?* similar to that of the same author's work on the passion of Christ.

Schilder wants to study his subject as an aspect of the Christian philosophy of history. With characteristic depth of penetration he therefore shows how the history of heaven is an aspect of the history of the created universe as a whole. He is particularly anxious to distinguish the Biblical view of eschatology from the modern view as entertained by such men as Hegel, Kierkegaard, Barth, Althaus and Tillich. A thoroughly devastating criticism is given of the various theories of these men. Their philosophy of history and therefore their view of eschatology are shown to be utterly unscriptural and consequently unchristian.

Very little of all this is passed on to the English reader. The first two chapters of the original, in which the basic contrast between the Christian and the modern philosophies of history are most comprehensively set forth in seventy pages of close reasoning, are reduced to a popularized paraphrase of less than ten pages of print. In the last chapter of the original (52 pages) Schilder gives his critique of the much controverted question of "common grace". To him the acceptance of Abraham Kuyper's view

of "common grace" involves a weakening of a truly Christian philosophy of history and of culture. English readers get only a faint taste of the flavor of Schilder's argument in the eighteen pages of paraphrase that is offered to them.

To be sure what is given in the English booklet is still very valuable. It is still far superior to what is usually produced on the subject of eschatology by orthodox writers. How could it be otherwise? It is still Schilder speaking. But the power of his voice has been greatly reduced. And it is precisely Schilder as a powerful voice against modern unbelief and every form of compromise of the gospel of God's grace that is sorely needed in our day.

C. VAN TIL

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Ralph Stob: *Christianity and Classical Civilization*. Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1950. 198. $3.00.

Dr. Stob is professor of Greek studies in Calvin College, Grand Rapids. His purpose in this book, he tells us, is twofold. First, he plans to make an historical investigation of the relation between New Testament Christianity and the civilization of Greece and Rome in which Christianity came to birth. Secondly, he wishes to study the interaction of Hebrew and Hellenic principles in the course of Christian history, with a view to evaluating some of the ideas currently associated with the Christian faith.

In the main, however, the book is concerned with the first of the two. Dr. Stob compares the teachings of Christianity and of paganism in the fields of theology and ethics. What influences, if any, were exercised back and forth? To what extent, if any, was Christian thought dependent on or derived from its classical environment? After a few preliminary chapters Dr. Stob takes up such questions as the nature of God, the meaning of the Logos, the relationship of God and the world, the character of man, and the doctrines of the last things. Then entering the field of ethics, he considers the virtues which Christianity exalts, and their relationship to those uppermost in paganism. At points it is noted that certain pagan ideas of antiquity are very similar to ideas that have become integrated in the structure of the modern liberal interpretation of Christianity. But this aspect of the work is incidental. Chiefly we have here an historical investigation.

In the first few chapters Dr. Stob gives a background for his study. In developing this background he brings in the common grace of God. The Christian Reformed Church a few years ago affirmed the fact of common grace that led to the withdrawal of a group of members. Dr. Stob finds it desirable to relate the fact of common grace to the subject under consideration.

Undoubtedly the common grace of God is involved in any interpretation of pagan civilization. But it appears that Dr. Stob goes too far in his emphasis on a positive aspect of common grace. For example, he says, "The Reformed view . . . sees some, yes, much good in pagan thought, but at the same time maintains the essential difference between it and the teaching of Scripture . . . It is the common grace of God which has led the noble souls of antiquity to see and to propagate the excellent ideas and ideals" (p. 34).

Dr. Stob goes further than this. Finding good in paganism, he appears to suggest that Christianity is a sort of syncretism. "In the narrative of the history of Israel and Greece the difference between the two national ideals becomes apparent. Israel excelled in religion and morality. Greece reached the heights in the field of culture . . . But Christianity comes as the fulfillment of all that went before" (p. 56). "Now Israel had genuine religion and morality, but fell short of culture. Greece had that. But the ideal of Christian teaching is not the one or the other, but both" (p. 57).

The fullest statement of Dr. Stob's position is this: "Through it all runs a sovereign purpose. The world is about to become acquainted with the perfect ideal life. Then first through these contacts each nation must learn to see its own deficiency. Here again, we have that same working of grace in the negative and positive way at the same time. Negatively each saw what itself lacked. And positively it admired the good of the other. The ideal of life was about to be declared to be a combination of both. Religion alone is not the complete fulfillment of man's calling. Much less is culture alone. Christianity has room for both religion and culture. It may have a definite view of the value of each, and that too in relation to one another. But it does hold up as the ideal that man should acquire both. Then it will no longer be Jew or Greek, but that which transcends both by taking up into itself the essential part of each. This is what Christianity does" (*idem*).

To picture Christianity as taking up into itself the essential parts of Hebrew religion and pagan culture without sharply distinguishing the two is to destroy its very nature as the faith of special revelation.

We are glad that when Dr. Stob comes to the main body of his work he

quickly disabuses himself and us of any such syncretistic notions. At every point where his investigation carries he comes to the conclusion that, though apparent similarities of language may exist, there was a fundamental divergence of thought between Christianity and paganism. Dr. Stob acknowledges this in his own brief but pointed conclusion when, looking back over the whole comparison, he says: "It appears therefore that formally there is a real approach to identity but materially there is not" (p. 191). This is certainly the conclusion to be drawn from his main study, and it happily is inconsistent with views expressed in the preliminary chapters.

There is little point in reviewing the discussion in detail. Dr. Stob is at home in classical Greek literature, and cites freely from its various writers. The discussion is frequently interesting, generally profitable, and in no sense outside the range of the ordinary reader. However, an acquaintance with Greek philosophy is no hindrance to one's understanding of the argument. In the chapter, "Is there a God?", to take but one example, Dr. Stob shows that the essential New Testament ideas of the personality of God, His Fatherhood with respect to believers, His spirituality, and monotheism are wanting in Greek thought.

In the section dealing with ethics, we have the feeling that Dr. Stob has become sidetracked in his discussion of Christian versus pagan virtues. The Christian ethic is not a matter of certain specific virtues (*e. g.*, faith, hope, love), but rather of the whole conduct of the whole man. Traditional Reformed thought analyzes this matter in terms of the aim of conduct (the glory of God), the standard of conduct (the Word of God), and the motive for conduct (faith in and love for God). We think Dr. Stob would have been more effective if he had approached his subject along these lines. However his analysis of the specific Christian virtues of faith, hope, and, especially, love is certainly not without both interest and value.

We have one concluding remark concerning the book as a whole. A professor in an American college should be able to produce a book characterized by a reasonably high degree of literary and typographical accuracy. This book is so filled with typographical errors and deficiencies of grammatical expression as to be fatally marred. It will have to appear in a new corrected (if not rewritten) edition before it can expect to receive much attention in competent academic circles.

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R. Laird Harris: *Introductory Hebrew Grammar*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1950. iv, 81. $2.50.

The present volume is a photo-offset publication. In twenty lessons Dr. Harris seeks to present the essentials of Hebrew grammar together with some observations on syntax. The method herein presented has been employed by the author for some ten years of teaching the language. Perhaps the central feature of the work is to be found in its emphasis on the verb and upon "the method of learning the verb by rule rather than by rote".

As early as the second lesson the student is introduced to the perfect of the regular verb, and lesson five is devoted to a treatment of the perfect in the derived stems. In lesson seven the imperfect is introduced, and in lesson eight the entire strong verb is completed. The Waw Consecutive is treated in lesson nine, and immediately thereafter the student is plunged into a study of the weak verb. The lessons are accompanied with exercises for translation from Hebrew to English and from English to Hebrew.

Detail which is not immediately requisite for an understanding of the exercises is omitted, so that the student may begin the reading of the Hebrew Bible at the earliest possible moment. The author has attempted a difficult task, and he has performed it well. In the hands of a capable instructor, this grammar should prove really helpful to the beginner. There are a few minor inaccuracies of statement and some errors in the exercises which will doubtless be corrected in a second edition.

The reviewer has found that it is best to begin the reading of the Hebrew Bible as soon as the alphabet has been mastered. Dr. Harris' grammar has proven to be a very satisfactory reference book for use with such a method.

EDWARD J. YOUNG

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Randolph Crump Miller: *The Clue to Christian Education*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1950. xi,211. $2.75.

The Clue to Christian Education is another evidence of the fact that several churchmen representing diverse faiths are at least looking in the direction of "the old paths" for current spiritual need. In the short preface, Dr. Miller says, in explaining the reason for the present volume, "I

found as I thought upon the problem that the 'clue' would be found in the relevance of theology to the whole of life, and that with this clue I could open the doors of the associated questions of method, evangelism, and parent cooperation. The opening chapter is a brief description of what I believe the clue to be. The remainder of the book is an elaboration of theory in terms of the relevance of specific theological beliefs to the lives of adults and children of various ages. I have not been concerned primarily with method except as it illustrates the theory" (p. viii).

"The problem" just mentioned above he defines in a quotation from an earlier book where he writes, "A theology for Christian education is needed. The objectives, theory and methods of Christian education need to be undergirded and perhaps altered by a more self conscious theological reconstruction . . . . . at the same time, there needs to be a facing of the whole *problem of relating content to method in an organic whole*"[1] (italics mine).

One reason why many conservatives have abhorred current Religious Education texts and articles is the almost total lack of Christian content in them. Many such books have been largely concerned with a life-centered, experience-centered and pupil-centered method. As Dr. Miller states in the first chapter, this latter concentration on method was reached because of the revulsion of earlier religious educationalists from "catechetical or ungraded, or Bible centered (lessons), with no thought for the religious needs and experiences of the pupils" (p. 2). But such emphasis on method to the neglect of content led to "a failure to grasp the purpose of Christian Education and to impart Christian truth" (*idem*).

This failure on the part of religious education in the first half of our century is part and parcel of the same failure of education in the secular realm so recently and so brilliantly excoriated by Dr. Miller's fellow Anglican, Bernard Iddings Bell, when he said of American education, "It neglects the basic disciplines. It tends to turn out graduates who expect the cheap success of reward without labor. It denies our society the training of leadership by madly mixing technology and liberal learning and trying to feed the indigestible stew to thousands who choke on it. By treating religion as a dispensable diversion, it deprives the young of allegiance to any spiritual compulsion greater than love of country . . . 'Know how' is not enough. It is vain and empty without 'know why'."[2]

[1] Henry H. Shires and Randolph C. Miller: *Christianity and the Contemporary Scene*, New York, 1943, pp. 196–201.

[2] "Know How Versus Know Why" in *Life*, October 16, 1950, p. 98.

But while Dr. Miller may seem to be wearing camel's hair with a girdle of skin about his loins and eating locusts and wild honey, and while he may appear to be crying "Make his paths straight", let us not be deceived. Look closer. He is wearing nylon and plastic. Cashew nuts and milkshakes are his diet. "Back up, but not too far", is his message. It is only an *ersatz* voice in the wilderness we hear. For even when he writes boldly, "The major task of Christian education to-day is to discover and impart the relevance of Christian truth" (p. 4), he is ever so quick to explain that "This is not a plea to return to a content-centered curriculum . . . it is not a desire to return to indoctrination, for indoctrination implies a kind of authority which is consistent with controlled propaganda rather than with the growth of individuals in the Christian way of life" (p. 5). His true position is here seen. Emphasis on content implies an authoritarian view of Christian education. Modern religious man can never accept that.

The hatred for authoritarianism was pointed out long ago by Bavinck when he said, "Whoever believes in God, . . . and as a result seriously adjusts his life to this belief, honors God's providential rule and all those relationships in life involving authority, rests on it, continually builds on it, and worships God for the privilege of believing this".[3] And the converse is also true. The reason Brederveld sees for the rejection of the lecture method in modern education is: "Because it does not want religion, it does not want instruction in religion either".[4] One could also paraphrase, "Because Christian Education does not want compulsion, it will not have authority either". So while conservatives may properly rejoice that a trend is appearing to return to "content" in Christian Education, let them rejoice but soberly. For here in the most outspoken desire for such a return is the statement of the author that since "Neither content nor indoctrination provides the clue, how can theology be at the center of the curriculum? The answer is that theology is *not* at the center. *The center of the curriculum is a twofold relationship between God and the learner. The curriculum is both God-centered and experience-centered. Theology must be prior to the curriculum*" (p. 5).

There is further persuasion in the opening chapter to "rediscover a relevant theology . . . to bring the learners into the right relationship with the living God". But it doesn't have to be rediscovered. It was never lost. It is at the elbow of the author in the Thirty-nine Articles of the

[3] Herman Bavinck: *Paedagogische Beginselen*, pp. 127 f., translated in J. Brederveld: *Christian Education, A Summary and Critical Discussion of Bavinck's Pedagogical Principles*, Grand Rapids, 1928, p. 96.

[4] J. Brederveld: *op. cit.*, p. 103.

writer's own communion. It is embodied in the Westminster Confession of Faith. The Reformers had it. Augustine taught it. Paul expounded it. It is the Bible!

The reading of the balance of the book is a most frustrating experience. There is so much that is good and with which a conservative could agree if he could provide his own context, and if he didn't know the author's disavowal of the priority of God's Word to speak authoritatively for itself.

The chapter "Focal Point" is about Jesus Christ. It warns against a "watered-down Christology" (p. 20). It amplifies: "Jesus was not simply a man; he was also God in the flesh. God was in Christ. This is the Christian gospel" (p. 23). Yet the same author writes in the next paragraph "Jesus was a man, born of human parents, who lived and taught and suffered and died just as Socrates or Buddha or Confucius did much the same in their day" (*idem*).

So the chapters go, as the author summarizes for us the doctrinal content of Christian Education for various age levels in these areas: "The Source", "The Creature", "The Fellowship", "Grace", "Faith", "Prayer", "Behavior", "Society". The next chapter holds great interest for us since it is labeled "Authority". It is about the Bible. A more theological approach to the whole problem would have put "The Bible" as the first chapter and the author's first chapter about Jesus after one on God.

"The primary seat of revelation and thus of authority is found in the Bible as interpreted by the concept of 'the mind of Christ' " (p. 170). This is shortly followed by the following: "One has freedom to submit to Rome, to a fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible, to the Inner Light, to a particular denominational tradition, or to a liberal interpretation of Christianity" (p. 171). Thus the "mind of Christ" may lead one to Rome, one to Quakerism and one to bottomless scepticism and the authority spoken of in the beginning is ultimately the mind of man which rises above any "authority" of Scripture so-called.

It is no surprise then to read: "When we turn to the various age groups, it is surprising how little of the Bible we can use" (p. 177), "The Bible is a tool of Christian living, not a text book to be assimilated" (p. 178). And to resolve all doubt about the author's attitude on authority he tells us, "Memorizing for the sake of retention of ideas before the age of nine is a complete waste of time, especially the Bible verses which are simply a drill" (p. 178). The author forgets his original quest for a "clue" and goes back to the morass of pragmatism on the byway of progressivism to come up with this: "On the high school level, an entirely new approach to the Bible may be used. If the teacher has been intelligent in handling Biblical

stories as myths, legends, drama, poetry and history in the earlier grades no conflicts of any importance will arise until the skepticism of the high school mind is turned on the problem of authority" (p. 181).

The epilogue is a plea for childlikeness of faith without the childishness of immaturity. There is a book list of twelve volumes with a two or three line comment about each one. The author's evaluation gives more than a clue to his own position. A quite complete index has the added feature of some more important references being in bold-faced type. The format is attractive and the type easy to read. Dr. Miller's "clue" has led us back to the same old experience-centered, child-centered humanism of Christian Education for the last fifty years.

The solution which the "clue" professes to be seeking will be found when Christian Education puts God at the center and His revelation in its rightful place of authority. Our methods and techniques certainly need improvement, but our content and its priority never!

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Arthur Wallace Calhoun: *The Cultural Concept of Christianity.* Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1950. 155. $2.50.

The jacket of this book informs us that Dr. Calhoun grew up in the Reformed Presbyterian Church, received his Ph. D. from Clark University, and has been fourteen years Dean of Sterling College (United Presbyterian) in Kansas.

Dr. Calhoun writes from the viewpoint of a sociologist. He holds that the troubles of the modern world may be traced to the habit of mechanistic as against organismic thinking. And so the solution is to reorient all of life along organismic lines.

The mechanistic viewpoint, he says, "is that meaning resides in the parts of anything, and is to be reached by dissection" (p. 6). Science, medicine, psychology, religion, and even "twentieth century sociology" have all become afflicted with the terrible disease of a "mechanistic "approach. That is, they have all turned their attention to dealing with individual details in their field of study, and have lost sight of the whole, of which the detail is but a part.

Dr. Calhoun reminds us that the whole is more than merely the sum of the parts, and asserts that meaning lies in wholes, and that parts get their

meaning from their relation to the whole. Hence the "way to understand anything is not by mechanical separation into fragments but by integral apprehension of the organic wholeness of what we are studying" (p. 13).

In the rest of the book Dr. Calhoun proceeds to work out this thesis. First he seeks to establish the meaning of the whole, that is, the universe, and then works down the line attempting to show how in every field it is the meaning of the whole that should guide the study of the parts.

It is when Dr. Calhoun begins to talk about the meaning of the universe, however, that serious doubts arise in our mind. He speaks of "the wholeness of experience, which Christians designate as apprehension of God" (p. 16). He says the aim is to "conceive of everything in terms of an overruling vital wholeness, which is what devout people mean by 'God' " (p. 20). He says the initial hypothesis of true scientific method is "faith in the meaning of the universe" (p. 34), and concludes that "science is necessarily theistic, for if we have a universe (rather than a chaos) then we are brought face to face with that integral wholeness which theologians call God" (p. 36 f.). "Belief in God" then is "essentially confidence in the wholeness of things" (p. 40).

If this language is to be taken seriously, Dr. Calhoun is enmeshed in some sort of pantheism which is very far from Christianity. For the first essential of Christian thought is the absolute, self-existent God, distinct from the universe, the Creator and controller of it, but in no sense identical with it. Dr. Calhoun indeed acknowledges that this is not his view. "Of course, if we set God over against the universe as an external factor capable of intrusion, the story will sound different, but it is far more practical to apply the term 'universe' not to our particular solar system nor yet to everything except God, but rather to the total of all that exists" (p. 47). In other words, a "practical" approach to reality demands a finite God, which, apparently, is all Dr. Calhoun is interested in having, and all he has.

Since God has been brought into the universe, Dr. Calhoun can now interpret religion as "a social attitude toward one's universe" (p. 51), and can make it to be the handmaid, the "implementation", of sociology. But it is sociology that gives us the answer to our riddles. "Sociology shows us . . . that the key to the solution of human problems lies not in unrestrained individualism or in unbridled nationalism but in world solidarity on a basis of socialization, which would take and administer all world resources and facilities on a basis of community pursuit of community ends" (p. 72). We presume that the sociologists would themselves be the world rulers who would exercise this world government whereby, in the name of religion, existence would become the community of forgotten men. In this world

order the spiritual is, in fact, to be completely cooperative in the common cause of humanity" (p. 76).

It is not strange that this "organismic" rethinking of human existence leads to some reinterpretations of Christian doctrine. Aside from occasional references to "social regeneration", there is this explanation of the atonement: "The atonement, which evangelicals are wont to couch in a forbidding formula borrowed from the law courts and the class in mathematics, becomes an artistic and valid expression of the principle of social integration, personal identification and collective salvation" (p. 124).

It would be easy to criticize this book far more than we have done. The use of Christian terminology and Scripture quotations is often deceptive. But we wish to express our appreciation of the attempt of the author to promote thinking and acting in terms of ultimate relationships. His ultimate, indeed, is not our ultimate, his God does not appear to be ours. But it is certainly true that evangelicals today have often failed to sense the wide implications of the gospel. Christian faith has significance in every realm of thought and conduct, from physics to politics, from biology to psychology. That these implications have not been worked out in any comprehensive sense suggests that the Christian community has been entirely too self-centered. In calling for a recognition of the social implications of the Christian faith, Dr. Calhoun has done real service.

Unfortunately he appears to have an inadequate understanding of what the Christian faith is. His thinking is, in spite of the use of the term "organismic", really self-centered. For it centers in the universe, and he is himself a part of that universe. To him the universe can never be objective, he can never get outside of it. He has no real authority for what he says, no adequate grounds for the criticism he levels at society.

In contrast the Christian faith starts with the self-existent God who, separate from and above the universe, which is His own creation, can and does view it objectively, and is competent to speak authoritatively concerning it, and concerning the ideals of its inhabitants. Also according to Christian faith, God has actually spoken, authoritatively, in Holy Scripture, which is thus not a record of human experience merely, but a revelation of the divine purpose and accomplishments in human history.

Central in this revelation is the declaration that the trouble with society lies not in an improper orientation of the thinking of men, but in the fact of a radical evil within the individual. Hence the corrective lies not in a re-directing of human thought, but in a supernaturally wrought regeneration of the total individual, in intellect, will and emotions. The outworking of this regenerate life is directed indeed to the coming of the

kingdom of God, but sees that kingdom not in a "social commonwealth of mutuality" (p. 102), but in the community of the believers whose destiny is the new heavens and the new earth.

One of the basic problems of philosophy has always been the problem of the one and the many. At times the emphasis has been on the importance of the individuals, the many. At other times the unity of the whole has come into prominence. But neither can stand alone. The pendulum has for years been over on the side of the many. Now it is swinging back to the side of the one, to the recognition of the unity of the whole, to organismic thinking, as Dr. Calhoun calls it.

Only within the historic Christian faith is there a view of the world and of man that gives adequate significance to both the part and the whole, to both the many and the one. The love of God is a love for the world, it is also a love for the individual. The believer is to work out his own salvation, to love his neighbor, to seek the kingdom of God, to go into all the world. But his great aim and end in all of life is not self, not even human welfare generally, but the glory of the true and living God who, being outside the universe, its Creator, Ruler and Redeemer, is alone worthy of the worship and service of His creatures.

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